State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company et al v. Peter J. Hanson, P.C. et al

Filing 37

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 29 MOTION TO COMPEL, by Judge Robert S. Lasnik. (KERR)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY and STATE
FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,

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Case No. C16-1085RSL
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION TO COMPEL

v.
PETER J. HANSON, P.C. D/B/A HANSON
CHIROPRACTIC and PETER J. HANSON,
Defendants.

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I. INTRODUCTION

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This matter comes before the Court on plaintiffs’ motion to compel better answers to their
requests for admission (Dkt. #29) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(6). For the reasons set forth
below, the Court grants the motion and plaintiffs’ request for related costs.
II. BACKGROUND

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In July 2016, plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal court alleging defendants had
submitted false, misleading, and/or fraudulent insurance claims. Dkt. #1 at 1-2, ¶1. In essence,
plaintiffs contend defendants’ care of insured patients amounted to predetermined courses of
treatment without regard for the patients’ actual needs. Dkt. #1 at 2-3, ¶¶2-4. Plaintiffs allege

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION TO COMPEL- 1

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these practices resulted in $300,000 in wrongful billings. Dkt. #1 at 3, ¶5.
In September 2016, plaintiffs served defendants with twenty-five requests for admission.

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See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36. One month later, defendants served responses in which they made no

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admissions and objected to each request. The parties conferred over the phone and via written

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correspondence.1 This motion followed.
III. DISCUSSION

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Rule 36 allows a party to ask another party to admit the truth of facts or the authenticity

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of any described documents. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1). If the receiving party elects not to admit,

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they must “specifically deny it, or state in detail why the answering party cannot truthfully admit

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or deny it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(4). The denial “must fairly respond to the matter.” Id. If a

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response “does not comply with [the] rule, the court may order either that the matter is admitted

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or that an amended answer be served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 (6).

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Plaintiffs’ requests for admission relate to a series of exhibits attached to their complaint.

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Exhibits A, D, E, and L are tables identifying certain of defendants’ patients and providing

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information relevant to plaintiffs’ legal claims. Each row represents a patient and claim number

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while each column relates to a particular identifier, like date of treatment, age, or diagnosis.

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Each request for admission asks defendants to admit that a particular column properly includes

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the relevant patients and insurance claims. Dkt. #30. If admitted, defendants would effectively

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acknowledge that a particular set of patients received a particular treatment, were billed pursuant

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to a particular code, or the like.

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Defendants have objected to plaintiffs’ requests on several grounds. Their answers to the

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requests, Dkt. #30-1, articulate nine general objections and, for each request, reproduce a

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functionally identical boilerplate specific objection. The general objections preserve various

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privileges, qualify answers as the best available to defendant as discovery and investigation

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The Court is satisfied the parties have complied with the relevant meet-and-confer
requirements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); Local Civil Rule 37(a)(1).

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION TO COMPEL- 2

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continue, insist the patients in question are inadequately identified by the exhibits in the

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complaint, and argue that federal and state health privacy laws require additional steps before

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additional disclosure. Dkt. #30-1 at 3-5. The boilerplate objection argues that the exhibits do

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not “identify patients by name or any other reasonably recognizable identifier to . . . permit

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Defendant to render a sufficient or accurate response,” that “defendant has not been afforded

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sufficient opportunity to review said production in the context of responding to these requests for

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admission,” and that the particular column’s title “is undefined and Plaintiff has provided no

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context, explanation, basis or underlying assessment for the contents of the column.” Dkt. #30-1

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at 6-29. The boilerplate objection to the requests regarding Exhibit E includes a sentence

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indicating “confidentiality concerns are heightened to the fact the discovery request involves

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minors, who may not have sufficient capacity to consent to release and disclosure of Protect [sic]

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Health Information under HIPPA [sic].” Id. at 19-27.

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In opposition to plaintiffs’ motion, defendants again argue that the requests are “entirely

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objectionable and unduly burdensome.” Dkt. #31 at 2. Defendants argue that plaintiffs’

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requests “do not seek to, nor would they if either admitted or denied, narrow the issues at trial.”

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Dkt. #31 at 3. By way of example, defendants highlight a request seeking an admission that 138

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patients were diagnosed with “fixation, spasm, tenderness, and inflammation at six spinal

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levels.” Dkt. #31 at 4. Defendants point to one of those 138 patients who, at least on one visit,

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had a treatment “objective” of “fixation, spasm, and tenderness” but not inflammation.

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Defendants argue that they cannot truthfully admit or deny whether patients like this one meet

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the request’s criteria, and that even if they could, it would require a burdensome review of all

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treatment notes for each patient. Dkt. #31 at 4-5. Even then, defendants contend the answers

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would leave plaintiffs “right where [they] started, still having to prove that the treatment

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provided to [patients] on each visit was unreasonable and unnecessary and ‘non-

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individualized.’” Dkt. #31 at 5. Defendants also characterize plaintiffs’ requests regarding the

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amount of plaintiffs’ payments to defendants as requiring a burdensome review of both approved

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION TO COMPEL- 3

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and declined bills. Dkt. #31 at 6-7.
Plaintiffs argue their requests for admission “were tailored for a simple purpose: to

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confirm the parties’ agreement or identify any dispute . . . regarding the factual accuracy of the

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medical and billing summaries” in plaintiffs’ complaint. Dkt. #34 at 2. Plaintiffs indicate they

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have offered to extend the time for defendants to respond and offered to clarify the wording of

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their requests to simplify the process of responding. Dkt. #30-2 at 8; Dkt. #30-5 at 2.

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Defendants apparently refused these offers and reiterated that responding to reworded requests

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would be equally burdensome. Dkt. #30-3 at 2-3; Dkt. #30-4 at 2; Dkt. #30-5 at 2-3.

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Plaintiffs’ briefing sheds some additional light on the nature of their requests. In reply to

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the defendants’ concern about the burdensome scope of medical records required to truthfully

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answer their request, plaintiffs insist they seek only the “initial examination report” for each

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patient. Dkt. #34 at 4. In fairness, this is not obvious from the plain language of the request for

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admission. See Dkt. #30-1 at 6. Likewise, many of plaintiffs’ requests seek admission that a

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particular column “identifies those patients that Hanson Chiropractic” identified, diagnosed, or

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treated in a certain way. See, e.g., Dkt. #30-1 at 6 (emphasis added). A technical reading of this

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wording could make that request ambiguous as to the universe of patients about which plaintiffs

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seek an admission. Last, some of the requests about x-ray imaging are also ambiguous. Dkt.

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#30-1 at 19-23. For example, one request asks defendants to admit dates on which “Hanson

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Chiropractic performed the patient’s first set of X-ray(s).” Based on the plain language, it is not

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clear whether plaintiffs are seeking information about defendants’ first set of x-rays of a

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particular patient or about whether defendants performed the first x-rays a patient had ever

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received. However, “[w]hen the purpose and significance of a request are reasonably clear,

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courts do not permit denials based on an overly-technical reading of the request.” U.S. ex rel.

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Englund v. Los Angeles County, 235 F.R.D. 675, 684 (E.D. Cal. 2006). Regardless of whether

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defendants adopted a technical reading, their objection is not persuasive in light of their

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declining plaintiffs’ counsel’s offer to clarify the requests. Dkt. #30-3 at 2-3; Dkt. #30-4 at 2.

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION TO COMPEL- 4

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District courts have broad discretion in controlling discovery. Little v. City of Seattle,

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863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants do not seem to have complied with Local Civil

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Rule 26(f)’s instruction to “promote the just, efficient, speedy, and economical determination” of

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the action. The shortcomings of plaintiffs’ requests could have and should have been remedied

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between the parties. Defendants’ abandonment of certain objections likewise fails to engender a

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perception of good faith. Last, defendants have not explained why reviewing their own medical

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and accounting records is overly burdensome. See Watkins v. Infosys, C14-247JCC, 2015 WL

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1424107 (W.D. Wash. March 27, 2015) (holding a party resisting a request for admission has a

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“‘heavy burden’ of establishing that written discovery should be denied”). Neither the parties

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nor the Court benefits from protracted discovery litigation. While the Court may construe future

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improper responses to Rule 36 requests as admissions, see Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 669

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F.2d 1242, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 1981), the Court hopes the parties can resolve this and other

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discovery matters collaboratively.
IV. COSTS

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Plaintiffs’ motion includes a request for attorney’s fees pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A).

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Dkt. #29 at 14. If a motion to compel is granted, the Court “must, after giving an opportunity to

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be heard, require the party . . . whose conduct necessitated the motion . . . to pay the movant’s

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reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Expenses are

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justified when a party objects improperly to a request for admission without substantial

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justification provided the moving party attempted in good faith to obtain the disclosure without

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court action and the award of expenses is not unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i)-(iii). The

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Court concludes an award of reasonable expenses is justified.

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V. CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion (Dkt. #29) is GRANTED. Defendants’

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answers to the requests for admission are STRICKEN. Defendants are ordered to serve

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amended answers to plaintiffs’ requests within thirty days from the date of this order. If

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION TO COMPEL- 5

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necessary, the parties should confer in good faith so that plaintiffs can revise the wording of their

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requests to clarify the information sought. Plaintiffs are ordered to submit a statement of

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reasonable expenses incurred in making this motion within fourteen days of the date of this

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order.

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Dated this 7th day of March, 2017.

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A
Robert S. Lasnik

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United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION TO COMPEL- 6