LHF Productions Inc v. Doe 1 et al
Filing
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ORDER granting dft Jose Sosa's 18 Motion to Dismiss by Judge Ricardo S Martinez.(RS) cc Amy Johnston, no address provided for dft Jose Sosa
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
Plaintiff,
v.
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Case No. C16-1273 RSM
LHF PRODUCTIONS, INC.,
DOE 1, et al.,
Defendants.
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I.
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INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Jose Sosa’s unopposed Motion to
Dismiss. Dkt. #18. For the reasons discussed herein, Mr. Sosa’s motion is GRANTED.
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II.
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BACKGROUND
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Plaintiff LHF Producutions, Inc. (“LHF”) filed an Amended Complaint identifying
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Mr. Sosa as one of several Doe Defendants on November 11, 2016. Dkt. #10 ¶ 19. According to
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LHF, Mr. Sosa, along with thirteen other named defendants, unlawfully infringed, in violation of
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17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., its exclusive copyright to the motion picture London Has Fallen.
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Id. ¶ 10. More specifically, LHF contends that Mr. Sosa copied and distributed its film over the
Internet through a peer-to-peer network using the BitTorrent protocol. Id. ¶¶ 1, 17-30. Mr. Sosa
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS— 1
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was named in the Amended Complaint because, given the unique identifier associated with a
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particular digital copy of London Has Fallen, along with the timeframe when the internet
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protocol (“IP”) address associated with Mr. Sosa accessed that unique identifier, LHF alleges
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Mr. Sosa was part of the same “swarm” of users that reproduced, distributed, displayed, and/or
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performed its copyrighted work. Id. ¶¶ 10, 30-36, 46. LHF seeks injunctive relief, statutory
damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and any further relief deemed proper by the Court. Id. at 15.
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Mr. Sosa disputes LHF’s allegations, and now moves to dismiss the action against him.
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See Dkt. #18. In support of his motion, Mr. Sosa argues that “[a]n IP address is not a reliable or
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legitimate form of identification of [a] person.” Id. at 1. Mr. Sosa also contends that LHF has
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not presented any proof that Mr. Sosa either owned or used the IP address LHF now attributes to
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him, and that LHF “is without a[] verified infringer.” Id. Additionally, Mr. Sosa explains that he
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has complied with LHF’s request for voluntary cooperation by reviewing the computers in his
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home, speaking with his children, and by changing his computer and internet passwords. Id. In
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essence, Mr. Sosa argues that LHF fails to state a “plausible” ground for relief.
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Notably, LHF did not respond to Mr. Sosa’s motion. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule
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7(b)(2), the Court may construe a party’s failure to file an opposition to a motion “as an
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admission that the motion has merit.” Consequently, the Court construes LHF’s failure to
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oppose the motion as an admission that Mr. Sosa’s motion has merit.
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III.
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LEGAL STANDARD
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To survive dismissal, complaints “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
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to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
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(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial plausibility can
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be established if a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS— 2
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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While complaints do not
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need to provide detailed factual allegations, they must offer “more than labels and conclusions”
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and contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly,
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550 U.S. at 555. If the complaint does not state a cognizable legal theory, or fails to provide
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sufficient facts to support a claim, dismissal is appropriate. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir.1984).
IV.
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DISCUSSION
LHF fails to adequately allege a copyright infringement claim against Mr. Sosa. Where
plaintiffs claiming violations of the Copyright Act do not provide specific facts linking a named
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defendant to an alleged infringement, courts have found that claims for copyright infringement
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are not adequately alleged. E.g., Cobbler Nevada, LLC v. Gonzalez, Case No. 3:15-cv-00866-
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SB, 2016 WL 3392368, at *6 (D. Or. June 8, 2016) (slip copy) (finding that plaintiff did not
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plead sufficient facts to support Copyright Act claims where specific facts tying defendant to
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alleged infringement were not alleged); also Elf-Man, LLC v. Cariveau, No. C13-0507RSL,
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2014 WL 202096, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 204) (motion to dismiss granted where plaintiff
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did not offer facts, aside from allegation that defendant paid for internet access, to support
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allegation that defendant participated in BitTorrent “swarm”). Here, LHF relies on one fact, that
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Mr. Sosa was assigned a particular IP address, to assert that Mr. Sosa was personally involved in
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a BitTorrent “swarm.” See Dkt. #10 ¶ 19. However, “the allegation that an IP address is
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registered to an individual is, alone, insufficient to support a claim that the Internet subscriber is
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guilty of infringement.” E.g., Dallas Buyers Club, LLC v. Doughty, Civ. No. 3:15-cv-00176-AC,
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2016 WL 1690090, at *6 (D. Or. April 27, 2016) (slip copy).
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LHF has not alleged any facts that link Mr. Sosa to the infringing conduct alleged, and
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS— 3
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while it is possible that Mr. Sosa participated in the BitTorrent “swarm,” it is also possible that
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someone else with access to Mr. Sosa’s IP address is the actual infringer. As noted by the Ninth
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Circuit in In re Century Aluminum Co. Securities Litigation, parties must allege something more,
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“such as facts tending to exclude the possibility that [an] alternative explanation is true,” when
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“faced with two possible explanations, only one of which can be true and only one of which
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results in liability.” 729 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2013). Because LHF has not plead sufficient
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facts to support its allegations, its claim against Mr. Sosa warrants dismissal. Accordingly,
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Mr. Sosa’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.1
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V.
CONCLUSION
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The Court, having reviewed the relevant pleadings and the remainder of the record,
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hereby GRANTS Mr. Sosa’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #18).
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Dated this 23rd day of February 2017.
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A
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RICARDO S. MARTINEZ
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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As part of his Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Sosa appears to request relief from a deadline. Dkt. #18
at 1. Because the Court grants Mr. Sosa’s motion to dismiss, his request is STRICKEN as moot.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS— 4
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