Yellowowl-Burdeau et al v. City of Tukwila et al

Filing 14

ORDER denying defendants' 8 Motion to Dismiss by Judge Richard A Jones.(RS)

THE HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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LUIS YELLOWOWL-BURDEAU,
No. 2:16-cv-01632-RAJ

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Plaintiff,
ORDER

v.
CITY OF TUKWILA, d/b/a TUKWILA
POLICE DEPARTMENT, a local
governmental entity, JAMES
STURGILL, an individual, and MIKE
BOEHMER, an individual,

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Defendants.

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This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Dkt.

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# 8. Plaintiff opposes the motion. Dkt. # 11. For the reasons that follow, the Court

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DENIES the motion.

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I.

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On October 13, 2012, a Tukwila Police Department K-9, Gino, bit Plaintiff’s

BACKGROUND

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leg while two officers, James Sturgill and Mike Boehmer, tackled Plaintiff and

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unleashed pepper spray. Dkt. # 1-1 (Amended Complaint) at ¶ 2.1. Plaintiff

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sustained serious and permanent injuries due to the dog bite. Id. at ¶ 2.16. On

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November 9, 2015, Plaintiff sued the City of Tukwila (“City”) in King County

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Superior Court, alleging that its officers used excessive force during the arrest.

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In September 2016, Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint by adding
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Officers Sturgill and Boehmer as individual defendants. Dkt. # 12 at 4. The City

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opposed Plaintiff’s motion, arguing that the statute of limitations barred Plaintiff

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from suing the individual officers. Id. at 17. The state court ruled in Plaintiff’s

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favor. Id. at 41. Defendants removed to this Court and now seek to reargue the

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statute of limitations issue.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD

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Rule 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a

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claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The rule requires the court to assume the truth of the

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complaint’s factual allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising from

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those allegations. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). A court

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“need not accept as true conclusory allegations that are contradicted by documents

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referred to in the complaint.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519

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F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must point to factual allegations that

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“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

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U.S. 544, 570 (2007). If the plaintiff succeeds, the complaint avoids dismissal if

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there is “any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint” that would

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entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 563; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

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A court typically cannot consider evidence beyond the four corners of the

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complaint, although it may rely on a document to which the complaint refers if the

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document is central to the party’s claims and its authenticity is not in question.

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Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). A court may also consider

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evidence subject to judicial notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th

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Cir. 2003).

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III.

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A. Collateral Estoppel

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Plaintiff argues that Defendants are collaterally estopped from seeking

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DISCUSSION

dismissal of the individual officers. Dkt. # 11 at 4. Defendants respond that

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collateral estoppel is not applicable because the issues presented to the state court

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are not identical to the issues presented to this Court, the officers lack privity with

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the City, the officers were not afforded a full opportunity to litigate this issue to the

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state court, and applying the doctrine would be unjust. Dkt. # 8 at 6-9.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents a party from relitigating an

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issue on which a court has already ruled. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).

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In determining the preclusive effect of a prior state court judgment, federal courts

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apply the collateral estoppel rules of the state that rendered the underlying judgment.

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See 29 U.S.C. § 1738 (“Full Faith and Credit Act”); Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist.

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Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); Everett v. Perez, 78 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1136 (E.D.

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Wash. 1999). In this case, a Washington state court ruled on whether Plaintiff could

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amend his complaint to add the individual officers as defendants, and therefore this

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Court will abide by Washington rules regarding collateral estoppel. Everett, 78

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F.Supp.2d at 1136.
Under Washington law, a party may not relitigate an issue after the party

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against whom the doctrine is applied has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his

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or her case. Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 852 P.2d 295, 300 (Wash. 1993). Before

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a court may apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the moving party must prove

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that:

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(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be

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identical with the one presented in the second; (2) the prior

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adjudication must have ended in a final judgment on the

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merits; (3) the party against whom the plea of collateral

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estoppel is asserted must have been a party or in privity

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with a party to the prior litigation; and (4) application of

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the doctrine must not work an injustice.

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In re Moi, 360 P.3d 811, 813 (Wash. 2015), as amended (Jan. 25, 2017), cert. denied

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sub nom. Washington v. Moi, 137 S. Ct. 566 (2016). Defendants concede that the

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state court judgment constitutes a final judgment; therefore, the Court need only

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analyze the three remaining elements.

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1. Identical Issues
Courts may look to the Restatement of Judgments for guidance in

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determining whether an issue in the prior adjudication is identical to an issue in the

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subsequent proceeding. The Restatement identifies four factors for courts to

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consider:

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(1) is there a substantial overlap between the evidence or

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argument to be advanced in the second proceeding and

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that advanced in the first?

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(2) does the new evidence or argument involve the

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application of the same rule of law as that involved in the

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prior proceeding?

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(3) could pretrial preparation and discovery related to the

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matter presented in the first action reasonably be expected

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to have embraced the matter sought to be presented in the

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second?

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(4) how closely related are the claims involved in the two

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proceedings?

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Kamilche Co. v. United States, 53 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1995), opinion amended

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on reh'g sub nom. Kamilche v. United States, 75 F.3d 1391 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing

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the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27); see also Lopez-Vasquez v. Dep’t of

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Labor & Indus. of St. of Wash., 276 P.3d 354, 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).

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In the prior state court proceeding, the City argued that the statute of

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limitations barred Plaintiff from suing the individual officers. Dkt. # 12 at 17-25.

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The City alluded to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), stating that the “claims

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against officers Sturgill and Boehmer would not relate back to the original

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complaint.” Id. at 22. After reviewing the arguments in opposition to Plaintiff’s

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motion to amend, the state court granted the motion to amend and allowed Plaintiff

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to add the individual officers to his complaint. Id. at 41-42.

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In their current motion, Defendants argue that the “applicable statute of

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limitations has expired” and “[r]elation-back does not breathe life into Plaintiff’s

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expired claims.” Dkt. # 8 at 3. This is the identical issue that the City addressed in

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its opposition to Plaintiff’s prior motion to amend. Moreover, Defendants did not

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require additional evidence to advance their current argument than the City required

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when it previously brought this argument. Indeed, the evidence and some of the

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case law presented in the instant motion substantially overlap with what the City

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presented in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the

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issue decided in state court is identical to the issue presented in the current motion.

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2. Privity of parties

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Courts generally “view different defendants between suits as the same party

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as long as they are in privity.” Kuhlman v. Thomas, 897 P.2d 365, 368 (Wash. Ct.

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App. 1995). Many courts “have concluded that, in general, the employer/employee

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relationship is sufficient to establish privity.” Id. This is especially true when a suit

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against an employer is based upon actions of its employees. Id. at 368-69 (“The suit

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against SHA was therefore essentially a suit against its employees. That is to say,

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whether SHA violated Kuhlman’s rights turned on the propriety of its employees

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conduct.”). Privity may also exist where the initial party “adequately represented the

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nonparty’s interests in the prior proceeding.” Stevens County v. Futurewise, 192

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P.3d 1, 6 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).

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Officers Boehmer and Sturgill are employees of the City and it is their

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actions, in part, that prompted Plaintiff to file this lawsuit. Indeed, Plaintiff brought

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a vicarious liability claim against the City for the actions of these officers. Dkt. # 1-

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1 at ¶ 8.1. Moreover, the City adequately represented the officers’ interests when it

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opposed Plaintiff’s prior motion to amend. The City raised the same arguments in

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its opposition that Defendants raise here; specifically, the City argued that the statute

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of limitations had run and therefore Plaintiff was barred from suing the individual

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officers. It does not appear to this Court that the City failed to properly represent the

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interests of the officers in the prior proceeding. As such, the Court finds privity

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between the individual officers and the City.

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3. Whether applying the doctrine will work an injustice
“‘[I]njustice’ means more than that the prior decision was wrong.” State

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Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Avery, 57 P.3d 300, 304 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). To

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analyze whether an injustice will occur, the Court looks to whether the party against

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whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in

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the prior proceeding. Nielson By & Through Nielson v. Spanaway Gen. Med. Clinic,

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Inc., 956 P.2d 312, 317 (Wash. 1998).

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Defendants argue that applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel will work

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an injustice to the individual officers. Defendants claim that, though they argued the

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issue of whether Plaintiff’s amendment would relate back to the original complaint,

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this was not actually the focus of the prior proceeding. Defendants appear to fault

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the state court for its summary order granting Plaintiff’s motion to amend;

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Defendants find that the state court did not expressly address the relation-back issue

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and therefore there is room for this Court to make a decision on the merits. The

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Court is not persuaded.

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In order for the state court to have allowed Plaintiff to sue the individual

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officers, it would necessarily have analyzed whether the claims against the officers

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could relate back to the original date of the complaint. This Court need not assume

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otherwise. Moreover, Defendants claim that they were not offered a chance to fully

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litigate the relation-back issue, yet they did not present substantially new legal

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arguments or factual evidence in this Motion that they failed to present in prior

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briefing. Allowing Defendants to reargue the issue would grant them a second bite

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of the apple. Accordingly, the Court finds that applying the doctrine of collateral

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estoppel does not work an injustice in this context.

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IV.

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For all the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to

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CONCLUSION

dismiss the individual officers. Dkt. # 8.

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Dated this 3rd day of May, 2017.

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A

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The Honorable Richard A. Jones
United States District Judge

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ORDER - 7