Head v. Disttech, Inc et al

Filing 36

ORDER granting Defendants' 26 Motion for Protective Order, by Judge Ricardo S Martinez. (SWT)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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ROMERO HEAD, as the court-appointed
Personal Representative of the Estate of
ROMEO A. HEAD,

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Plaintiff,

CASE NO. C16-1727 RSM
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER

v.
DISTTECH, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

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I.

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants DistTech LLC (“DistTech”) and

18 Jacques Wright’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion for Protective Order. Dkt. #26. For the
19 reasons stated herein, the Court agrees with Defendants and GRANTS their Motion.
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II.

BACKGROUND

The background facts in this matter have been summarized by the Court’s Order

22 Granting Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. #29) and are incorporated
23 by reference. In that Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant DistTech
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 1

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for negligent hiring, retention, entrustment, supervision, and training. Dkt. #29. However,
while that Motion was still pending and before the Court issued its Order, Plaintiff propounded
certain discovery requests that relate directly to the dismissed claims. See Dkts. #26-1 and #262. On February 23, 2017, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Protective Order. Dkt. #26.
This Motion was properly noted for consideration on March 3, 2017. Id. Plaintiff’s response
to this Motion was due on March 1, 2017. See LCR 7(d)(2). Seeing no response brief,
Defendants filed a Reply in support of their Motion on March 3, 2017. Dkt. #30. On March 6,
2017, Plaintiff filed a purported Response without leave from the Court. Dkt. #31.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance
of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to
relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “District courts have broad discretion in determining
relevancy for discovery purposes.” Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635

17 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Seiter v.
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Yokohama Tire Corp., 2009 WL 2461000, *1 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (“The decision to issue a
protective order rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.”). This Court has the

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authority to “issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,

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oppression, or undue burden or expense…” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).

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IV.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue in the instant Motion, filed before the Court’s Order dismissing certain
of Plaintiff’s claims, that Plaintiff should not be allowed to pursue discovery related to those

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 2

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claims. See Dkt. #26. Defendants attach some of Plaintiff’s discovery requests seeking, e.g.,
information related to “training and education… provided by or on behalf of [DistTech] to
Jacques A. Wright at any time,” and “documents related to your recruiting and hiring of Jacques
A. Wright.” Dkt. #26-1 at 2. Defendants argue that “many” of these discovery requests “relate
directly to the redundant negligence claims at issue.” Dkt. #26 at 2. However, Defendants stop
short of explicitly requesting that all of the attached discovery requests be barred under a
proposed protective order. See Dkts. #26 and #26-3 (Defendants’ proposed protective order).
Plaintiff failed to file a timely response to the instant Motion. Plaintiff’s purported
Response (Dkt. #31) was filed without prior leave from the Court and fails to acknowledge the
timing issue. Plaintiff’ “does not dispute that some Protective Order should be issued by the
Court,” but argues that such an order should not preclude Plaintiff’s discovery on Defendant
Wright’s “driver qualification file, training file, discipline file (if any) and DisTech LLC
Policies, Procedures, Guidelines and Safe Driver requirements.” Dkt. # 31 at 2. Although the
Court is entitled to ignore this brief, the Court has reviewed it and concluded it would not have
changed the Court’s decision below.
Given the Court’s prior Order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims at issue, it is clear that

17 discovery requests that relate solely to those claims should be barred as irrelevant. See Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Plaintiff appears to agree. The Court will thus grant Defendants’ requested
relief and issue a protective order barring Plaintiff from seeking discovery related to Plaintiff’s

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now-dismissed negligent hiring, training, retention, supervision and entrustment claims. It is not

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properly before the Court whether Defendant Wright’s “driver qualification file, training file,

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discipline file (if any) and DisTech LLC Policies, Procedures, Guidelines and Safe Driver
requirements” are properly relevant to Plaintiff’s remaining negligence claim. The Court trusts
the parties and their counsel can adequately resolve this question without the Court’s assistance.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 3

V.

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For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Protective

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CONCLUSION

Order (Dkt. #26) and hereby orders that Plaintiff may not propound discovery regarding
Plaintiff’s now-dismissed negligent hiring, training, retention, supervision and entrustment
claims.
DATED this 7th day of April 2017.

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A

RICARDO S. MARTINEZ
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 4