Sumanti v. Lashway et al

Filing 51

ORDER granting Plaintiff's 46 Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, signed by Judge Richard A. Jones. (SWT)

1

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES

2
3
4
5
6
7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

8
9
10

BEVERLY SUMANTI,

11

Plaintiff,

12

14
15
16

ORDER

v.

13

CASE NO. C17-80 RAJ

CHERYL STRANGE, in her official
capacity as Secretary of the
Washington State Department of
Social and Health Services; DAVID
RICHARDS,

17

Defendants.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to amend judgment.
Dkt. # 46. For separate reasons, Defendants agree that the Court should amend the
judgment. Dkt. # 47. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the motion.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Court outlined the relevant facts of this case in its prior Order and will not
reiterate those facts here. See Dkt. # 44. However, in that Order, the Court failed to
address Defendant David Richards’s qualified immunity defense. See Dkt. # 27. Both

26
27

ORDER- 1

1 parties find error in the absence of this analysis and move the Court to amend its Order to
2 address the qualified immunity defense.
3

II.

4

Rule 59(e) allows a plaintiff to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment “no later

LEGAL STANDARD

5 than 28 days after the entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 59(e). Although a district
6 court may extend filing times for good cause, Rule 6(b)(2) expressly prohibits the court
7 from extending time to act under Rule 59(e). Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 6(b)(2). A rule 59(e)
8 motion “‘should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district
9 court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is
10 an intervening change in the controlling law.’” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253,
11 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th
12 Cir. 1999)) (emphasis in original).
13

III.

14

A. Qualified Immunity

15

Government officials are generally entitled to qualified immunity when

DISCUSSION

16 performing discretionary functions “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
17 established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
18 known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Anderson v.
19 Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). Whether the officials are entitled to qualified
20 immunity depends on (1) whether the facts that the plaintiffs have alleged or shown make
21 out a constitutional violation and, (2) if so, whether the constitutional right at issue was
22 clearly established at the time of the violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
23 (2001); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (finding that courts may
24 use their “discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
25 analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at
26 hand.”). A “clearly established” right “must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
27

ORDER- 2

1 official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson, 483 U.S.
2 at 640.
3

Here, even if there were a due process right at issue, that right was not clearly

4 established with regard to Mr. Richards. Mr. Richards approved the investigation and
5 signed the findings letter. There is no evidence that Mr. Richards knew that Plaintiff
6 would not respond to or appeal the finding. Plaintiff makes leaps—unsupported by
7 relevant case law—to land at the conclusion that Mr. Richards was somehow on notice
8 that his actions would directly impact Plaintiff’s employment or result in automatic
9 deprivation.
10

Plaintiff’s overreliance on Chalkboard is misplaced. There, the defendants failed

11 to follow specific legislation that addressed how the Department of Health Services must
12 act when dealing with conditions that present possibilities of serious harm to children.
13 Chalkboard, Inc. v. Brandt, et al., 902 F.2d 1375, 1382 (9th Cir. 1989). In failing to
14 follow the statute, defendants in Chalkboard did not provide the proper notice to the
15 plaintiff. Id. This is immediately distinguishable from the facts of the instant case, in
16 which Mr. Richards followed the correct protocol. For these reasons, the Court finds that
17 Mr. Richards is entitled to qualified immunity and therefore dismisses the claim for
18 monetary damages against him.
19

B. Standing

20

The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to the extent she seeks reconsideration of the

21 Court’s standing analysis. Plaintiff does not raise new evidence or show clear error on
22 behalf of the Court. Instead, she reasserts her arguments in favor of standing. Mere
23 disagreement with the Court is not enough to grant her relief under Rule 59(e).
24

IV.

25

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to alter or

CONCLUSION

26 amend the judgment to the extent that the Court erred in not addressing Mr. Richards’
27

ORDER- 3

1 qualified immunity defense. Dkt. # 46. The Court dismisses the claim for monetary
2 damages against Mr. Richards.
3
4

Dated this 5th day of June, 2018.

5

A

6
7

The Honorable Richard A. Jones
United States District Judge

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

ORDER- 4