Hill v. Value Inn 22246

Filing 26

ORDER dismissing 24 Amended Complaint; denying Plaintiff's pending motions 20 , 21 , 22 and 25 ; striking as improperly filed 19 Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff is directed to file a second amended complaint no later than 4/12/2017. Signed by Judge James L. Robart. (swt) (cc: Plaintiff via USPS)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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ANTHONY D. HILL,

CASE NO. C17-0087JLR
ORDER DISMISSING
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
DENYING PENDING MOTIONS

Plaintiff,

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v.
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CITY OF DES MOINES, et al.,
Defendants.

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I.

INTRODUCTION

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Before the court are pro se Plaintiff Anthony D. Hill’s amended complaint against

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Defendants City of Des Moines (“the City”), South Correctional Entity (“SCORE”), and

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“Roving Guard 9[:]05 [p.m.] S-6 SCORE system” (“Roving Guard”) (collectively,

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“Defendants”) (FAC (Dkt. # 24)) and four motions for various forms of relief (1st Mot.

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(Dkt. # 20); 2d Mot. (Dkt. # 21); 3d Mot. (Dkt. # 22); 4th Mot. (Dkt. # 25)). Mr. Hill is

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proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (IFP Order (Dkt. # 3).) The court has considered

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Mr. Hill’s amended complaint and filings, the relevant portions of the record, and the

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applicable law. Being fully advised, the court DISMISSES Mr. Hill’s amended

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complaint with leave to amend and DENIES his pending motions.

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II.

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BACKGROUND

On January 23, 2017, Mr. Hill filed a motion for leave to proceed IFP (IFP Mot.

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(Dkt. # 1)) along with a proposed complaint (Prop. Compl. (Dkt. # 1-1)). On January 27,

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2017, Magistrate Judge James P. Donohue granted Mr. Hill’s IFP motion, and Mr. Hill’s

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complaint was filed on the court’s docket the same day. (IFP Order; Compl. (Dkt. # 4).)

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In his order, Magistrate Judge Donohue recommended that the court review Mr. Hill’s

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complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (IFP Order at 1.)

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The court undertook the recommended review and determined that Mr. Hill’s

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complaint was frivolous and failed to state a claim. (See 2/3/17 Order (Dkt. # 11) at 3.)

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Although Mr. Hill’s complaint was difficult to follow, the court determined that Mr.

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Hill’s allegations appeared to stem from Mr. Hill’s eviction from a hotel where he had

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been renting a room. (See id. at 2.) The court concluded that Mr. Hill had not stated a

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basis for the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and that the court could not determine

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what claims Mr. Hill attempted to assert or identify facts in Mr. Hill’s complaint from

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which the court could reasonably infer then-defendant Value Inn 22246’s (“Value Inn”)

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liability to Mr. Hill. (Id. at 4-5.) For these reasons, the court dismissed Mr. Hill’s

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complaint with leave to amend. (Id. at 1.)

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On February 16, 2017, Mr. Hill moved to extend the deadline to file his amended

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complaint and for the appointment of counsel. (See MTE (Dkt. # 16); MAC (Dkt. # 17).)

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The court declined to appoint counsel, granted Mr. Hill’s request for an extension, and

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ordered that any amended complaint be filed no later than March 9, 2017.1 (2/23/17

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Order (Dkt. # 18) at 2.) On March 7, 2017, Mr. Hill filed an amended complaint.2 (See

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FAC.) The court now evaluates Mr. Hill’s amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915 and his four pending motions.

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III.

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A.

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ANALYSIS

Mr. Hill’s Amended Complaint
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) requires a district court to dismiss a claim filed

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IFP if the court determines “at any time” that the action (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2)

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fails to state a claim, or (3) seeks relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

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See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court concludes that Mr. Hill’s amended complaint

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fails to state a claim. However, the court cannot conclude that it is impossible for Mr.

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The court denied without prejudice Mr. Hill’s motion to appoint counsel because
without an operative complaint to review, the court could not perform the necessary screening to
determine that “based on the face of the complaint and case records . . . the case is not frivolous.”
(Id.) The court also concluded that Mr. Hill had not shown extraordinary circumstances
otherwise warranting appointment of counsel. (See id.) The court stated that if Mr. Hill timely
filed an amended complaint that satisfied the pleading requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, he
could re-file a motion to appoint counsel. (Id. at 3.) Mr. Hill has not done so. (See generally
Dkt.)
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The next day, Mr. Hill filed a second amended complaint against Des Moines Municipal
Judge Lisa Leon and the City. (See SAC (Dkt. # 19).) The court DIRECTS the Clerk to strike
that filing because Mr. Hill did not seek the court’s leave to file a second amended complaint.
(See generally Dkt.) Moreover, Mr. Hill’s purported second amended complaint is frivolous and
fails to state a claim. Specifically, Mr. Hill alleges facts related to Judge Leon’s performance of
her judicial functions. (Id. at 1 (“[Judge] Lisa Leon previously bound over trespass 1st
degree . . . .”).) Accordingly, the doctrine of judicial immunity bars Mr. Hill’s claim against
Judge Leon. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d
1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). In addition, Mr. Hill fails to allege any facts against the
City from which the court can reasonably infer liability. (See generally SAC.)

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Hill to cure the defects in his amended complaint and grants him leave to amend the

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complaint in the manner described below.

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1. The Allegations

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Mr. Hill’s amended complaint names the City of Des Moines, SCORE jail, and

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Roving Guard as defendants.3 (See FAC at 1.) Mr. Hill’s allegations are once again

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difficult to follow, but Mr. Hill appears to allege that after he attempted to retrieve his

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property from Value Inn—the defendant named in Mr. Hill’s original complaint—City of

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Des Moines police officers arrested Mr. Hill for trespass (id. at 2, 4) and that he is

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currently being held in King County’s SCORE jail facility (see generally id.). He alleges

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that he “feel[s his] life is in jeopardy and believe[s that he is] being held illegally . . . and

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threatened daily.” (Id. at 1.) He further asserts that he has “written over 70 grievances”

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while at SCORE and that he was “recently falsely arrested.” (Id. at 2.) As an exhibit to

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his complaint, Mr. Hill includes a declaration apparently from another SCORE inmate.

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(Id. at 3 (“Ex. A-1”).) That declaration includes allegations that SCORE is withholding

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Mr. Hill’s HIV medication. (Id.)

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2. The Claims

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Liberally construing these allegations, it appears that Mr. Hill attempts to assert

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two claims against Defendants: (1) false arrest, and (2) deliberate indifference to Mr.

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Although it is a single filing, Mr. Hill labels his amended complaint as two parts:
Complaint I and Complaint II. (See FAC at 1-2.) Because the court has a duty to liberally
construe Mr. Hill’s filings, the court construes the filing as a single complaint.

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Hill’s medical needs. Mr. Hill’s factual allegations, however, are insufficient to support a

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plausible inference that he is entitled to relief on either of these claims.

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a. False Arrest
“A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the

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Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other

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justification.” Dubner v. City & Cty. of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001). To

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prove a claim for false arrest or improper seizure of a person under Section 1983, a

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plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant lacked a warrant or probable cause to

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arrest the plaintiff, and (2) the defendant actually arrested the plaintiff. Hernandez v. Cty.

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of Marin, No. C 11-03085, 2012 WL 1207231, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2012) (citing

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Cabrera v. City of Hunting Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998)).

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To comply with constitutional protections, an arrest must be supported by

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probable cause. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1972). Probable cause is

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an objective standard, United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), and

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exists if “under the totality of circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent

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person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the defendant] had

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committed a crime,” Grant v. City of Long Beach, 315 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Stated another way, probable cause to arrest exists when the officer has knowledge or

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reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to

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believe that an offense has been or is being committed.4 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91

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(1964).

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To impose liability on a local governmental entity—such as a city or jail—under

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Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional

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right, (2) the local government entity has a policy, (3) the policy amounts to deliberate

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indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right, and (4) the policy is the moving force

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behind the constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436

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U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Mabe v. San Bernardino Cty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d

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1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001).

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The court can reasonably infer from Mr. Hill’s complaint that he was actually

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arrested (see FAC (stating that Mr. Hill is being held in SCORE and was arrested)), but

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Mr. Hill makes no factual allegations from which the court can reasonably infer that City

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of Des Moines police officers arrested Mr. Hill without probable cause (see generally

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id.). In addition, Mr. Hill makes no allegations that support the inference that the City,

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SCORE, or Roving Guard are liable to Mr. Hill for any such false arrest. (See generally

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Under state law, “[t]he gist of an action for false arrest or false imprisonment is the
unlawful violation of a person’s right of personal liberty or the restraint of that person without
legal authority . . . .” Bender v. City of Seattle, 664 P.2d 492, 499 (Wash. 1983); see also Youker
v. Douglas Cty., 258 P.3d 60, 68 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (“The gist of false arrest and false
imprisonment is essentially the same, viz., the unlawful violation of a person’s right of personal
liberty, and a false imprisonment occurs whenever a false arrest occurs.”).
As under federal law, the existence of “probable cause is a complete defense to an action
for false arrest and imprisonment” under state law. Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 852 P.2d 295,
301 (Wash. 1993) (citing Bender, 664 P.2d at 500); see also Youker, 258 P.3d at 69. Washington
law mirrors federal law in this regard: “The existence of probable cause is determined by an
objective standard” and “exists when the arresting officer is aware of facts or circumstances,
based on reasonably trustworthy information, sufficient to cause a reasonable officer to believe a
crime has been committed.” State v. Gaddy, 93 P.3d 872, 875 (Wash. 2004).
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id. (failing to state any basis for liability for false arrest on the part of the City, SCORE,

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or Roving Guard)); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1110-11. The court

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therefore concludes that Mr. Hill fails to state a claim for false arrest.

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b. Deliberate Indifference
An Eighth Amendment violation based on inadequate medical care requires “acts

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or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical

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needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A medical need is serious if “the

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failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the

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‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059

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(9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104), overruled on other grounds by WMX

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Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

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If a plaintiff shows a “serious medical need,” the analysis turns on the presence of

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“deliberate indifference,” which “is evidenced only when ‘the official knows of and

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disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of

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the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

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exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th

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Cir. 2002) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). The indifference to a

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prisoner’s medical needs must be substantial and is not established by “[m]ere

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‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice.’” Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622

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F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“[A]n inadvertent failure

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to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton

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infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” (internal quotation

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marks omitted)). “Prison officials violate their obligation by ‘intentionally denying or

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delaying access to medical care.’” Clement, 298 F.3d at 905 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at

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104-05).

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The declaration incorporated into Mr. Hill’s complaint states that SCORE has

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withheld Mr. Hill’s HIV medication.5 (FAC at 3.) The court liberally construes the

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allegations in this declaration as an attempt to state a claim of deliberate indifference in

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violation of the Eighth Amendment. (See id.) The court can reasonably infer from Mr.

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Hill’s filings that he has a serious medical need because he is HIV positive; however, Mr.

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Hill fails to allege sufficient facts to plausibly suggest deliberate indifference. (See

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generally id.) In addition, Mr. Hill fails to allege sufficient facts from which the court

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can reasonably infer that Defendants are liable for any such constitutional violation. (See

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generally id.); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1110-11. For these

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reasons, Mr. Hill fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.

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3. Leave to Amend

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When a court dismisses a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, the court must give the

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plaintiff leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that amendment could not cure the

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defects in the complaint. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995).

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At this time, it is not absolutely clear that Mr. Hill cannot possibly cure his complaint to

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state a claim for false arrest or deliberate indifference and that Defendants are liable on

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those claims. Accordingly, the court grants Mr. Hill leave to file a second amended

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Mr. Hill’s “motion for a hearing of protection” also states “2 days no HIV meds.” (See
3d Mot. at 1.)
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complaint. If Mr. Hill chooses to amend his complaint, the court directs Mr. Hill to pay

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close attention to the following instructions. Mr. Hill’s failure to comply with these

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instructions may lead the court to dismiss this case with prejudice.

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First, Mr. Hill’s amended complaint, if any, is due no later than April 12, 2017. If

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Mr. Hill fails to file an amended complaint by that date, the court will dismiss this action

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with prejudice. Second, Mr. Hill’s amended complaint, if any, will supersede any

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previous complaint Mr. Hill has filed. Mr. Hill may not incorporate by reference any

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portion of his previous complaints. Third, Mr. Hill’s amended complaint must include a

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short and plain statement that describes (1) the factual circumstances of the alleged harm,

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e.g., where and when it occurred; (2) the actions of each defendant that give rise to Mr.

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Hill’s claims; (3) the basis for the court’s jurisdiction; and (4) the relief Mr. Hill seeks.

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See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3). Specifically, Mr. Hill must allege facts supporting his

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false arrest and deliberate indifference claims and the plausible inference that Defendants

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are liable for Mr. Hill’s alleged harms. See supra III.A.2(a)-(b). Mr. Hill does not have

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the court’s leave to add defendants or claims to his complaint, and the court will strike

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any attempt to do so. Mr. Hill’s failure to remedy the deficiencies in his complaint may

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lead to dismissal of this case with prejudice.

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B.

Mr. Hill’s Motions

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Mr. Hill also brings four motions: (1) a “motion to dismiss citation 720242098”

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because “it is fatally flawed and illegal” (1st Mot. at 1); (2) a motion to proceed IFP (2d

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Mot.); (3) a motion “for a hearing of protection against King County Sheriff, De[s ]

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Moines, WA Police Dept, SCORE System, Value Inn [Manager] Trish, Judge Edward

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McKinnon, Tracy Kopla . . . , [Judge] Lisa Leon, et al[.], and Elizabeth Vorhey’s[,] et al.”

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(3d Mot. at 1); and (4) “a motion for a[n] order to have the [United States] marshals pick

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up” his “belongings from 22246 Pac Hwy[,] Des Moines, WA” for which Mr. Hill

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“agree[s] to pay [$]50.00” to the United States Marshals Service (4th Mot. at 1).

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The court denies Mr. Hill’s motions. His first, third, and fourth motions seek

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forms of relief that the court cannot grant Mr. Hill. (See 1st Mot.; 3d Mot.; 4th Mot.) For

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example, the court cannot dismiss the citation Mr. Hill references, which the court

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presumes arises from his arrest by Des Moines police officers. The court also cannot

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order the United States Marshal to pick up Mr. Hill’s belongings for $50.00. In addition,

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Mr. Hill’s second motion seeks the court’s leave to proceed IFP (see 2d Mot.), but Mr.

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Hill has already been granted IFP status (see IFP Order). Accordingly, Mr. Hill’s second

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request is moot, and the court denies it on that basis.

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The court notes that—in addition to his properly presented motions—Mr. Hill has

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now filed eight motions seeking relief that the court cannot grant. (See Dkt. ## 5, 6, 7, 8,

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10, 20, 22, 25.) Therefore, the court cautions Mr. Hill that it will strike from the docket

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motions seeking relief that the court cannot grant or that are patently frivolous.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court DISMISSES Mr. Hill’s amended complaint

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(Dkt. # 24) and DENIES Mr. Hill’s pending motions (Dkt. ## 20, 21, 22, 25). The court

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ORDERS Mr. Hill to file a second amended complaint, if any, no later than April 12,

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2017. The court also DIRECTS the Clerk to strike Mr. Hill’s second amended complaint

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(Dkt. # 19) as improperly filed. Finally, the court INSTRUCTS Mr. Hill to carefully

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follow the court’s instructions in this order as to any amended complaint and any future

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motions.

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Dated this 23rd day of March, 2017.

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A

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JAMES L. ROBART
United States District Judge

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