ME2 Productions Inc v. Doe 1 et al

Filing 101

ORDER granting in part and denying in part plaintiff's 79 , 81 , 83 , 85 , 87 , 89 , 91 Motions for Default Judgment; directing Clerk to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants for the amount specified in this Order. Signed by Judge Robert S. Lasnik. (SWT) (cc: Liliana Ramos via USPS)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 9 10 11 ME2 PRODUCTIONS, INC, Case No. C17-0099RSL Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART ME2’s MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT 12 13 v. 14 FAHAD BUSBAIT, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 20 21 I. INTRODUCTION This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff ME2 Productions, Inc.’s motions for default judgment against defendants Fahad Busbait (Dkt. #79), Elzie Henderson (Dkt. #81), D’Anthony Le-Greenhalgh (Dkt. #83), Carlos Hernandez (Dkt. #85), Liliana 22 Ramos (Dkt. #87), Dara Chamroeun (Dkt. #89), and Merridy Eason (Dkt. #91). Having 23 reviewed the relevant briefing and the remainder of the record, ME2’s motions for 24 25 26 27 28 default judgment are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. II. BACKGROUND The seven motions for default judgment that are the subject of this Order are just a portion of the more than eighty default judgment motions ME2 has filed in nineteen ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 1 1 cases before this Court.1 All of the cases assert the same causes of action. ME2 alleges 2 that hundreds of individual defendants unlawfully infringed its exclusive copyright to 3 the motion picture Mechanic: Resurrection, which it developed and produced, by 4 5 copying and distributing the film over the Internet through a peer-to-peer network using 6 the BitTorrent protocol. Plaintiff served internet service providers (“ISP”s) with 7 subpoenas in order to identify the alleged infringers. Amended complaints identifying 8 9 defendants by name were subsequently filed. Defendants Busbait, Henderson, Le-Greenhalgh, Hernandez, Ramos, 10 11 12 13 Chamroeun, and Eason (collectively “Defendants”) are named in the same complaint because, given the unique identifier associated with a particular digital copy of 14 Mechanic: Resurrection and the timeframe in which the internet protocol address 15 associated with each Defendant accessed that digital copy, ME2 alleges the named 16 17 Defendants were all part of the same “swarm” of users that reproduced, distributed, 18 displayed, and/or performed the copyrighted work. According to ME2, Defendants 19 directly or indirectly shared, downloaded, and distributed a single unique copy of 20 Mechanic: Resurrection that had been seeded to the torrent network at some undefined 21 22 point in the past. 23 24 25 26 27 28 See Case Nos. C16-1881RSL, C16-1882RSL, C16-1950RSL, C16-1953RSL, C16-1955RSL, C170099RSL, C17-0100RSL, C17-0181RSL, C17-0182RSL, C17-0246RSL, C17-0248RSL, C17-0250RSL, C17-0465RSL, C17-0466RSL, C17-0783RSL, C17-0893RSL, C17-1077RSL, C17-1220RSL, and C171221RSL. Two other cases, C16-1776RSL and C16-1778RSL were dismissed for failure to timely served and refiled as C17-0246RSL and C17-0248RSL, respectively. A final case, C17-694RSL, was closed in August 2017. 1 ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 2 1 Defendants did not respond to ME2’s complaint. The Clerk of Court therefore 2 entered default against Defendants at ME2’s request. See Dkts. ##55-60 and #78. ME2 3 now seeks judgment against each Defendant. 4 III. 5 DISCUSSION 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) authorizes a court to grant default 7 judgment. Prior to entering judgment in defendant’s absence, the Court must determine 8 9 whether the allegations of a plaintiff’s complaint establish his or her liability. Eitel v. 10 McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The court must accept all well-pled 11 allegations of the complaint as established fact, except allegations related to the amount 12 13 of damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987). 14 Where the alleged facts establish a defendant’s liability, the court has discretion, not an 15 obligation, to enter default judgment. Alan Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 16 17 18 19 20 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988). If plaintiff seeks an award of damages, it must provide the Court with evidence to establish the amount. TeleVideo Sys., 826 F.2d at 917-18. A. Liability Determination. The allegations in ME2’s complaint establish Defendants’ liability for direct 21 22 copyright infringement. To establish direct infringement, ME2 must demonstrate 23 ownership of a valid copyright and that Defendants copied “constituent elements of the 24 work that are original.” L.A. Printex Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 846 25 26 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 27 (1991)). Here, ME2 alleges it owns the exclusive copyright to the motion picture 28 Mechanic: Resurrection and that Defendants participated in a “swarm” to unlawfully ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 3 1 copy and/or distribute the same unique copy of Mechanic: Resurrection. These 2 allegations were established by entry of default against Defendants. Accordingly, ME2 3 has established Defendants’ liability for direct copyright infringement. 4 5 B. Default Judgment is Warranted. 6 Having established liability, plaintiff must also show that default judgment is 7 warranted. Courts often apply the factors listed in Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72, to make 8 this determination. Those factors are: 9 10 11 12 13 14 “(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.” The majority of these factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment against 15 16 Defendants. ME2 may be prejudiced without the entry of default judgment as it will be 17 left without a legal remedy. See Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enters., Inc., 725 F. 18 Supp.2d 916, 920 (C.D. Cal. 2010). ME2’s complaint sufficiently alleges a claim of 19 20 direct copyright infringement, and Defendants did not present any evidence or argument 21 to the contrary. Additionally, the Court finds there is a low probability that default against 22 Defendants was due to excusable neglect: Defendants were given ample opportunity to 23 24 respond to the filings in this matter between the time they were served with ME2’s 25 complaint and when ME2 filed its motions for default judgment. Finally, although there 26 is a strong policy favoring decisions on the merits, the Court may consider Defendants’ 27 28 ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 4 1 2 3 failure to respond to ME2’s requests for default and default judgment as admissions that the motions have merit. LCR 7(b)(2). The Court acknowledges that a dispute concerning the material facts alleged by 4 5 ME2, including the identity of the alleged infringers, could arise in this case. The Court 6 also acknowledges that the amount at stake may be significant depending on the means 7 of each Defendant. ME2 seeks enhanced statutory damages in the amount of at least 8 9 $1,500 along with attorneys’ fees in excess of $1,550 and costs in excess of $90 from 10 each individual Defendant. Notwithstanding these considerations, the Eitel factors 11 weigh in favor of granting default judgment against Defendants. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 C. Appropriate Relief. ME2 requests entry of a default judgment against each Defendant providing the following three categories of relief: (1) permanent injunctive relief; (2) statutory damages; and (3) attorney’s fees and costs. Each category is discussed below. i. Permanent Injunctive Relief Permanent injunctive relief is appropriate. Section 502(a) of Title 17 of the United States Code allows courts to “grant temporary and final injunctions on such 21 22 terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” As 23 part of a default judgment, courts may also order the destruction of all copies of a work 24 made or used in violation of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b). 25 26 Given the nature of the BitTorrent protocol and Defendants’ participation therein, the 27 Court finds Defendants possess the means to continue infringing in the future. MAI Sys. 28 Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 1993) (granting permanent ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 5 1 injunction where “liability has been established and there is a threat of continuing 2 violations.”). Consequently, the Court will issue a permanent injunction enjoining 3 Defendants from infringing ME2’s rights in Mechanic: Resurrection and directing them 4 5 6 7 8 9 to destroy all unauthorized copies of Mechanic: Resurrection. ii. Statutory Damages Plaintiff requests an award of statutory damages in the amount of at least $1,500 against each Defendant for his or her participation in the BitTorrent swarm that resulted 10 in the unauthorized download and/or distribution of the seed file containing Mechanic: 11 Resurrection. Although the actual economic damages associated with a lost video rental 12 13 are likely minimal, plaintiff correctly points out that Congress has authorized statutory 14 damages in significant amounts to compensate for difficult-to-prove downstream losses 15 and to deter future infringement. Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters Int’l, Ltd., 149 16 17 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Peer Int’l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 18 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990)). Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), the Court may award 19 statutory damages “for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one 20 work, . . . for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum 21 22 of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just.” The Court has 23 wide discretion when determining the amount of statutory damages and takes into 24 consideration the amount of money requested in relation to the seriousness of the 25 26 27 defendant’s conduct, whether large sums of money are involved, and whether “the recovery sought is proportional to the harm caused by defendant’s conduct.” Curtis v. 28 ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 6 1 2 Illumination Arts, Inc., 33 F. Supp.3d 1200, 1212 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (citing Landstar, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 921). 3 Copyright violations come in all shapes and sizes, from the unauthorized copying 4 5 of a Halloween word puzzle for a child’s party to the unauthorized manufacture and sale 6 of millions of bootleg copies of a new release. While Defendants’ alleged copyright 7 violation is of concern in that it represents a theft of intellectual property, it is a 8 9 relatively minor infraction causing relatively minor injury. ME2 has not shown that any 10 of the Defendants is responsible for the “seed” file that made ME2’s copyrighted work 11 available on the BitTorrent network, nor has ME2 presented evidence that Defendants 12 13 profited from the infringement in any way. Given the range of statutory damages 14 specified in the Copyright Act, the Court finds that an award of $750 for the swarm- 15 related infringements involved in this action is appropriate. Each of the Defendants is 16 17 jointly and severally liable for this amount. This award is in line with the awards made by other courts in the Ninth Circuit 18 19 20 and appears adequate to deter Defendants from infringing on plaintiff’s copyright in the future.2 Plaintiff argues that a significantly higher award is necessary to force people 21 22 like Defendants to appear and participate in these BitTorrent cases. Plaintiff apparently 23 wants the Court to raise the statutory damage award to an amount that is at or above the 24 anticipated costs of defending this action. A defendant may, however, decide that 25 26 27 28 ME2 has presented no evidence that Defendants will not be dissuaded from infringing in the future. The judgment entered in this case, including statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and costs, may be recovered by garnishing Defendants’ wages and/or seizing and selling their non-exempt property. This is a steep penalty for having been too lazy to go to the local Redbox or too cheap to pay a few dollars for an authorized download. Plaintiff offers no evidence to support its contention that personal liability for a judgment in excess of $500 is of no consequence to the judgment debtor. 2 ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 7 1 conceding liability through default is the best course of action given the nature of the 2 claims and the available defenses. The “punishment” for that choice is the entry of 3 default judgment and an award of damages under the governing standards. As discussed 4 5 above, those standards lead to the conclusion that the minimum statutory penalty should 6 apply in this case. Plaintiff offers no support for the proposition that participation in 7 federal litigation should be compelled by imposing draconian penalties that are out of 8 9 proportion to the harm caused by Defendants’ actions or any benefits derived therefrom. 10 Statutory damages are not intended to serve as a windfall to plaintiffs and will not be 11 used to provide such a windfall here. 12 13 14 15 16 17 The Court will award ME2 $750 in statutory damages for the infringements involved in this action, for which defendants are jointly and severally liable. iii. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Finally, ME2 asks the Court to award between $1,588.50 and $1,646.50 in 18 attorneys’ fees and between $96.00 and $136.00 in costs against each Defendant in this 19 matter. Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505, the Court “in its discretion may allow the recovery 20 of full costs by or against any party,” and “may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee 21 22 23 24 to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” The Court agrees that ME2 should be awarded attorneys’ fees. Courts consider several factors, including “(1) the degree of success obtained, (2) frivolousness, 25 26 (3) motivation, (4) objective unreasonableness (legal and factual), and (5) the need to 27 advance considerations of compensation and deterrence,” when making attorneys’ fee 28 determinations under the Copyright Act. Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir. ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 8 1 1996) (citing Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1994)). Because ME2 has 2 succeeded on its non-frivolous direct infringement claim3 and because an award would 3 advance considerations of compensation and deterrence, ME2 is entitled to attorneys’ 4 5 fees. However, despite counsel’s efforts to allocate the fees and costs to each 6 7 8 9 individual defendant, the overall fee request is problematic. Courts determine the amount of a fee award by determining a “lodestar figure,” which is obtained by 10 multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on a matter by a reasonable 11 hourly rate. Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1993). Courts 12 13 may then adjust the lodestar with reference to factors set forth in Kerr v. Screen Extras 14 Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975), to the extent those factors are not 15 already subsumed in counsel’s hourly rates or the number of hours expended on the 16 17 litigation. The relevant Kerr factors here are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the 18 novelty and difficulty of the questions; and (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal 19 services properly. 20 1. Reasonableness of Rate Requested 21 In the Ninth Circuit, the determination of a reasonable hourly rate “is not made 22 23 by reference to rates actually charged the prevailing party.” Chalmers v. City of Los 24 Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986). Instead, the reasonable hourly rate is 25 26 determined with reference to the prevailing rates charged by attorneys of comparable 27 28 Despite the entry of default, the Court specifically declines to enter judgment in plaintiff’s favor on its indirect and contributory infringement claims. 3 ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 9 1 skill and experience in the relevant community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 2 (1984). “Generally, when determining a reasonable hourly rate, the relevant community 3 is the forum in which the district court sits.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 4 5 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). Courts may also consider “rate determinations in other cases, 6 particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney” as “satisfactory evidence of 7 the prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 8 9 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990). 10 Identifying counsel’s hourly rate is more challenging than it should be. His 11 hourly rate for “normal” intellectual property cases is now $545/hour, but he has agreed 12 13 to a reduced rate of $350/hour in this case. Dkt. #79 at ¶7. In a similar BitTorrent matter 14 involving another copyright holder, counsel stated that his reduced rate was $450/hour 15 (LHF Prods., Inc. v. Acosta, C16-1175RSM, Dkt. #71 at ¶7), which is the rate he posits 16 17 is “reasonable and warranted in the Seattle area” in this case (Dkt. #79 at ¶9). The Court 18 assumes, based on the fee calculation charts set forth in counsel’s declarations, that he 19 seeks an hourly rate of $350 in this case. This hourly rate is generally within the norm 20 for BitTorrent cases in this district and is a reasonable rate for the type of formulaic 21 22 23 24 legal work performed in these matters. 2. Reasonableness of Hours Requested Turning to the reasonableness of the hours requested, plaintiff has the burden of 25 26 documenting the hours expended on this matter and establishing their reasonableness. 27 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). The Court will exclude hours that are 28 “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” and therefore not reasonably ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 10 1 expended. Id. at 434. Counsel has attempted to calculate the hours spent in connection 2 with ME2’s claims against each individual Defendant by dividing the total number of 3 hours spent on collective efforts by the total number of defendants at the time the action 4 5 was taken. Time spent working solely in pursuit of claims against an individual are 6 allocated wholly to that individual. Dkt. #79 at ¶10. Taking Busbait as an example, 7 counsel seeks compensation for the following activities: 8 Activity 9 10 Review evidence of BitTorrent activity giving rise to potential claims Prepare complaint and supporting exhibits Prepare and file motion to expedite discovery Communicate with client Review Court orders Prepare subpoena and letter to ISPs Review ISP response and prepare communications with Defendant Review Defendant’s “status and history” Prepare amended complaint and review Prepare, review, and file waivers and/or summons Review file Prepare and file motion for default Prepare and file motion for default judgment 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Total: Attorney Time Legal Assistant Time .4 hours .4 hours .4 hours .1 hours ≈ .2 hours .1 hours .1 hours .3 hours ≈ .5 hours ≈ .2 hours ≈ .1 hours ≈ .2 hours 1 hour 4 hours .3 hours .4 hours 1 hour 1.7 hours 22 23 These seemingly modest time expenditures mask the reality of counsel’s fee request. 24 Until recently, the BitTorrent cases filed in this district all proceeded in a similar 25 26 manner.4 The original complaints list Doe defendants, identified only by IP addresses, 27 28 The Honorable Thomas S. Zilly has required certain additional disclosures or proffers in BitTorrent cases pending before him. See Venice PI, LLC v. O’Leary, C17-0988TSZ, Dkt. # 32. 4 ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 11 1 and allege infringement of the client’s exclusive rights in a specified motion picture. 2 Groups of Doe defendants are named in the same complaint because they allegedly 3 infringed the same digital copy of the copyrighted material by participating in the same 4 5 BitTorrent “swarm.” The nearly identical complaints are accompanied by nearly 6 identical motions for expedited discovery. Once the Court grants leave to conduct 7 expedited discovery, subpoenas are served on the ISP associated with the addresses 8 9 identified in the log attached to the complaint as Exhibit B. Once in possession of the 10 Doe defendants’ identities, counsel attempts to obtain a settlement of the claims and 11 files amended complaints against any non-settling defendants. Service, additional 12 13 settlements, and defaults/default judgments follow, with the exception of a handful of 14 defendants who are actively litigating the cases in this district. On occasion, counsel 15 seeks an extension of time in which to serve. 16 Almost every filing in this cause of action was essentially copied from scores of 17 18 other cases filed by the same counsel.5 There is nothing wrong with utilizing form 19 documents to pursue identical infringement claims arising from identical activities. As 20 has been previously noted, however, it is wrong for ME2’s counsel to file identical 21 22 complaints and motions with the Court and then expect the Court to believe that he 23 labored over each filing. LHF Prods., C16-1175RSM, Dkt. #73 at 12. To arrive at his 24 per Defendant fee request, counsel divided time entries related to specific activities by 25 26 27 28 The one exception was when plaintiff filed an ill-fated motion to compel a response from Ramos rather than seeking entry of default. Interestingly, despite counsel’s emphatic assurance that the hours billed to each defendant accurately reflected the pro rata share of combined efforts plus time worked solely for the defaulted defendant, no additional charge is levied against Ramos for the time spent drafting the motion to compel a response. Compare Dkt. #80 at ¶9 with Dkt. #88 at ¶9. 5 ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 12 1 the number of defendants then in the case. When the relatively small time allotments set 2 forth in counsel’s declaration related to Busbait are multiplied by the number of 3 defendants, counsel is seeking compensation for an excessive number of hours. Counsel 4 5 apparently spent 10 hours studying the log of infringing transactions and IP addresses 6 that gave rise to this particular lawsuit.6 He spent another 10 hours generating a 7 complaint that is virtually identical to the complaints ME2 filed in other cases (not to 8 9 mention the scores of BitTorrent cases filed on behalf of other clients). Altering the 10 form complaint to initiate a new lawsuit is, at this point, a word processing chore: the 11 preparer checks to make sure the correct plaintiff and film are identified, changes the 12 13 number of Doe defendants in the caption, inserts the correct IP addresses in the section 14 of the complaint describing the defendants, and attaches the investigator’s log regarding 15 the relevant swarm as Exhibit B. Charging 10 hours of attorney time for this task is 16 17 unreasonable. Counsel seeks to recover fees for another 8 hours spent preparing an 18 amended complaint that was identical to the original except for the caption and the 19 correlation of the IP addresses with the subscribers’ names. 20 A form pleading and motions practice such as this simply does not take the type 21 22 of expertise or time that is normally associated with intellectual property matters. Nor 23 does it justify the number of cumulative hours that counsel seeks here. Having reviewed 24 the billing records and dockets in this and other similar matters, the Court finds that the 25 26 bulk of the “legal” work in these cases was performed and compensated years ago, that 27 28 6 This case was originally filed against twenty-five Doe defendants. ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 13 1 these actions now involve far more word processing than drafting or legal analysis, and 2 that the attorney time necessary to tailor documents to each case and/or individual is 3 minimal. The Court will award 1 hour, at an hourly rate of $350, to compensate ME2 4 5 for counsel’s time spent pursuing its claims against each named Defendant, and 1.3 6 hours, at an hourly rate of $145.00, to compensate ME2 for legal assistant time altering 7 pleadings, motions, and service documents. The Court is satisfied that an attorneys’ fee 8 9 10 of $538.50 per Defendant is reasonable and sufficient to cover the form-pleading work required by this case. 11 12 13 3. Costs ME2 requests between $196.00 and $136.00 in costs from each Defendant, 14 depending on expenses related to service. Recovery of a pro rata portion of the filing fee 15 and the individual costs associated with the third-party subpoena and service is 16 17 appropriate. 18 19 IV. CONCLUSION The Court, having reviewed the motions for default judgment and the remainder 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 of the record, finds adequate bases for default judgment. Accordingly, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS: 1. ME2’s motions for default judgment (Dkts. #79, #81, #83, #85, #87, #89, and #91) are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 2. Defendants Busbait, Henderson, Le-Greenhalgh, Hernandez, Ramos, Chamroeun, and Eason are hereby permanently enjoined infringing ME2’s exclusive rights in the motion picture film Mechanic: Resurrection, including without limitation by using the Internet to reproduce or copy Mechanic: Resurrection, to distribute Mechanic: Resurrection, or to make Mechanic: ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 14 1 Resurrection available for distribution to the public, except pursuant to lawful written license or with the express authority of ME2; 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 3. To the extent any unauthorized reproduction or copy of Mechanic: Resurrection is in Defendants’ possession or subject to their control, they are directed to destroy it; 4. Defendants are jointly and severally liable for statutory damages in the amount of $750; 5. Defendant Fahad Busbait is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $538.50 and costs in the amount of $136.00. 6. Defendant Elzie Henderson is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $538.50 and costs in the amount of $96.00. 7. Defendant D’Anthony Le-Greenhalgh is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $538.50 and costs in the amount of $96.00. 8. Defendant Carlos Hernandez is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $538.50 and costs in the amount of $136.00. 9. Defendant Liliana Ramos is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $538.50 and costs in the amount of $136.00. 10. Defendant Dara Chamroeun is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $538.50 and costs in the amount of $136.00. 11. Defendant Merridy Eason is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $538.50 and costs in the amount of $136.00. 21 22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in 23 24 25 favor of plaintiff and against defendants for the amounts specified in this Order. Dated this 9th day of August, 2018. 26 A 27 Robert S. Lasnik United States District Judge 28 ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 15

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