State of Washington, et al., v. Trump., et al

Filing 194

MOTION for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint, filed by Plaintiffs Commonwealth of Massachusetts, State of California, State of Maryland, State of New York, State of Washington, Intervenor Plaintiff State of Oregon. (Attachments: # 1 Complaint 3rd Amended, # 2 Index of Exhibits, # 3 Index of Declarations, # 4 Exhibit A, # 5 Exhibit B, # 6 Exhibit C, # 7 Exhibit D, # 8 Exhibit E, # 9 Exhibit F, # 10 Exhibit G, # 11 Exhibit H, # 12 Exhibit I, # 13 Exhibit J, # 14 Exhibit K, # 15 Exhibit L, # 16 Exhibit M, # 17 Exhibit N, # 18 Decl of Joint Former National Security Officials, # 19 Decl of Nima Ala, # 20 2nd Decl of Rabyaah Althaibani, # 21 Decl of Alireza Ayoubi, # 22 Decl of Shervin Beygi, # 23 Decl of Bahareh Bina, # 24 Decl of Ethan Devenport, # 25 Decl of Yasaman Esmaili, # 26 Decl of Mahdi Hajiaghayi, # 27 Decl of Mojdeh Jalali Heravi, # 28 Decl of Vahid Jazayeri, # 29 Decl of Mohammad Shafiei Khadem, # 30 Decl of Ahmad Moghaddam, # 31 Decl of Younes Nouri, # 32 Decl of Proshat Parsimoghadam, # 33 Decl of Emad Soroush, # 34 Decl of Tannaz Sattari Tabrizi, # 35 Decl of Seyed Danial Vaezi, # 36 Decl of Banafsheh Samareh Abolhasani, # 37 Decl of Armin Alaghi, # 38 Decl of Pegah Jalali Asheghabadi, # 39 3rd Decl of Rovy Branon, # 40 5th Decl of Asif Chaudhry, # 41 Decl of Maryam Dadkhahan, # 42 Decl of Jason Detwiler, # 43 2nd Decl of David Eaton, # 44 Decl of Kiana Ehsani, # 45 Decl of Ali Farhadi, # 46 Decl of Hoda Farhadi, # 47 Decl of Maryam Fayazi, # 48 Decl of Mohammad Ghaedi, # 49 Decl of Anne Greenbaum, # 50 Decl of Hannaneh Hajishirzi, # 51 2nd Decl of Deirdre Heatwole, # 52 Decl of Parisa Hosseinzadeh, # 53 Decl of Adam Mokhalalati, # 54 Decl of Shima Nofallah, # 55 4th Decl of Jeffrey Riedinger, # 56 Decl of Solmaz Shakerifard, # 57 Decl of Khadijeh Sheikhan, # 58 Decl of Ali Shojaie, # 59 Decl of Hema Yoganarasimhan, # 60 2nd Decl of Kathy Oline, # 61 2nd Decl of Dave Soike, # 62 2nd Decl of Rita Zawaideh, # 63 2nd Decl of Mitra Akhtari, # 64 2nd Decl of Melanie de Leon, # 65 Decl of Payam Fotouhiyehpour, # 66 2nd Decl of Marc Overbeck, # 67 2nd Decl of Sana Parsian, # 68 Decl of Sahar Z. Zangenah, # 69 2nd Decl of Dennis Galvan, # 70 Proposed Order) Noting Date 10/16/2017, (Melody, Colleen)

DECLARATION OF
JOINT FORMER
NATIONAL
SECURITY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-cv-00141-JLR

DONALD TRUMP, et al.,
Defendants.

JOINT DECLARATION OF
FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICIALS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2), we, the below named former national security officials,
hereby declare as follows:
1.

We are former national security, foreign policy, and intelligence officials in the

United States Government:
a.

Madeleine K. Albright served as Secretary of State from 1997 to 2001. A
refugee and naturalized American citizen, she served as U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations from 1993 to 1997. She has also been a
member of the Central Intelligence Agency External Advisory Board since 2009

1

and of the Defense Policy Board since 2011, in which capacities she has
received assessments of threats facing the United States.
b.

Rand Beers served as Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to the President of
the United States from 2014 to 2015.

c.

John B. Bellinger III served as the Legal Adviser for the U.S. Department of
State from 2005 to 2009. He previously served as Senior Associate Counsel to
the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council from 2001 to
2005.

d.

Daniel Benjamin served as Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism at the
U.S. Department of State from 2009 to 2012.

e.

Antony Blinken served as Deputy Secretary of State from 2015 to January 20,
2017. He previously served as Deputy National Security Advisor to the
President of the United States from 2013 to 2015.

f.

John O. Brennan served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from
2013 to 2017. He previously served as Deputy National Security Advisor for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and Assistant to the President from
2009 to 2013.

g.

R. Nicholas Burns served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from
2005 to 2008. He previously served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO and as U.S.
Ambassador to Greece.

h.

William J. Burns served as Deputy Secretary of State from 2011 to 2014. He
previously served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 2008 to
2011, as U.S. Ambassador to Russia from 2005 to 2008, as Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern Affairs from 2001 to 2005, and as U.S. Ambassador to
Jordan from 1998 to 2001.

2

i.

James Clapper served as U.S. Director of National Intelligence from 2010 to
January 20, 2017.

j.

David S. Cohen served as Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence from 2011 to 2015 and as Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency from 2015 to January 20, 2017.

k.

Eliot A. Cohen served as Counselor of the U.S. Department of State from 2007
to 2009.

l.

Bathsheba N. Crocker served as Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs from 2014 to 2017.

m.

Ryan Crocker served as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2011 to 2012, as
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq from 2007 to 2009, as U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan
from 2004 to 2007, as U.S. Ambassador to Syria from 1998 to 2001, as U.S.
Ambassador to Kuwait from 1994 to 1997, and U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon
from 1990 to 1993.

n.

Thomas Donilon served as U.S. National Security Advisor from 2010 to 2013.

o.

Jen Easterly served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for
Counterterrorism from October 2013 to December 2016.

p.

Daniel Feldman served as U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan from 2014 to 2015, Deputy U.S. Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2009 to 2014, and previously Director for
Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs at the National Security Council.

q.

Jonathan Finer served as Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State from 2015 until
January 20, 2017, and Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S.
Department of State from 2016 to January 20, 2017.

r.

Michèle Flournoy served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 2009 to
2013.

3

s.

Robert S. Ford served as U.S. Ambassador to Syria from 2011 to 2014, as
Deputy Ambassador to Iraq from 2009 to 2010, and as U.S. Ambassador to
Algeria from 2006 to 2008.

t.

Josh Geltzer served as Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the National
Security Council from 2015 to 2017. Previously, he served as Deputy Legal
Advisor to the National Security Council and as Counsel to the Assistant
Attorney General for National Security at the Department of Justice.

u.

Suzy George served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff and
Executive Secretary to the National Security Council from 2014 to 2017.

v.

Phil Gordon served as Special Assistant to the President and White House
Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf from 2013 to 2015,
and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs from 2009 to
2013.

w.

Chuck Hagel served as Secretary of Defense from 2013 to 2015, and previously
served as Co-Chair of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board. From 1997
to 2009, he served as U.S. Senator for Nebraska, and as a senior member of the
Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees.

x.

Avril D. Haines served as Deputy National Security Advisor to the President of
the United States from 2015 to January 20, 2017. From 2013 to 2015, she
served as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

y.

Luke Hartig served as Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the
National Security Council from 2014 to 2016.

z.

General (ret.) Michael V. Hayden, USAF, served as Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency from 2006 to 2009. From 1995 to 2005, he served as
Director of the National Security Agency.

4

aa.

Heather A. Higginbottom served as Deputy Secretary of State for Management
and Resources from 2013 to 2017.

bb.

Christopher R. Hill served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs from 2005 to 2009. He also served as U.S. Ambassador to
Macedonia, Poland, the Republic of Korea, and Iraq.

cc.

John F. Kerry served as Secretary of State from 2013 to January 20, 2017.

dd.

Prem Kumar served as Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa on
the National Security Council staff of the White House from 2013 to 2015.

ee.

Richard Lugar served as U.S. Senator for Indiana from 1977 to 2013, and as
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from 1985 to 1987 and
2003 to 2007, and as ranking member of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations from 2007 to 2013.

ff.

John E. McLaughlin served as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency from 2000 to 2004 and as Acting Director in 2004. His duties included
briefing President-elect Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush.

gg.

Lisa O. Monaco served as Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor from 2013 to January
20, 2017.

hh.

Cameron P. Munter served as U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan from 2009 to 2012
and to Serbia from 2007 to 2009.

ii.

James C. O’Brien served as Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs
from 2015 to January 20, 2017. He served in the U.S. Department of State from
1989 to 2001, including as Principal Deputy Director of Policy Planning and as
Special Presidential Envoy for the Balkans.

jj.

Matthew G. Olsen served as Director of the National Counterterrorism Center
from 2011 to 2014.

5

kk.

Leon E. Panetta served as Secretary of Defense from 2011 to 2013. From 2009
to 2011, he served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

ll.

Jeffrey Prescott served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director
for Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Gulf States from 2015 to 2017.

mm.

Samantha J. Power served as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations from 2013 to January 20, 2017. From 2009 to 2013, she served as
Senior Director for Multilateral and Human Rights on the National Security
Council.

nn.

Susan E. Rice served as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
from 2009 to 2013 and as National Security Advisor from 2013 to January 20,
2017.

oo.

Anne C. Richard served as Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees
and Migration from 2012 to January 20, 2017.

pp.

Kori Schake served as the Deputy Director for Policy Planning at the U.S.
Department of State from December 2007 to May 2008. Previously, she was
the director for Defense Strategy and Requirements on the National Security
Council in President George W. Bush’s first term.

qq.

Eric P. Schwartz served as Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees
and Migration from 2009 to 2011. From 1993 to 2001, he was responsible for
refugee and humanitarian issues on the National Security Council, ultimately
serving as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and
Senior Director for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs.

rr.

Wendy R. Sherman served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from
2011 to 2015.

6

ss.

Vikram Singh served as Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan from 2010 to 2011 and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Southeast Asia from 2012 to 2014.

tt.

Jeffrey H. Smith served as General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency
from 1995 to 1996. Previously, he served as General Counsel of the Senate
Armed Services Committee.

uu.

James B. Steinberg served as Deputy National Security Adviser from 1996 to
2000 and as Deputy Secretary of State from 2009 to 2011.

vv.

William Wechsler served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Special Operations
and Combating Terrorism at the U.S. Department of Defense from 2012 to
2015.

ww.

Samuel M. Witten served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Population, Refugees, and Migration from 2007 to 2010. From 2001 to 2007,
he served as Deputy Legal Adviser at the State Department.

We have collectively devoted decades to combatting the various terrorist threats that
the United States faces in a dynamic and dangerous world. We have held the highest security
clearances, and many of us were current on active intelligence regarding all credible terrorist
threat streams directed against the United States as recently as one week before the issuance of
the Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order on “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into
the United States” (“Travel Ban 1.0”). A number of us signed a declaration that was filed on
February 6, 2017 with the Ninth Circuit in this case, as an exhibit to the plaintiffs’ response to
the defendants’ motion for a stay of this court’s temporary restraining order blocking that
initial Executive Order.1 Each of us also joined an amicus brief that was filed in the Supreme

1

Joint Decl. of Madeline Albright et al., No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2017).

7

Court in support of two separate groups of plaintiffs challenging the subsequent March 6, 2017
Executive Order (“Travel Ban 2.0”).2
2.

The Administration has now replaced the Travel Ban 2.0 with a new

Proclamation titled “Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes
for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety
Threats.” The Proclamation is dated September 24, 2017, and is scheduled to take effect fully
on October 18, 2017 (“Travel Ban 3.0” or “Ban”).
3.

The Ban preserves the basic approach of the original two Orders, without

providing any persuasive evidence that these measures are necessary to enhance our national
security or foreign policy interests. The Ban includes a few new exceptions to the prior
Order, adds a couple of countries to the list (Chad, North Korea, and Venezuela) and
removes a country (Sudan). But it still relies on unprecedented and sweeping nationalitybased bans, directed at a list of almost exclusively Muslim-majority countries that is
substantially similar to the prior lists. (The North Korea and Venezuela additions will affect
exceedingly few people, and Chad is a majority-Muslim country.) The Ban blocks well over
150 million people from entering the United States.3
4.

We agree that the United States faces real threats from terrorist networks and

must take all prudent and effective steps to combat them, including the appropriate vetting of
travelers to the United States. Yet, we are unaware of any national security threat that would
justify Travel Ban 3.0. To the contrary, its enforcement would cause serious harm to the
national security and foreign policy of the United States.

2

Br. of Amici Curiae Former National Security Officials in Support of Respondents, Nos. 16-1436 and
16-1540 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Sept. 18, 2017).
3
This figure reflects the population of the listed countries in the Proclamation, excluding North Korea
and Venezuela.

8

I.

Travel Ban 3.0 Serves No Genuine National Security Purpose
5.

As a national security measure, this Ban is unnecessary. National security-

based immigration restrictions have consistently been tailored to respond to: (1) specific,
credible threats based on individualized information, (2) the best available intelligence, and (3)
thorough interagency legal and policy review. Travel Ban 3.0 rests not on such tailored
grounds, but rather, on (1) general bans (2) that are not responsive to an actual national security
threat informed by intelligence, and (3) that emerged from a January Order that was not vetted
through the kind of careful interagency legal and policy review that we would expect from a
serious national security process.
6.

The Ban is of unprecedented scope. Apart from Travel Bans 1.0 and 2.0, we

know of no case where a President has invoked his statutory authority to suspend admission for
such a broad class of people. Even after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Government did not invoke
the provisions of law cited by the Administration to broadly bar entrants based on nationality,
national origin, or religious affiliation. Suspensions were limited to particular individuals or
subclasses of nationals who posed a specific, articulable threat based on their known actions and
affiliations. In adopting Travel Ban 3.0, the Administration alleges no derogatory factual
information about any particular recipient of a visa or green card or any credible threat from
nationals of the countries banned.
7.

Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has developed a rigorous system of

security vetting, leveraging the full capabilities of the law enforcement and intelligence
communities. This vetting is applied to travelers not once, but multiple times. As government
officials, we sought continually to improve that vetting, as was done in response to particular
threats identified by U.S. intelligence in 2011 and 2015. Indeed, successive administrations
have continually worked to improve this vetting through robust information-sharing and data
integration, without resorting to multiple, sweeping bans on travel. We have seen no evidence
from the Government for why the country suddenly needs to shift from this tested system of

9

individualized vetting, developed and implemented by national security professionals across
the government, to a national origin-based ban.
8.

The current individualized vetting system places the burden of proof on the

traveler to prove her identity and eligibility for travel. If the traveler is unable to make this
showing, the U.S. Government can deny her a visa based on an individualized review. This
has been the policy of the U.S. Government across multiple administrations.
9.

Travel Ban 3.0’s generalized, country-based approach is substantially the same

as its predecessors, although its bans on travel are now indefinite rather than temporary, and
the stated rationale has shifted. Removing most of the emphasis on terrorism, the new Ban is
purportedly necessary “to elicit improved identity-management and information-sharing
protocols and practices from foreign governments.” We have seen no evidence, however, that
such a sweeping, country-based ban on travel is necessary for this objective.
10.

In fact, the only concrete evidence to emerge from this administration on this

point to date has shown just the opposite, that country-based bans are ineffective. A leaked
DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis memorandum analyzing the ban in the January Order
found that “country of citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist
activity.” The memorandum went on to note that a majority of the U.S.-based individuals who
were inspired by a foreign terrorist organization to participate in terrorism-related activity were
citizens of the United States; the minority of foreign-born individuals were scattered from
among twenty-six different countries; and most of the top origin countries of those individuals
are not the countries listed in the Order.4
11.

Imposing a ban on all or most of the travelers for a series of countries due to

the information sharing practices of their government is a massively overbroad and imprecise
response, especially when the data does not show any particularized threat from those

4

Citizenship Likely an Unreliable Indicator of Terrorist Threat to the United States,
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3474730/DHS-intelligence-document-on-President-Donald.pdf.

10

countries. Defendants have provided no evidence or specific information that nationals of the
banned countries pose a credible threat to the safety of Americans if they are allowed to enter
the United States after individualized screenings, or of the alleged harm that would occur in the
absence of the ban. The Ban targets a list of countries whose nationals have committed no
deadly terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in the last forty years.5 In fact, a recent analysis by the
Cato Institute shows that each new version of the travel ban is “even further divorced from
threats of terrorism to the United States than the prior order.”6
In particular:
a.

The Ban newly adds Chad to the list of countries subject to a ban. No citizen of
Chad has carried out a terrorist attack or been convicted of planning an attack
on U.S. soil in the last forty years. Chad, a Muslim-majority country, has long
been one of the United States’ most effective counterterrorism partners in the
region. Chad has been used as a staging ground by the U.S. Air Force in its
surveillance of Boko Haram, hosted about 2,000 U.S. troops for an annual
military exercise in March 2017, and is the base of the Multinational Joint Task
Force, the coordinated effort to fight Boko Haram in the region. The presence
of Boko Haram in Chad is dwarfed by their activity in other countries in the
region that were not included in the ban. Chad’s inclusion on the Travel Ban
3.0 list reportedly occurred over objections by officials in the State Department,
the Pentagon, the U.S. Embassy in Chad, and U.S. Africa Command, a decision
that left administration officials “befuddled and frustrated.”7

5

Alex Nowrasteh, President Trump’s New Travel Executive Order Has Little National Security
Justification, Cato Institute: Cato at Liberty, September 25, 2017.
6
David Bier, New Travel Ban Would Not Have Prevented the Entry of Any Terrorists Since 9/11, Cato
Institute: Cato at Liberty, September 25, 2017.
7
Helene Cooper et al., Chad’s Inclusion in Travel Ban Could Jeopardize American Interests, Officials
Say, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2017.

11

b.

The Ban newly adds North Korea (DPRK) to the list of countries subject to a
ban. No citizen of North Korea has carried out a terrorist attack or been
convicted of planning an attack on U.S. soil in the last forty years. Because of
severe exit restrictions imposed by the North Korean government, very few
North Koreans actually travel to the United States at all. North Korean
defectors typically first receive South Korean passports in any event.8 In
addition, such defectors would likely have a well-founded fear of political
persecution if returned to North Korea, and thus deserve careful consideration
for refugee status.

c.

The Ban newly adds Venezuela to the list of countries subject to a ban. No
citizen of Venezuela has carried out a terrorist attack or been convicted of
planning an attack on U.S. soil in the last forty years. The Ban only applies to
officials from government agencies involved in screening and vetting
procedures. Such targeted sanctions are more appropriately done by the
Treasury Department under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
and other legal authorities rather than through overbroad country bans.

12.

Notably, the Ban does not include non-Muslim majority countries such as

Belgium where there have been widely-documented problems with information sharing, and
whose nationals have carried out terrorist attacks on Europe. And although for some of the
countries, the Ban applies only to certain non-immigrant visas, together those visas are far and
away the most frequently used non-immigrant visas from these nations.

8

Darla Cameron, Why Trump’s Latest Travel Ban Included These Eight Countries, Wash. Post (Sept. 26,
2017); Emily Rauhala, Almost No North Koreans Travel to the U.S., So Why Ban Them?, Wash. Post (Sept. 25,
2017).

12

II.

Travel Ban 3.0 Will Harm the National Security and Foreign Policy Interests of
the United States
13.

In our professional judgment, Travel Ban 3.0 would undermine the national

security of the United States, rather than making us safer. If given effect, Travel Ban 3.0
would do long-term damage to our national security and foreign policy interests, and disrupt
counterterrorism and national security partnerships. It would aid the propaganda effort of the
Islamic State (“IS”) and serve its recruitment message by feeding into the narrative that the
United States is at war with Islam. It would hinder relationships with the very communities
law enforcement professionals need to engage to address the threat. And apart from all of
these concerns, the Ban offends our nation’s laws and values.
In particular:
a.

The Ban would disrupt critical counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national
security partnerships that are critical to our obtaining the necessary information
sharing and collaboration in intelligence, law enforcement, military, and
diplomatic channels to address the threat posed by terrorist groups such as IS.
The Ban would further strain our relationships with partner countries in Europe
and the Middle East, on whom we rely for vital counterterrorism cooperation,
undermining years of effort to bring them closer. By alienating these partners,
we would frustrate access to the intelligence and resources necessary to fight
the root causes of terror or disrupt attacks launched from abroad, before an
attack occurs within our borders.

b.

The Ban would endanger intelligence sources in the field. For current
information, our intelligence officers may rely on human sources in some of the
countries listed. The Ban breaches faith with those very sources, who have
risked much or all to keep Americans safe—and whom our officers had

13

promised always to protect with the full might of our government and our
people.
c.

The Ban would feed the recruitment narrative of IS and other extremists that
portray the United States as at war with Islam. As government officials, we took
every step we could to counter violent extremism. Because of the Ban’s
disparate impact on Muslim travelers and immigrants, it would fuel IS’s
narrative and sends the wrong message to the Muslim community here at home
and all over the world: that the U.S. Government is hostile to them and their
religion. The Ban also might endanger Christian communities, by handing IS a
recruiting tool and propaganda victory that spreads their message that the United
States is engaged in a religious war.

d.

The Ban would disrupt ongoing law enforcement efforts. By alienating MuslimAmerican communities in the United States, it would harm our efforts to enlist
their aid in identifying radicalized individuals who might launch attacks of the
kind recently seen in San Bernardino and Orlando.

e.

The Ban would have a devastating humanitarian impact. The current bans have
already disrupted the movement of countless people, including women and
children, who are fleeing danger and have been victimized by actual terrorists.
Travelers face deep uncertainty about whether they may travel to or from the
United States: for medical treatment, funerals or other pressing family reasons.

f.

The Ban would cause serious economic damage to American citizens and
residents. The Ban would affect many foreign travelers who annually inject
hundreds of billions into the U.S. economy, supporting well over a million U.S.
jobs. Affected companies have noted the adverse impact of the bans to date on
many strategic economic sectors, including defense, technology, medicine,
culture and others.

14

14.

For all of the foregoing reasons, in our professional opinion, Travel Ban 3.0

does not further—but instead harms—sound U.S. national security and foreign policy.
Issuing a new preliminary injunction against Travel Ban 3.0 would not jeopardize national
security. It would simply preserve the status quo ante, still requiring individuals to be
subjected to all the rigorous legal vetting processes that are currently in place. Allowing the
Ban to take effect would wreak havoc on innocent lives and deeply held American values.
15.

Ours is a nation of immigrants, committed to the faith that we are all equal

under the law and abhor discrimination, whether based on race, religion, sex, or national
origin. As government officials, we sought diligently to protect our country, even while
maintaining an immigration system as free as possible from discrimination, that applies no
religious tests, and that measures individuals by their merits, not stereotypes of their
countries or groups. Blanket bans of certain countries or classes of people are beneath the
dignity of the nation and Constitution that we each took oaths to protect. Rebranding a
proposal first advertised as a “Muslim Ban” as “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist
Entry” or “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes” does not disguise the Ban’s
discriminatory intent, or make it necessary, effective, or faithful to America’s Constitution,
laws, or values.

Respectfully submitted,
s/MADELINE K. ALBRIGHT
s/RAND BEERS
s/JOHN D. BELLINGER III
s/DANIEL BENJAMIN
s/ANTONY BLINKEN
s/JOHN O. BRENNAN
s/R. NICHOLAS BURNS
s/WILLIAM J. BURNS
s/JAMES CLAPPER
s/DAVID S. COHEN
s/ELIOT A. COHEN
s/BATHSHEBA N. CROCKER
s/RYAN CROCKER

15

s/THOMAS DONILON
s/JEN EASTERLY
s/DANIEL FELDMAN
s/JONATHAN FINER
s/MICHÈLE FLOURNOY
s/ROBERT S. FORD
s/JOSH GELTZER
s/SUZY GEORGE
s/PHIL GORDON
s/CHUCK HAGEL
s/AVRIL D. HAINES
s/LUKE HARTIG
s/MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
s/HEATHER A. HIGGINBOTTOM
s/CHRISTOPHER R. HILL
s/JOHN F. KERRY
s/PREM KUMAR
s/RICHARD LUGAR
s/JOHN E. MCLAUGHLIN
s/LISA O. MONACO
s/CAMERON P. MUNTER
s/JAMES C. O’BRIEN
s/MATTHEW G. OLSEN
s/LEON E. PANETTA
s/JEFFREY PRESCOTT
s/SAMANTHA J. POWER
s/SUSAN E. RICE
s/ANNE C. RICHARD
s/KORI SCHAKE
s/ERIC P. SCHWARTZ
s/WENDY R. SHERMAN
s/VIKRAM SINGH
s/JEFFREY H. SMITH
s/JAMES B. STEINBERG
s/WILLIAM WECHSLER
s/SAMUEL M. WITTEN
Executed on this 10th day of October, 2017.
*All original signatures are on file with Harold Hongju Koh, Rule of Law Clinic, Yale Law
School, New Haven, CT. 06520-8215 203-432-4932.
We declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the
foregoing is true and correct.

16

17