Shavlik et al v. City of Snohomish et al

Filing 25

ORDER denying plaintiffs' 20 Motion for declaratory relief signed by U.S. District Judge John C Coughenour.(RS)

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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LORI SHAVLIK AND KENNETH
SHAVLIK, individually and as a
marital community;

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CASE NO. C17-0144-JCC
ORDER

Plaintiffs,
v.

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CITY OF SNOHOMISH, et al.

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Defendants.

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This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory relief (Dkt. No.

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20). Having thoroughly considered the parties’ briefing and the relevant record, the Court finds

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oral argument unnecessary and hereby DENIES the motion for the reasons explained herein.

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On February 4, 2010, a fire occurred at Plaintiff Lori Shavlik’s business, the Tan Line,

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and Defendant Snohomish County Fire Protection was called to extinguish it. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3.)

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City of Snohomish Police investigated the fire and classified it as arson, bringing charges against

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Lori Shavlik. (Dkt. No. 20-2 at 3–4.) The Snohomish Times then published an article, alleged to

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have been sourced from the police department, stating that Mrs. Shavlik was “said to have a

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million dollar insurance policy that may have been part of the motive in the arson attempts.”

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(Dkt. No. 20-2 at 4.) After two trials, Mrs. Shavlik was acquitted and brings this lawsuit for

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(1) defamation, (2) civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (3) intentional or reckless

ORDER
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infliction of emotional distress, and (4) malicious prosecution. (See Dkt. No. 1-2.) Plaintiffs now

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request the Court declare that it was legally and factually impossible for Mrs. Shavlik to directly

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receive “money from a commercial general liability insurance coverage” as a result of the 2010

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fire. (Dkt. No. 20 at 2.)

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Defendants argue that under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA), the

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requested relief would be improper. (Dkt. No. 22.) The UDJA provides the Court with the

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authority to issue a declaratory judgment requested by a party. See Wash. Rev. Code. § 7.24.010

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(2017). “In order to decide an action for declaratory relief, a justiciable controversy must be

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present.” Benton Cty. v. Zink, 361 P.3d 801, 805 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (citing To–Ro Trade

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Shows v. Collins, 27 P.3d 1149, 1153 (2001)). A justiciable controversy is:
an actual, present and existing dispute, or the mature seeds of one, as distinguished
from a possible, dormant, hypothetical, speculative, or moot disagreement,
(2) between parties having genuine and opposing interests, (3) which involves
interests that must be direct and substantial, rather than potential, theoretical,
abstract or academic, and (4) a judicial determination of which will be final and
conclusive.

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Benton, 361 P.3d at 805. “Unless all these elements are present, the reviewing court steps into

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the prohibited area of advisory opinions.” Superior Asphalt & Concrete Co. Inc. v. Washington

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Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 89 P.3d 316, 318 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Diversified Indus. Dev.

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Corp. v. Ripley, 514 P.2d 137, 139 (Wash. 1973)). “The court may refuse to render or enter a

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declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not

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terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Wash. Rev. Code.

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§ 7.24.060.

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Plaintiffs seek a declaration that will not resolve the controversy that gives rise to this

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proceeding. Plaintiffs “allege that it is a violation of their civil rights to have the authorities use

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as a legal weapon a factual and legal falsity as being a supposed motive for an ‘arson’ that never

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occurred.” (Dkt. No. 20-2 at 10–11.) The Court takes Plaintiffs’ allegation as inferring that the

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use of commercial liability coverage as a motive to pursue an investigation is untenable because

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the suspect could never receive payment under the policy. However, Plaintiffs’ claims do not

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turn on the legal possibility or impossibility that Mrs. Shavlik could have collected on the

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insurance policy. Rather, they depend on whether investigators could have reasonably believed

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that Mrs. Shavlik believed she could collect on the policy.

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The requested relief will not result in a “judicial determination that is final and

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conclusive” and thus fails the final factor of the Benton standard. 361 P.3d at 805. Even if the

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Court concluded such declaratory relief were legally sound, granting this relief would still leave

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the same issues for the trier of fact to determine. While Plaintiffs argue that this goes to the

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reasonableness of the investigation, it would be a supporting fact better left for a jury to evaluate.

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The Court will not equate a legal impossibility to collect on a single insurance policy, with the

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investigators having no probable cause to pursue the investigation.

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For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory relief (Dkt. No. 20) is
DENIED.
DATED this 11th day of July, 2017.

A

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John C. Coughenour
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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ORDER
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