Ortiz v. Berryhill

Filing 16

ORDER VACATING DEFENDANT'S DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS - by Judge David W. Christel. The Court orders the Commissioners final decision to deny benefits be vacated in its entirety and this matter remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for a de novo hearing in accordance with the findings contained in this Order. (SH)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

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RABECA ORTIZ,

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Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,

CASE NO. 2:17-CV-00243-DWC

ORDER VACATING
DEFENDANT’S DECISION TO
DENY BENEFITS

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Defendant.
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Plaintiff Rabeca Ortiz filed this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for judicial review
of Defendant’s denial of her application for supplemental security income (“SSI”). Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73 and Local Rule MJR 13, the parties have
consented to have this matter heard by the undersigned Magistrate Judge. See Dkt. 8.
After considering the record, the Court concludes the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
failed to properly consider the medical opinion evidence of non-examining physician Dr.
Guillermo Rubio, M.D, and examining physicians Drs. Christopher Nelson, Ph.D and Richard G.
Peterson, Ph.D. Had the ALJ properly considered their opinions, the residual functional capacity

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ORDER VACATING DEFENDANT’S DECISION
TO DENY BENEFITS - 1

1 (“RFC”) assessment may have included additional limitations. Therefore, the ALJ’s error is
2 harmful. The Court orders the Commissioner’s final decision be vacated in its entirety and this
3 matter remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for a de novo hearing
4 consistent with this Order.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 17, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI, alleging disability as of January

7 5, 2011. 1 See Dkt. 11, Administrative Record (“AR”) 13. The application was denied upon initial
8 administrative review and upon reconsideration. AR 13. Plaintiff filed a written request for a
9 hearing on March 5, 2014. AR 13. ALJ Kimberly Boyce heard the matter on August 18, 2014
10 and again on June 17, 2015 for the purpose of obtaining additional vocational expert testimony.
11 AR 31–62, 63–72. In a decision dated July 24, 2015, the ALJ determined Plaintiff to be not
12 disabled. See AR 13–25. Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision was denied by the
13 Appeals Council, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See AR 1–
14 8; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
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In Plaintiff’s Opening Brief, she maintains the ALJ failed to: (I) properly weigh medical

16 opinion evidence by (A) giving great weight to Dr. Rubio’s opinion but failing to include all
17 opined functional limitations in the RFC assessment and (B) providing legally insufficient
18 reasons for rejecting the Drs. Nelson and Peterson’s opinions; (II) provide clear and convincing
19 reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s statements about the limiting effects of her conditions; and (III)
20 establish the existence in significant numbers of jobs Plaintiff is able to perform at Step Five. See
21 Dkt. 13 at 1.
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Plaintiff’s alleged onset date was amended to February 12, 2010 at the hearing. AR 35.

ORDER VACATING DEFENDANT’S DECISION
TO DENY BENEFITS - 2

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

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Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of

3 social security benefits if the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not supported by
4 substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th
5 Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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DISCUSSION

7 I.

Whether the ALJ properly weighed the medical opinion evidence.

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Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in her evaluation of the medical opinion evidence of

9 non-examining physician Dr. Rubio and examining physicians Drs. Nelson and Peterson. Dkt.
10 13, 15. Defendant asserts the ALJ properly considered and weighed all medical opinion evidence
11 and formulated an RFC finding that was consistent with the credible limitations. Dkt. 14.
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The ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted

13 opinion of either a treating or examining physician. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.
14 1996) (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988); Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d
15 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990)). When a treating or examining physician’s opinion is contradicted, the
16 opinion can be rejected “for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial
17 evidence in the record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830–31 (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,
18 1043 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989)
19 (“Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. It means
20 such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”)
21 (internal quotations omitted). The ALJ can accomplish this by “setting out a detailed and
22 thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation
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ORDER VACATING DEFENDANT’S DECISION
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1 thereof, and making findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing
2 Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751).
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A.

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Plaintiff maintains the ALJ erred when she gave great weight to Dr. Rubio’s opinion, yet

Dr. Rubio

5 failed to include all his opined limitations in the RFC assessment. Dkt. 13, at 3–5; Dkt. 15 at 4–5.
6 Defendant contends the ALJ properly incorporated the opinion into the RFC assessment. Dkt. 14
7 at 2–4.
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Dr. Rubio, a state agency consultative doctor, completed an RFC assessment as a portion

9 of a Disability Determination Explanation. AR 107–09. He opined, in relevant part, Plaintiff can
10 occasionally lift and/or carry twenty pounds, frequently lift and/or carry ten pounds, and has
11 “unlimited” handling (gross manipulation). AR 107–08. He also opined Plaintiff has
12 manipulative limitations that include limited reaching left/right in front and/or laterally, reaching
13 overhead, and “occasional overhead lifting/handling due to neck pain.” AR 108–09. The ALJ
14 gave significant weight to this opinion’s finding that Plaintiff can perform light exertional work
15 and can occasionally reach overhead. AR 22.
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The ALJ “need not discuss all evidence presented.” Vincent ex rel. Vincent v. Heckler,

17 739 F.2d 1393, 1394–95 (9th Cir. 1984). However, the ALJ “may not reject ‘significant
18 probative evidence’ without explanation.” Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 570–71 (quoting
19 Vincent ex rel. Vincent, 739 F.2d at 1395). The “ALJ’s written decision must state reasons for
20 disregarding [such] evidence.” Id. at 571.
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It is unclear if the ALJ adequately accounted for Dr. Rubio’s opinion that Plaintiff is

22 limited to occasional overhead lifting and handling. In the RFC determination, the ALJ found
23 Plaintiff can perform light work, and can lift “within the light exertional limits,” “occasionally
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ORDER VACATING DEFENDANT’S DECISION
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1 reach overhead,” and “frequently finger with the non-dominant left hand.” AR 17. However, the
2 ALJ did not discuss Dr. Rubio’s occasional overhead lifting and handling limitation in the RFC
3 assessment when explaining the weight she gave to Dr. Rubio’s opinion (see AR 17), or in any
4 other portion of the decision. See AR 13–25.
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Plaintiff’s occasional overhead lifting and handling limitation is related to her ability to

6 be employed and is therefore significant, probative evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b) (the
7 Commissioner must consider a claimant’s RFC assessment “for work activity on a regular and
8 continuing basis”). As the ALJ failed to provide any discussion regarding the overhead lifting
9 and handling limitation, the Court cannot determine if the ALJ properly considered this
10 limitation or simply ignored the evidence. Accordingly, the ALJ erred by failing to explain the
11 weight given to Dr. Rubio’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s limitation. See Provencio v. Astrue,
12 2012 WL 2344072, *9 (D. Ariz., June 20, 2012) (finding the ALJ erred by giving “great weight”
13 to a consultative examiner’s opinion, yet ignoring parts of the opinion).
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Harmless error principles apply in the Social Security context. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d

15 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). An error is harmless, however, only if it is not prejudicial to the
16 claimant or “inconsequential” to the ALJ’s “ultimate nondisability determination.” Stout v.
17 Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006); see Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115.
18 The determination as to whether an error is harmless requires a “case-specific application of
19 judgment” by the reviewing court, based on an examination of the record made “‘without regard
20 to errors’ that do not affect the parties’ ‘substantial rights.’” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1118–19
21 (quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407 (2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2111)). When the
22 ALJ ignores significant and probative evidence in the record favorable to a claimant’s position,
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ORDER VACATING DEFENDANT’S DECISION
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1 the ALJ “thereby provide[s] an incomplete [RFC] determination.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153,
2 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).
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The ALJ’s failure to discuss a portion of the opinion submitted by Dr. Rubio resulted in

4 an incomplete RFC assessment. Had the ALJ properly considered the occasional overhead lifting
5 and handling limitations opined by Dr. Rubio, she may have included additional limitations in
6 the RFC assessment and in the hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert. As the
7 ultimate disability determination may change, the ALJ’s failure to discuss all of Dr. Rubio’s
8 opined limitations is not harmless and requires reversal.
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B.

Drs. Nelson and Peterson

Plaintiff next asserts the ALJ erred by failing to properly consider the opinions of

11 examining psychologists Drs. Nelson and Peterson. Dkt. 13 at 5–14.
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In January of 2014, Dr. Nelson completed a psychological diagnostic evaluation

13 regarding Plaintiff’s functional abilities. See AR 555–61. Dr. Nelson reviewed portions of
14 Plaintiff’s medical records, conducted a clinical interview, observed Plaintiff, and conducted a
15 mental status examination (“MSE”). AR 555–59. He opined Plaintiff will have marked difficulty
16 performing activities within a schedule, maintaining regular attendance, being punctual within
17 customary tolerances, and completing a normal workday or workweek due to focus on pain, low
18 energy, and insomnia. AR 559.
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In October of 2012, Dr. Peterson completed a psychological evaluation regarding

20 Plaintiff’s functional abilities. See AR 567–71. Dr. Peterson conducted a clinical interview,
21 observed Plaintiff, and conducted an MSE. AR 567–71. He opined Plaintiff will have marked
22 difficulty performing activities within a schedule, maintaining regular attendance, being punctual
23 within customary tolerances, adapting to changes in a work setting, communicating, and
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ORDER VACATING DEFENDANT’S DECISION
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1 maintaining appropriate behavior in a work setting. AR 569. He further opined Plaintiff would
2 have severe difficulty in completing a normal workday or workweek without interruption from
3 psychologically based symptoms. AR 569.
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The ALJ discussed the findings of Drs. Nelson and Peterson and gave their opinions little

5 weight, stating:
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Dr. Nelson opines that the claimant would have marked difficulty performing
activities within a schedule, maintaining regular attendance, and being punctual
with customary tolerances. He also opines that the claimant will have marked
difficulty completing a normal workday and workweek due to focus on pain, low
energy, and insomnia. (1) I note that Dr. Nelson reviewed minimal treatment
records prior to rendering his opinion. (2) Despite her allegations of impairment,
the claimant is consistently able to show up on-time to appointments by herself, can
take care of her children, and can tend to her daily activities. Her ability to persist
in these tasks indicates an ability to handle a routine and keep a schedule, and
suggests a higher level of functioning than opined by Dr. Nelson. Furthermore, (3)
the degree of impairment the claimant alleged to Dr. Nelson is not reflected in the
treatment notes.

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[Dr. Peterson] opines that the claimant has marked impairment in her ability to
perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, adapt to changes
in a routine work setting, communicate and perform effectively in a work setting,
and maintain appropriate behavior in a work setting. Dr. Peterson further opines
that the claimant has severe limitation in her ability to complete a normal workday
and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms.
Notably, (1) Dr. Peterson did not review any medical records prior to rendering his
opinion. Furthermore, (2) the limitations he opines are inconsistent with the
claimant’s ability to care for her two young children to include getting them to
school regularly and preparing their meals.

19 AR 22–23 (internal citations omitted and numbering added).
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When a treating or examining physician’s opinion is contradicted, the ALJ can reject the

21 opinion “for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the
22 record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830–31 (citing Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043). The ALJ can accomplish
23 this by “setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical
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ORDER VACATING DEFENDANT’S DECISION
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1 evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725
2 (citing Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751).
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Here, the ALJ rejected Drs. Nelson and Peterson’s opinions for two reasons and named a

4 third reason to reject Dr. Nelson’s—none of which is legally sufficient. The ALJ’s first reason
5 for rejecting the doctors’ opinions is Dr. Nelson reviewed minimal treatment records and Dr.
6 Peterson reviewed none prior to rendering their opinions. See AR 22–23. However, the ALJ
7 failed to explain why their failures to review records discredit their opinions. See AR 22–23.
8 Both doctors interviewed and observed Plaintiff and administered MSEs. See AR 555–61, 567–
9 71. Defendant does not cite, nor does the Court find, authority holding an examining physician’s
10 failure to supplement his or her own examination and observations with additional records is a
11 specific and legitimate reason to give less weight to the opinions. See Dkt. 14. Therefore, this is
12 not a specific and legitimate reason for discounting Drs. Nelson and Peterson’s opinions.
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Second, the ALJ gave little weight to Drs. Nelson and Peterson’s opinions because

14 Plaintiff is consistently able to show up on-time to appointments by herself, can care for her
15 children, and performs daily activities. AR 22–23. However, the ALJ failed to discuss specific
16 instances in the record where Plaintiff’s attendance at appointments, childcare, and daily
17 activities support the ALJ’s findings, or explain how such evidence contradicts Drs. Nelson and
18 Peterson’s findings.
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Further, the ALJ failed to discuss any clinical evidence regarding Plaintiff’s childcare or

20 daily activities that conflicts with her findings. For example, in the clinical interview with Dr.
21 Nelson, Plaintiff stated that her typical day includes childcare and activities of daily living. AR
22 555–56. She reported similarly to Dr. Peterson, but stated that by the end of a day of childcare
23 and daily activities, “she can barely walk.” AR 568. She also stated to Dr. Peterson that she must
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ORDER VACATING DEFENDANT’S DECISION
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1 make dinner before she sits because “she is not able to do much once the pain gets bad.” Id.
2 Additionally, she stated that her friend drives the children to and from school daily, and she
3 relies on her mother for childcare assistance “when she is in a lot of pain.” AR 556. At the
4 hearing, Plaintiff testified that her mother lives with her and the children, assists her to get the
5 children ready for school, and watches the children in the evening if Plaintiff needs to take a nap
6 “due to pain.” AR 39–40, 50. Plaintiff also testified that her mother washes the dishes, vacuums,
7 sweeps, cleans the kitchen and the bathroom, and goes shopping for Plaintiff. AR 39, 42–43, 46.
8 The ALJ failed to discuss any of these facts. Without more, the ALJ’s second reason for giving
9 little weight to Drs. Nelson and Peterson’s opinions has failed to meet the level of specificity
10 required to reject physicians’ opinions. See Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421–22 (“it is incumbent on the
11 ALJ to provide detailed, reasoned, and legitimate rationales for disregarding the physicians’
12 findings.”).
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Third, the ALJ rejected Dr. Nelson’s opinion because she determined the degree of

14 impairment alleged by Plaintiff to Dr. Nelson is not reflected in the treatment notes. AR 22.
15 Defendant maintains, citing Valentine v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, a
16 conflict with treatment notes is a specific and legitimate reason to reject a treating physician’s
17 opinion. Dkt. 14 at 7; Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692–93 (9th Cir.
18 2009). However, this case is inapplicable. In Valentine, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ALJ’s
19 decision to give less weight to a treating psychologist’s opinion because the ALJ identified a
20 contradiction within the opinion, and evidence in the record, including the physician’s “own
21 treatment progress reports” contradicted the physician’s opinion that the plaintiff was disabled.
22 Id. at 692–93.
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ORDER VACATING DEFENDANT’S DECISION
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Here, the ALJ gave Dr. Nelson’s opinion less weight because it was inconsistent with

2 another physician’s opinions and treatment notes. AR 22. Further, the ALJ failed to identify
3 which “treatment notes” in the record she was referring to, and any specific evidence in the
4 treatment notes that is inconsistent with Dr. Nelson’s opinion. AR 22. While an ALJ may reject
5 an examining physician’s opinion if it is contradicted by clinical evidence, Bayliss, 427 F.3d at
6 1216, “an ALJ errs when [she] rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight while doing
7 nothing more than ignoring it, asserting without explanation that another medical opinion is more
8 persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for
9 [her] conclusion.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nguyen v.
10 Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, this is not a specific and legitimate
11 reason for discounting Dr. Nelson’s opinion.
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Additionally, the ALJ failed to discuss significant, probative evidence within Dr.

13 Nelson’s opinion. As discussed above, the ALJ “need not discuss all evidence presented.”
14 Vincent ex rel. Vincent, 739 F.3d at 1394–95. However, the ALJ “may not reject ‘significant
15 probative evidence’ without explanation.” Flores, 49 F.3d at 570–71 (quoting Vincent ex rel.
16 Vincent, 739 F.2d at 1395). The “ALJ’s written decision must state reasons for disregarding
17 [such] evidence.” Flores, 49 F.3d at 571. Here, the ALJ broadly identified the “Medical Source
18 Statement” portion of Dr. Nelson’s opinion, including a discussion of marked difficulties, but
19 failed to discuss any of Plaintiff’s moderate difficulties or other relevant portions of the opinion.
20 AR 22. Dr. Nelson opined Plaintiff had several moderate functional limitations that impacted her
21 ability to perform full-time work, such as moderate difficulty asking simple questions or
22 requesting assistance and communicating and performing effectively in a work setting due to
23 anxiety. AR 559. Dr. Nelson also opined Plaintiff ’s memory, abstract thinking, sequential
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ORDER VACATING DEFENDANT’S DECISION
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1 thinking, focus on pain, low energy, insomnia, anxiety, and feelings of worthlessness are all
2 likely to affect her ability to perform many work duties. AR 559–60. The ALJ failed to discuss
3 this significant, probative evidence, which is error.
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Without more, the ALJ’s conclusory statements rejecting Drs. Nelson and Peterson’s

5 opinions failed to meet the level of specificity required to reject a physician’s opinion and are
6 insufficient for this Court to determine if the ALJ properly considered the evidence. Therefore,
7 the ALJ erred. See Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421–22; McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th
8 Cir. 1989) (an ALJ’s rejection of a physician’s opinion on the grounds that it was contrary to
9 clinical findings in the record was “broad and vague, failing to specify why the ALJ felt the
10 treating physician’s opinion was flawed”).
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As discussed supra, “harmless error principles apply in the Social Security context.”

12 Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. An error is harmless, however, only if it is not prejudicial to the
13 claimant or “inconsequential” to the ALJ’s “ultimate nondisability determination.” Stout, 454
14 F.3d at 1055; see Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115.
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Had the ALJ included all of Drs. Nelson and Peterson’s limitations in the RFC

16 assessment, Plaintiff would likely have been found disabled. For example, the ALJ found the
17 Plaintiff’s RFC assessment includes an ability to meet ordinary and reasonable employer
18 expectations regarding attendance, production, and workplace behavior. See AR 17. However,
19 Dr. Nelson opined Plaintiff will have marked difficulty in performing activities within a schedule
20 and maintaining regular attendance due to pain, low energy, and insomnia. AR 559. Dr. Peterson
21 opined Plaintiff will have marked difficulty in maintaining appropriate behavior in a workplace
22 setting. AR 569. Moreover, according to the Vocational Expert (“VE”), Mark Harrington,
23 employers will tolerate two absences per month. AR 71. If all the limitations opined by Drs.
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1 Nelson and Peterson were included in the RFC and in the hypothetical questions posed to the
2 VE, the ultimate disability determination may have changed. Accordingly, ALJ’s error is not
3 harmless and requires reversal. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115.
4 II.

Whether the ALJ erred by failing to provide clear and convincing reasons
supported by the record to discount Plaintiff’s subjective testimony.

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Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to give clear and convincing reasons for discounting her
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subjective symptom testimony. Dkt. 13 at 14–17. The Court concludes the ALJ committed
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harmful error in assessing the medical opinion evidence. See Section I, supra. Because the ALJ’s
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reconsideration of the medical opinion evidence may impact her assessment of Plaintiff’s
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subjective testimony, the ALJ must reconsider Plaintiff’s subjective testimony on remand.
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The Court also notes that on March 16, 2016, the Social Security Administration changed
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the way it analyzes a claimant’s credibility. See SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (S.S.A. Mar. 16,
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2016). The term “credibility” will no longer be used. Id. Further, symptom evaluation is no
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longer an examination of a claimant’s character; “adjudicators will not assess an individual’s
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overall character or truthfulness.” Id. at *10. The ALJ’s decision, dated July 24, 2015, was issued
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approximately eight months before SSR 16-3p became effective. Therefore, the ALJ did not err
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by failing to apply SSR 16-3p. However, on remand, the ALJ is directed to apply SSR 16-3p
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when evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony.
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III.

Whether the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff not disabled at Step Five.

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Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred at Step Five of the sequential evaluation process because
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the ALJ failed to develop the record to clarify the nature of Dr. Rubio’s opined limitations, and
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because the jobs identified by the VE did not contain all of Plaintiff’s limitations and do not exist
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in sufficient numbers in the national economy. Dkt. 13 at 4–5; Dkt 15 at 4–7. As discussed
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above, the Court concludes the ALJ committed harmful error when she failed to properly
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ORDER VACATING DEFENDANT’S DECISION
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1 consider the opinions of Drs. Rubio, Nelson, and Peterson. See Section I, supra. The ALJ must
2 therefore reassess the RFC on remand. See Social Security Ruling 96-8p (“The RFC assessment
3 must always consider and address medical source opinions.”); Valentine, 574 F.3d at 690 (“an
4 RFC that fails to take into account a claimant’s limitations is defective”). As the ALJ must
5 reassess Plaintiff’s RFC on remand, she must also re-evaluate the findings at Step Five to
6 determine if there are jobs Plaintiff can perform in light of the RFC and existing in significant
7 numbers in the national economy. See Watson v. Astrue, 2010 WL 4269545, *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
8 22, 2010) (finding the ALJ’s RFC determination and hypothetical questions posed to the
9 vocational expert defective when the ALJ did not properly consider a doctor’s findings).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby finds that the ALJ improperly

12 concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Accordingly, the Court orders the Commissioner’s
13 final decision to deny benefits be vacated in its entirety and this matter remanded pursuant to
14 sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for a de novo hearing in accordance with the findings
15 contained herein.
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Dated this 26th day of July, 2017.

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David W. Christel
United States Magistrate Judge

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