Bolton v. King County Corrections et al

Filing 6

ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND by Hon. James P. Donohue. (cc: plaintiff with amended complaint form)(ST)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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Case No. C17-388-RSM-JPD

SCOTT C. BOLTON,
Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE AND
GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

KING COUNTY CORRECTIONS, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff Scott C. Bolton is currently confined at the King County Jail. Proceeding pro se

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and in forma pauperis, he filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint against the King

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County Correctional Facility (“KCCF”), KCCF Classifications Officer “John Doe,” and the

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Director of the KCCF. See Dkt. 1-1. Having reviewed plaintiff’s complaint, the Court finds and

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ORDERS:

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(1)

Plaintiff alleges that on February 3, 2017, a classifications officer admitted him

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into the “Trusty Inmate Worker Program.” Dkt. 1-1 at 3. He alleges that on February 4, 2017, a

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different classifications officer, the one named as a John Doe defendant in this action, revoked

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his admission into the program. Id. Plaintiff claims that the revocation was retaliatory and

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ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE
AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND- 1

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discriminatory. Id. As relief, he asks the Court to “correct this discriminatory act and its

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retaliatory concealment.” Id.

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(2)

Once a complaint is filed in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss it prior to

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service if it “fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii);

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see Talley v. Jackson, 2015 WL 3796339, at *1 (W.D. Wash. June 18, 2015) (citations omitted).

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To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). The

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factual allegations must be “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint may be dismissed if it

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lacks a cognizable legal theory or states insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.

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Zixiang v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013).

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The Court holds pro se plaintiffs to less stringent pleading standards than represented

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plaintiffs and liberally construes a pro se complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

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Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Nevertheless, § 1915(e) “not only permits but

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requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”

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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1229 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). When dismissing a complaint

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under § 1915(e), the Court gives pro se plaintiffs leave to amend unless “it is absolutely clear

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that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Cato v. United States,

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70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).

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(3)

To sustain a § 1983 civil rights claim, plaintiff must show (1) he suffered a

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violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2) the

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violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state or federal law. West v.

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ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE
AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND- 2

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Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). To

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satisfy the second prong, plaintiff must allege facts showing how individually named defendants

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caused or personally participated in causing the harm alleged in the complaint. Arnold v. IBM,

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637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).

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(4)

Having screened plaintiff’s complaint, the Court has identified the following

deficiencies:
a.

The KCCF is an entity of King County and, as such, is not a proper

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defendant in this action. See Nolan v. Snohomish Cnty., 59 Wn. App. 876, 883, 802 P.2d 792,

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796 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (“[I]n a legal action involving a county, the county itself is the only

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legal entity capable of suing and being sued.”). Plaintiff may sue King County as a “person”

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under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978).

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However, King County cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor.

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Id. A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on King County under § 1983 must identify a

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municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused his or her injury. Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of

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Bryant Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Plaintiff does

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not allege that any King County policy or custom caused him injury.

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b.

Plaintiff names the KCCF Director as a defendant in this action but he

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does not allege any facts regarding this defendant. The KCCF Director cannot be held liable

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simply because he is John Doe’s supervisor. Rather, to proceed against the KCCF Director,

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plaintiff must allege facts showing that he caused or personally participated in causing the harm

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alleged in the complaint.

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ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE
AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND- 3

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c.

Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a First Amendment

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retaliation claim against John Doe. His conclusory claim that John Doe retaliated against him is

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insufficient. If plaintiff files an amended complaint against John Doe, any retaliation claim will

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be screened under the following standards.

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“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five

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basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)

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because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s

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exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

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legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). “The

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prisoner must show that the type of activity in which he was engaged was constitutionally

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protected, that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the alleged

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retaliatory action, and that the retaliatory action advanced no legitimate penological interest.”

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Quiroz v. Horel, 85 F. Supp. 3d 1115, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d

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265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995)

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(plaintiff bears burden of pleading and proving the absence of legitimate correctional goals for

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the conduct of which he complains). Additionally, “a plaintiff who fails to allege a chilling

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effect may still state a claim if he alleges he suffered some other harm.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584

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F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).

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d.

Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a discrimination claim

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against John Doe. Plaintiff does not allege the basis for the discrimination, i.e., why John Doe

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discriminated against him. “Prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the

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Fourteenth Amendment from invidious discrimination based on race.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

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ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE
AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND- 4

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U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citing Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968)). But given the lack of any

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specific factual allegations, the Court cannot say that plaintiff alleges a valid discrimination

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claim under § 1983.

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(5)

Based on the forgoing, the Court DECLINES to serve plaintiff’s complaint, but

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GRANTS him leave to file an amended complaint curing the above-noted deficiencies within 30

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days after the date this Order is signed. The amended complaint must carry the same case

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number as this one and must be filed on the appropriate form, a copy of which will be sent with

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this Order. If no amended complaint is timely filed or if plaintiff files an amended

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complaint that fails to correct the deficiencies identified above, the Court may recommend

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that this action be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim

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upon which relief may be granted.

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Plaintiff is advised that an amended pleading operates as a complete substitute for an

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original pleading. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, any

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second amended complaint must clearly identify the defendant(s), the constitutional or federal

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statutory claim(s) asserted, the specific facts which plaintiff believes support each claim, and the

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specific relief requested.

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(6)

The Clerk is directed to send plaintiff the appropriate forms so that he may file an

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amended complaint. The Clerk is further directed to send copies of this Order to plaintiff and to

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the Honorable Ricardo S. Martinez.

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Dated this 3rd day of April, 2017.

A

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JAMES P. DONOHUE
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE
AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND- 5