Lyall v. U S Bank National Assocation et al
Filing
100
ORDER granting defendants' 87 Motion to Dismiss; directing the clerk to draw check from court registry; Within five (5) days from the date of this Order, Defendants shall provide the clerk with the mailing addresses, social security numbers, or tax identification numbers of the disbursement recipients signed by Judge Richard A Jones.(RS) cc fin'l
THE HONORABLE JUDGE RICHARD A. JONES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
MARTA D. LYALL,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
U.S. BANK NATIONAL
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ASSOCIATION; TRUMAN TITLE 2013 )
SC3 TITLE TRUST; TRUMAN
)
CAPITAL ADVISORS, LP;
)
RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT )
SERVICES, LLC; BANK OF AMERICA, )
N.A.; DITECH HOME LOAN
)
SERVICING; CWABS MASTER
)
TRUST, REVOLVING HOME EQUITY )
LOAN ASSET BACKED NOTES,
)
SERIES 2004-"O"; CARNEGIE
)
MELLON UNIVERSITY; UNIVERSITY )
OF WASHINGTON; WASHINGTON
)
STATE DEPARTMENT OF
)
COMMERCE; DISPUTE RESOLUTION )
CENTER OF KING COUNTY; and
)
JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-100,
)
)
Case No: 17-00472-RAJ
ORDER
Defendants.
)
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Rushmore Loan Management
Services, LLC (“Rushmore”), and U.S. Bank National Association as Legal Title Trustee
for Truman 2013 SC3 Title Trust’s (erroneously sued as U.S. Bank National Association,
Truman Title 2013 SC3 Title Trust, Truman Capital Advisors, L.P.; hereinafter the “Loan
ORDER - 1
Trust”) Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. # 87. Plaintiff filed a late response in opposition to the
motion that far exceeds the page limitations dictated by this Court’s Local Rules. LCR
7(e)(3) (limiting Plaintiff’s response to twenty-four pages). Therefore, when considering
the response, the Court may exercise its discretion to limit its inquiry to the first twentyfour pages. The Court is also in receipt of the parties’ briefs arguing whether the Court
should convert the TRO into a preliminary injunction, as well as Plaintiff’s request for
extension of time to file her response to the motion to dismiss. Dkt. ## 92, 96, 97.
Having reviewed the briefs, relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law,
the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. # 87. The Court DISSOLVES
the injunction.
I.
BACKGROUND
The parties are well versed in the relevant history of this case. At issue is whether
Plaintiff has properly alleged her claims against Defendants. Moreover, the Court must
determine whether the TRO currently in place should convert into a preliminary
injunction.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim. The rule requires the court to assume the truth of the complaint’s factual
allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising from those allegations. Sanders v.
Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). A court “need not accept as true conclusory
allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.” Manzarek v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must
point to factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). If the plaintiff succeeds, the complaint
avoids dismissal if there is “any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
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complaint” that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 563; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009).
A court typically cannot consider evidence beyond the four corners of the
complaint, although it may rely on a document to which the complaint refers if the
document is central to the party’s claims and its authenticity is not in question. Marder v.
Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). A court may also consider evidence subject to
judicial notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).
III.
DISCUSSION
In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff lodges claims against Defendants to quiet
title, for fraud, and for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO). Dkt. # 16 (Amended Complaint) at 24-53.
A. Quiet Title
“Any person having a valid subsisting interest in real property, and a right to the
possession thereof, may recover the same by action in” court. RCW 7.28.010 (describing
who may maintain such actions). “The plaintiff in an action to quiet title must succeed
on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of his adversary.” Desimone v.
Spence, 318 P.2d 959, 961 (1957); see also Robertson v. GMAC Mortg. LLC, 982
F.Supp.2d 1202, 1208 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
Plaintiff’s quiet title action fails as a matter of law because she has defaulted on
the mortgage. Dkt. # 16 (Amended Complaint) at 26-27. Her Amended Complaint seeks
to invalidate her mortgage agreement due to a fraudulent scheme allegedly devised by
Defendants. However, even if these facts were true, they do not give credence to a claim
for quiet title when Plaintiff does not have superior title. Therefore, the Court
DISMISSES the quiet title claims as alleged against Defendants.
B. Claims for Fraud
When alleging claims for fraud, a plaintiff is held to a higher pleading standard.
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She must “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud . . . . Malice,
intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Plaintiff wholly fails to meet this standard in her Amended Complaint. She does
not plead the “‘who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct charged.” Kearns
v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Vess v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003)). Defendants are not on “notice of the
particular misconduct so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that
they have done anything wrong.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Therefore, the Court DISMISSES the fraud claims as alleged against Defendants.
C. RICO Claims
To allege a civil RICO claim, Plaintiff must prove the following elements: “(1)
conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (known as
‘predicate acts') (5) causing injury to plaintiff’s ‘business or property.’” Living Designs,
Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Grimmitt v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Plaintiff fails to link these Defendants to an enterprise, and it is unclear what
predicate acts—that involve these Defendants—Plaintiff attempts to prove. See generally
Dkt. # 16 (Amended Complaint). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not sufficiently
allege a RICO claim against Defendants. Therefore the Court DISMISSES the claim as
against Defendants.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss
without leave to amend. Dkt. # 87. Because the claims fail on their merits as against
these Defendants, the Court will not convert the TRO into a preliminary injunction. This
order acts to dissolve the injunction currently in place.
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The clerk is authorized and directed to draw a check(s) on the funds deposited in
the registry of this court in the principal amount of $1,610.00 plus all accrued interest,
minus any statutory users fees, payable to Defendants and mail or deliver the check(s) to
Defendants. Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 67(b). Within five (5) days from the date
of this Order, Defendants shall provide the clerk with the mailing addresses, social
security numbers, or tax identification numbers of the disbursement recipients.
Dated this 17th day of August, 2017.
A
The Honorable Richard A. Jones
United States District Judge
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