UN4 Productions, Inc. v. Doe 1 et al

Filing 130

ORDER granting in part and denying in part plaintiff UN4's Motions for Default Judgment against defendants Theresa Kirwan, Nik Penchev, Francisco Ramirez, Lucy Kuria, Robert Morrison, Senghout Lim, Nouredin Alhegni, Catie Wentz, Griselda Gomez, Tara Salzer, and Curtis Casses (Dkts. 97 , 99 , 101 , 103 , 105 , 107 , 109 , 111 , 113 , 115 , 117 ). Signed by Judge Robert S. Lasnik. (SWT) (cc: Mortedha Al-Sultan via USPS)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

9
10
11

Case No. C17-0785RSL

UN4 PRODUCTIONS, INC.,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART UN4’S
MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

12
13
14
15

v.
MADISON PALMER, et al.,
Defendants.

16
17
18
19
20
21

I.

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff UN4’s motions for default
judgment against defendants Theresa Kirwan (Dkt. #97), Nik Penchev (Dkt. #99),
Francisco Ramirez (Dkt. #101), Lucy Kuria (Dkt. #103), Robert Morrison (Dkt. #105),

22

Senghout Lim (Dkt. #107), Nouredin Alhegni (Dkt. #109), Catie Wentz (Dkt. #111),

23

Griselda Gomez (Dkt. #113), Tara Salzer (Dkt. #115), and Curtis Casses (Dkt. #117).

24
25
26

Having reviewed the relevant briefing and the remainder of the record, UN4’s motions
for default judgment are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

27
28
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 1

II.

1

The eleven motions for default judgment that are the subject of this Order are just

2
3

BACKGROUND

a portion of the more than one hundred default judgment motions filed by plaintiff’s

4
5

counsel in twenty-six cases before the undersigned. All of the cases assert essentially

6

the same causes of action based on remarkably similar allegations, although the motion

7

picture at issue, the owner of the copyright, and the defendants vary. For purposes of

8
9

these motions, UN4 alleges that 60 individual defendants unlawfully infringed its

10

exclusive copyright to the motion picture Boyka Undisputed 4, which it developed and

11

produced, by copying and distributing the film over the Internet through a peer-to-peer

12
13

network using the BitTorrent protocol. Plaintiff served internet service providers

14

(“ISP”s) with subpoenas in order to identify the alleged infringers. Amended complaints

15

identifying defendants by name were subsequently filed.

16

Defendants Kirwan, Penchev, Ramirez, Kuria, Morrison, Lim, Alhegni, Wentz,

17
18

Gomez, Salzer, and Casses (collectively “Defendants”) are named in the same

19

complaint because, given the unique identifier associated with a particular digital copy

20

of Boyka Undisputed 4 and the timeframe in which the internet protocol address

21
22

associated with each Defendant accessed that digital copy, UN4 alleges the named

23

Defendants were all part of the same “swarm” of users that reproduced, distributed,

24

displayed, and/or performed the copyrighted work. According to UN4, Defendants

25
26

directly or indirectly shared, downloaded, and distributed a single unique copy of Boyka

27

Undisputed 4 that had been seeded to the torrent network at some undefined point in the

28

past.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 2

1

Defendants did not respond to UN4’s complaint. The Clerk of Court therefore

2

entered default against Defendants at UN4’s request. See Dkts. #81-91. UN4 now seeks

3

judgment against each Defendant.

4

III.

5

DISCUSSION

6

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) authorizes a court to grant default

7

judgment. Prior to entering judgment in defendant’s absence, the Court must determine

8
9

whether the allegations of a plaintiff’s complaint establish his or her liability. Eitel v.

10

McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The court must accept all well-pled

11

allegations of the complaint as established fact, except allegations related to the amount

12
13

of damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987).

14

Where the alleged facts establish a defendant’s liability, the court has discretion, not an

15

obligation, to enter default judgment. Alan Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862

16
17
18
19
20

F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988). If plaintiff seeks an award of damages, it must provide
the Court with evidence to establish the amount. TeleVideo Sys., 826 F.2d at 917-18.
A. Liability Determination.
The allegations in UN4’s complaint establish Defendants’ liability for direct

21
22

copyright infringement. To establish direct infringement, UN4 must demonstrate

23

ownership of a valid copyright and that Defendants copied “constituent elements of the

24

work that are original.” L.A. Printex Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 846

25
26

(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361

27

(1991)). Here, UN4 alleges it owns the exclusive copyright to the motion picture Boyka

28

Undisputed 4 and that Defendants participated in a “swarm” to unlawfully copy and/or
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 3

1

distribute the same unique copy of Boyka Undisputed 4. These allegations were

2

established by entry of default against Defendants. Accordingly, UN4 has established

3

Defendants’ liability for direct copyright infringement.

4
5

B. Default Judgment is Warranted.

6

Having established liability, plaintiff must also show that default judgment is

7

warranted. Courts often apply the factors listed in Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72, to make

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

this determination. Those factors are:
“(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's
substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money
at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material
facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong
policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on
the merits.”
The majority of these factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment against

15
16

Defendants. UN4 may be prejudiced without the entry of default judgment as it will be

17

left without a legal remedy. See Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enters., Inc., 725 F.

18

Supp.2d 916, 920 (C.D. Cal. 2010). UN4’s complaint sufficiently alleges a claim of

19
20

direct copyright infringement, and Defendants did not present any evidence or argument

21

to the contrary. Additionally, the Court finds there is a low probability that default against

22

Defendants was due to excusable neglect: Defendants were given ample opportunity to

23
24

respond to the filings in this matter between the time they were served with UN4’s

25

complaint and the date of this Order. Finally, although there is a strong policy favoring

26

decisions on the merits, the Court may consider Defendants’ failure to respond to UN4’s

27
28
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 4

1
2
3

requests for default and default judgment as admissions that the motions have merit. LCR
7(b)(2).
The Court acknowledges that a dispute concerning the material facts alleged by

4
5

UN4, including the identity of the alleged infringers, could arise in this case. The Court

6

also acknowledges that the amount at stake may be significant depending on the means

7

of each Defendant. UN4 seeks enhanced statutory damages in the amount of at least

8
9

$1,500 along with attorneys’ fees in excess of $1,430 and costs in excess of $95 from

10

each individual Defendant. Notwithstanding these considerations, the Eitel factors

11

weigh in favor of granting default judgment against Defendants.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

C. Appropriate Relief.
UN4 requests entry of a default judgment against each Defendant providing the
following three categories of relief: (1) permanent injunctive relief; (2) statutory
damages; and (3) attorney’s fees and costs. Each category is discussed below.
i.

Permanent Injunctive Relief

Permanent injunctive relief is appropriate. Section 502(a) of Title 17 of the
United States Code allows courts to “grant temporary and final injunctions on such

21
22

terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” As

23

part of a default judgment, courts may also order the destruction of all copies of a work

24

made or used in violation of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b).

25
26

Given the nature of the BitTorrent protocol and Defendants’ participation therein, the

27

Court finds Defendants possess the means to continue infringing in the future. MAI Sys.

28

Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 1993) (granting permanent
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 5

1

injunction where “liability has been established and there is a threat of continuing

2

violations.”). Consequently, the Court will issue a permanent injunction enjoining

3

Defendants from infringing UN4’s rights in Boyka Undisputed 4 and directing them to

4
5
6
7
8
9

destroy all unauthorized copies of Boyka Undisputed 4.
ii.

Statutory Damages

Plaintiff requests an award of statutory damages in the amount of at least $1,500
against each Defendant for his or her participation in the BitTorrent swarm that resulted

10

in the unauthorized download and/or distribution of the seed file containing Boyka

11

Undisputed 4. Although the actual economic damages associated with a lost video rental

12
13

are likely minimal, plaintiff correctly points out that Congress has authorized statutory

14

damages in significant amounts to compensate for difficult-to-prove downstream losses

15

and to deter future infringement. Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters Int’l, Ltd., 149

16
17

F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Peer Int’l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d

18

1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990)). Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), the Court may award

19

statutory damages “for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one

20

work, . . . for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum

21
22

of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just.” The Court has

23

wide discretion when determining the amount of statutory damages and takes into

24

consideration the amount of money requested in relation to the seriousness of the

25
26
27

defendant’s conduct, whether large sums of money are involved, and whether “the
recovery sought is proportional to the harm caused by defendant’s conduct.” Curtis v.

28
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 6

1
2

Illumination Arts, Inc., 33 F. Supp.3d 1200, 1212 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (citing Landstar,
725 F. Supp. 2d at 921).

3

Copyright violations come in all shapes and sizes, from the unauthorized copying

4
5

of a Halloween word puzzle for a child’s party to the unauthorized manufacture and sale

6

of millions of bootleg copies of a new release. While Defendants’ alleged copyright

7

violation is of concern in that it represents a theft of intellectual property, it is a

8
9

relatively minor infraction causing relatively minor injury. UN4 has not shown that any

10

of the Defendants is responsible for the “seed” file that made UN4’s copyrighted work

11

available on the BitTorrent network, nor has UN4 presented evidence that Defendants

12
13

profited from the infringement in any way. Given the range of statutory damages

14

specified in the Copyright Act, the Court finds that an award of $750 for the swarm-

15

related infringements involved in this action is appropriate. Each of the Defendants is

16
17

jointly and severally liable for this amount.
This award is in line with the awards made by other courts in the Ninth Circuit

18
19
20

and appears adequate to deter Defendants from infringing on plaintiff’s copyright in the
future.1 Plaintiff argues that a significantly higher award is necessary to force people

21
22
23

like Defendants to appear and participate in these BitTorrent cases. Plaintiff apparently
wants the Court to raise the statutory damage award to an amount that is at or above the

24
25
26
27
28

UN4 has presented no evidence that Defendants will not be dissuaded from infringing in the future. The
judgment entered in this case, including statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and costs, may be recovered
by garnishing Defendants’ wages and/or seizing and selling their non-exempt property. This is a steep
penalty for having been too lazy to go to the local Redbox or too cheap to pay a few dollars for an
authorized download. Plaintiff offers no evidence to support its contention that personal liability for a
judgment in excess of $500 is of no consequence to the judgment debtor.

1

ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 7

1

anticipated costs of defending this action. A defendant may, however, decide that

2

conceding liability through default is the best course of action given the nature of the

3

claims and the available defenses. The “punishment” for that choice is the entry of

4
5

default judgment and an award of damages under the governing standards. As discussed

6

above, those standards lead to the conclusion that the minimum statutory penalty should

7

apply in this case. Plaintiff offers no support for the proposition that participation in

8
9

federal litigation should be compelled by imposing draconian penalties that are out of

10

proportion to the harm caused by Defendants’ actions or any benefits derived therefrom.

11

Statutory damages are not intended to serve as a windfall to plaintiffs and will not be

12
13
14
15
16
17

used to provide such a windfall here.
The Court will award UN4 $750 in statutory damages for the infringements
involved in this action, for which defendants are jointly and severally liable.
iii.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

18

Finally, UN4 asks the Court to award between $1,437.50 and $1,796.00 in

19

attorneys’ fees and between $97.00 and $142.00 in costs against each Defendant in this

20

matter. Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505, the Court “in its discretion may allow the recovery

21
22
23
24

of full costs by or against any party,” and “may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee
to the prevailing party as part of the costs.”
The Court agrees that UN4 should be awarded attorneys’ fees. Courts consider

25
26

several factors, including “(1) the degree of success obtained, (2) frivolousness,

27

(3) motivation, (4) objective unreasonableness (legal and factual), and (5) the need to

28

advance considerations of compensation and deterrence,” when making attorneys’ fee
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 8

1

determinations under the Copyright Act. Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir.

2

1996) (citing Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1994)). Because UN4 has

3

succeeded on its non-frivolous direct infringement claim2 and because an award would

4
5
6

advance considerations of compensation and deterrence, UN4 is entitled to attorneys’
fees.

7
8
9

However, despite counsel’s efforts to allocate the fees and costs to each
individual defendant, the overall fee request is problematic. Courts determine the

10

amount of a fee award by determining a “lodestar figure,” which is obtained by

11

multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on a matter by a reasonable

12
13

hourly rate. Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1993). Courts

14

may then adjust the lodestar with reference to factors set forth in Kerr v. Screen Extras

15

Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975), to the extent those factors are not

16
17

already subsumed in counsel’s hourly rates or the number of hours expended on the

18

litigation. The relevant Kerr factors here are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the

19

novelty and difficulty of the questions; and (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal

20

services properly.

21

1. Reasonableness of Rate Requested

22

In the Ninth Circuit, the determination of a reasonable hourly rate “is not made

23
24

by reference to rates actually charged the prevailing party.” Chalmers v. City of Los

25
26

Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986). Instead, the reasonable hourly rate is

27
28

Despite the entry of default, the Court specifically declines to enter judgment in plaintiff’s favor on its
indirect and contributory infringement claims.

2

ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 9

1

determined with reference to the prevailing rates charged by attorneys of comparable

2

skill and experience in the relevant community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895

3

(1984). “Generally, when determining a reasonable hourly rate, the relevant community

4
5

is the forum in which the district court sits.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d

6

973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). Courts may also consider “rate determinations in other cases,

7

particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney” as “satisfactory evidence of

8
9
10
11
12
13

the prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896
F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990).
Identifying counsel’s hourly rate is more challenging than it should be. His
hourly rate for “normal” intellectual property cases is now $545/hour, but he has agreed

14

to a reduced rate of $350/hour in this case. Dkt. #98 at ¶7. In a similar BitTorrent matter

15

involving another copyright holder, counsel stated that his reduced rate was $450/hour

16
17

(LHF Prods., Inc. v. Acosta, C16-1175RSM, Dkt. #71 at ¶7), which is the rate he posits

18

is “reasonable and warranted in the Seattle area” in this case (Dkt. #98 at ¶9). The Court

19

assumes, based on the fee calculation charts set forth in counsel’s declarations, that he

20

seeks an hourly rate of $350 in this case. This hourly rate is generally within the norm

21
22
23
24

for BitTorrent cases in this district and is a reasonable rate for the type of formulaic
legal work performed in these matters.
2. Reasonableness of Hours Requested

25
26

Turning to the reasonableness of the hours requested, plaintiff has the burden of

27

documenting the hours expended on this matter and establishing their reasonableness.

28

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). The Court will exclude hours that are
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 10

1

“excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” and therefore not reasonably

2

expended. Id. at 434. Counsel has attempted to calculate the hours spent in connection

3

with UN4’s claims against each individual Defendant by dividing the total number of

4
5

hours spent on collective efforts by the total number of defendants at the time the action

6

was taken. Time spent working solely in pursuit of claims against an individual are

7

allocated wholly to that individual. Dkt. #98 at ¶10. Taking Kirwan as an example,

8
9

counsel seeks compensation for the following activities:
Activity

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Attorney
Time

Legal
Assistant
Time

.4 hours

Review evidence of BitTorrent activity giving rise to
potential claims
Prepare complaint and supporting exhibits
Prepare and file motion to expedite discovery
Communicate with client
Review Court orders
Prepare subpoena and letter to ISPs
Review ISP response and prepare communications
with Defendant
Review Defendant’s “status and history”
Prepare amended complaint and review
Prepare, review, and file waivers and/or summons
Review file
Prepare and file motion for default
Prepare and file motion for default judgment

.3 hours
.6 hours
.1 hours
≈ .1 hours
≈ .2 hours
1 hour

Total:

4.1 hours

.4 hours
.4 hours
.1 hours
.2 hours
.1 hours
.2 hours

.3 hours
.2 hours

.3 hours

22
23

.8 hours

24
25
26

These seemingly modest time expenditures mask the reality of counsel’s fee request.
Until recently, the BitTorrent cases filed in this district all proceeded in a similar

27
28
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 11

1

manner.3 The original complaints list Doe defendants, identified only by IP addresses,

2

and allege infringement of the client’s exclusive rights in a specified motion picture.

3

Groups of Doe defendants are named in the same complaint because they allegedly

4
5

infringed the same digital copy of the copyrighted material by participating in the same

6

BitTorrent “swarm.” The nearly identical complaints are accompanied by nearly

7

identical motions for expedited discovery. Once the Court grants leave to conduct

8
9

expedited discovery, subpoenas are served on the ISP associated with the addresses

10

identified in the log attached to the complaint as Exhibit B. Once in possession of the

11

Doe defendants’ identities, counsel attempts to obtain a settlement of the claims and

12
13

files amended complaints against any non-settling defendants. Service, additional

14

settlements, and defaults/default judgments follow, with the exception of a handful of

15

defendants who are actively litigating the cases in this district. On occasion, counsel

16
17

seeks an extension of time in which to serve.
Almost every filing in this cause of action was essentially copied from scores of

18
19
20

other cases filed by the same counsel.4 There is nothing wrong with utilizing form
documents to pursue identical infringement claims arising from identical activities. As

21
22
23

has been previously noted, however, it is wrong for UN4’s counsel to file identical
complaints and motions with the Court and then expect the Court to believe that he

24
25
26
27
28

The Honorable Thomas S. Zilly has required certain additional disclosures or proffers in BitTorrent
cases pending before him. See Venice PI, LLC v. O’Leary, C17-0988TSZ, Dkt. # 32.
3

The exceptions in this case including the filing of a Second Amended Complaint, a motion for leave to
permit alternative service and an extension of time, and discovery motions related to defendant Mortedha
Al-Sultan.

4

ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 12

1

labored over each filing. LHF Prods., C16-1175RSM, Dkt. #73 at 12. To arrive at his

2

per Defendant fee request, counsel divided time entries related to specific activities by

3

the number of defendants then in the case. When the relatively small time allotments set

4
5

forth in counsel’s declaration related to Kirwan are multiplied by the number of

6

defendants, counsel is seeking compensation for an excessive number of hours. Counsel

7

apparently spent 9.2 hours studying the log of infringing transactions and IP addresses

8
9

that gave rise to this particular lawsuit.5 He spent another 9.2 hours generating a

10

complaint that is virtually identical to the complaints UN4 filed in other cases (not to

11

mention the scores of BitTorrent cases filed on behalf of other clients). Altering the

12
13

form complaint to initiate a new lawsuit is, at this point, a word processing chore: the

14

preparer checks to make sure the correct plaintiff and film are identified, changes the

15

number of Doe defendants in the caption, inserts the correct IP addresses in the section

16
17

of the complaint describing the defendants, and attaches the investigator’s log regarding

18

the relevant swarm as Exhibit B. Charging 9.2 hours of attorney time for this task is

19

unreasonable. Counsel seeks to recover fees for another 12.6 hours spent preparing an

20

amended complaint that was identical to the original except for the caption and the

21
22

correlation of the IP addresses with the subscribers’ names.
A form pleading and motions practice such as this simply does not take the type

23
24

of expertise or time that is normally associated with intellectual property matters. Nor

25
26

does it justify the number of cumulative hours that counsel seeks here. Having reviewed

27
28

5

This case was originally filed against twenty-three Doe defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 13

1

the billing records and dockets in this and other similar matters, the Court finds that the

2

bulk of the “legal” work in these cases was performed and compensated years ago, that

3

these actions now involve far more word processing than drafting or legal analysis, and

4
5

that the attorney time necessary to tailor documents to each case and/or individual is

6

minimal. The Court will award 1 hour, at an hourly rate of $350, to compensate UN4

7

for counsel’s time spent pursuing its claims against each named Defendant, and .8

8
9

hours, at an hourly rate of $145.00, to compensate UN4 for legal assistant time altering

10

pleadings, motions, and service documents. The Court is satisfied that an attorneys’ fee

11

of $466.00 per Defendant is reasonable and sufficient to cover the form-pleading work

12
13

required by this case.
3.

14
15
16
17
18

Costs

UN4 requests between $97.00 and $142.00 in costs from each Defendant.
Recovery of a pro rata portion of the filing fee and the individual costs associated with
the third-party subpoena and service is appropriate.

19

IV.

20
21

CONCLUSION

The Court, having reviewed the motions for default judgment and the remainder

22

of the record, finds adequate bases for default judgment. Accordingly, the Court hereby

23

finds and ORDERS:

24
25
26
27
28

1. UN4’s motions for default judgment are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART.
2. Defendants Kirwan, Penchev, Ramirez, Kuria, Morrison, Lim, Alhegni,
Wentz, Gomez, Salzer, and Casses are hereby permanently enjoined
infringing UN4’s exclusive rights in the motion picture film Boyka
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Undisputed 4, including without limitation by using the Internet to reproduce
or copy Boyka Undisputed 4, to distribute Boyka Undisputed 4, or to make
Boyka Undisputed 4 available for distribution to the public, except pursuant
to lawful written license or with the express authority of UN4;
3. To the extent any unauthorized reproduction or copy of Boyka Undisputed 4
is in Defendants’ possession or subject to their control, they are directed to
destroy it;
4. Defendants are jointly and severally liable for statutory damages in the
amount of $750;
5. Defendant Theresa Kirwan is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the
amount of $466.00 and costs in the amount of $142.00.
6. Defendant Nik Penchev is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the
amount of $466.00 and costs in the amount of $142.00.
7. Defendant Francisco Ramirez is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the
amount of $466.00 and costs in the amount of $142.00.
8. Defendant Lucy Kuria is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the amount
of $466.00 and costs in the amount of $142.00.
9. Defendant Robert Morrison is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the
amount of $466.00 and costs in the amount of $142.00.
10. Defendant Senghout Lim is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the
amount of $466.00 and costs in the amount of $97.00.
11. Defendant Nouredin Alhegni is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the
amount of $466.00 and costs in the amount of $142.00.
12. Defendant Catie Wentz is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the amount
of $466.00 and costs in the amount of $142.00.
13. Defendant Griselda Gomez is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the
amount of $466.00 and costs in the amount of $142.00.
14. Defendant Tara Salzer is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the amount
of $466.00 and costs in the amount of $142.00.

28
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 15

1

15. Defendant Curtis Casses is individually liable for attorneys’ fees in the
amount of $466.00 and costs in the amount of $142.00.

2
3
4

Dated this 14th day of March, 2019.

5

A

6

Robert S. Lasnik
United States District Judge

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 16