Floyd v. Geico Insurance Company

Filing 22

ORDER granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's 13 Motion to Compel signed by U.S. District Judge John C Coughenour. (TH)

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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JOHN ANDREW FLOYD,

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Plaintiff,

CASE NO. C17-1154-JCC
ORDER

v.

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GEICO INSURANCE COMPANY,

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Defendant.

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This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to compel (Dkt. No. 13).

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Having thoroughly considered the parties’ briefing and the relevant record, the Court hereby

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GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion for the reasons explained herein.

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I.

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BACKGROUND
Defendant terminated Plaintiff, a claims handling supervisor and long-time employee,

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days after it allegedly learned that a default judgment had been entered relating to one of the

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claims that Plaintiff’s subordinates managed. (Dkt. No. 13 at 7.) Just prior to his termination,

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Plaintiff threatened Defendant with legal action regarding his personal medical benefits. (Dkt.

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No. 1-1 at 5–7.) Plaintiff brought a wrongful termination suit alleging disability and age

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discrimination, that his termination was retaliatory, and that Defendant used the default judgment

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as a pretext for Plaintiff’s termination. (Id.)

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Plaintiff served written discovery on January 3, 2018. (Dkt. No. 13 at 9.) Included were
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the following interrogatories:

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INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Please identify why plaintiff was terminated from
employment with GEICO, including: (1) how plaintiff was informed of your
decision to terminate his employment; and (2) any written documentation
supporting your determination to terminate his employment.

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INTERROGATORY NO. 11: For the years 2012-2017, please identify each
instance of disciplinary action taken by GEICO against an employee as a result of
the entry of a default judgment against a GEICO insured. For each instance,
identify: (1) the name of the employee disciplined; (2) the nature of the
disciplinary action; (3) the date of the disciplinary action; and (4) whether the
individual remains employed by GEICO.

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(Dkt. Nos. 13 at 5; 15-12 at 4, 5, 8.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s response “largely ignores”

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Interrogatory No. 4 and was “evasive” and “contorts the thrust” of Interrogatory No. 11. (Dkt.

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No. 13 at 10.) Following two attempts to meet and confer to resolve the issues, Plaintiff brings

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the instant motion, asking the Court to compel Defendant to “provide complete, non-evasive

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responses to the interrogatories.” (Id. at 13); (see Dkt. No. 15 at 1).

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II.

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DISCUSSION
The Court strongly disfavors discovery motions and prefers that the parties resolve the

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issues on their own. However, if the parties are unable to do so, a party may move for an order to

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compel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). Litigants “may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not

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privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” Surfvivor Media, Inc. v.

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Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005). “Relevant information for purposes of

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discovery is information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”

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Id. “A request for discovery should be considered relevant if there is any possibility that the

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information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of this action.” Ragge v.

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MCA/Universal Studios, Inc., 165 F.R.D. 601, 604 (C.D. Cal. 1995). “The party who resists

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discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of

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clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” Cable & Computer Tech., Inc. v. Lockheed

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Saunders, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 646, 650 (C.D. Cal. 1997). This burden is a heavy one in employment

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discrimination lawsuits, where discovery rules are construed liberally so as to provide the

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plaintiff with “broad access to the employers’ records.” Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio,

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490 U.S. 642, 643 (1989).

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A.

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Defendant has supplemented its response to Interrogatory No. 4 since Plaintiff moved to

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compel. (See Dkt. Nos. 19-4 at 6; 19-5 at 4.) Defendant’s response, as supplemented, adequately

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addresses the interrogatory. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel a full and adequate

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response to Interrogatory No. 4 is DENIED as moot.

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B.

Interrogatory No. 4

Interrogatory No. 11

In a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must normally demonstrate that an otherwise permissible

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reason for his or her termination was pretextual. E.E.O.C. v. Boeing Co., 577 F.3d 1044, 1049

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(9th Cir. 2009). One method is to show more favorable treatment of a similarly situated

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employee, i.e., a comparator. Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Interrogatory No. 11 is Plaintiff’s attempt to seek out such information. To be similarly situated,

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employees’ situations need only be “sufficiently similar” to “support at least a minimal inference

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that the difference to treatment may be attributable to discrimination.” McGuinness v. Lincoln

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Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 2001) (cited for this proposition in Aragon v. Republic Silver State

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Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 660 (9th Cir. 2002)).

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Defendant objects to Interrogatory No. 11 on the following bases: (1) it seeks information

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on disciplinary decisions made by persons other than the primary decisionmaker in this instance,

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Yvonne Obeng-Curwood, Defendant’s Seattle office Claims Director; (2) it seeks information on

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employees disciplined due to default judgments, whereas Plaintiff was terminated due to his

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pattern of reckless and negligent conduct that was discovered once the default judgment

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occurred; and (3) the interrogatory only asks for information on individuals who were disciplined

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following entry of default judgment, not those who escaped discipline. (Dkt. Nos. 16 at 9–13;

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19-4 at 11–12; 19-5 at 6–7.)
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Typically, comparators must have the same decisionmaker. See Garcia v. Courtesy Ford,

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Inc., Case No. C06-0855-RSL, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2007); Chavez v.

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DaimlerChrysler Corp., 206 F.R.D. 615, 621 (S.D. Ind. 2002). Defendant argues that Ms.

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Obeng-Curwood was the sole decisionmaker and, on this basis, nationwide discovery is

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overbroad. (Dkt. No. 16 at 12.) But this assertion is belied by the record. Before terminating

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Plaintiff, Ms. Obeng-Curwood sought the approval of Defendant’s corporate human resources

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department and general counsel. (Dkt. No. 13 at 9.) According to Defendant, this was no more

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than a perfunctory approval and the substantive termination decision fell squarely on Ms. Obeng-

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Curwood’s shoulders. (Dkt. No. 16 at 12); (see Dkt. No. 18 at 2) (declaration of Ms. Obeng-

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Curwood to this effect). But Plaintiff provides sufficient evidence to make this a debatable issue.

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(See Dkt. Nos. 15-4, 15-5, 21-2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. (b)(1) (“Information . . . need not be

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admissible in evidence to be discoverable.”). Therefore, nationwide discovery of similarly-

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situated employees would not be overbroad.

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Defendant also argues that the information sought in Interrogatory No. 11 is irrelevant

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because Plaintiff was not terminated due to the default judgment. This claim is also contradicted

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by the record. Plaintiff was terminated on March 7, 2017. (Dkt. No. 18-8.) Ms. Obeng-Curwood

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claims she made the decision to do so on March 2, 2017—the day she learned of the entry of

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default judgment. (Dkt. No. 18 at 2–4.) Yet Ms. Obeng-Curwood was presented with some of the

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evidence allegedly demonstrating Defendant’s negligent and reckless conduct in the days

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following March 2. (See Dkt. Nos. 18 at 2; 18-1; 18-6) (describing a March 6, 2017 interview

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with Plaintiff where he admitted to routinely reassigning time sensitive and special handling

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documents back to subordinates for follow-up and not having a system in place to confirm that

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follow-up was performed). This is sufficient to make this issue debatable. Therefore, the

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information resulting from discovery as to employees for whom a default judgment was entered

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would be relevant.

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Finally, Defendant argues that the Court should construe Interrogatory No. 11 as written
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and, therefore, preclude discovery into similarly-situated employees for which no disciplinary

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action was taken. (Dkt. No. 16 at 13.) Defendant’s argument contorts the clear intent of

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Interrogatory No. 11. The purpose of the interrogatory is to gather comparable information. This

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would be meaningless if instances where an employee who entirely escaped disciplinary action

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were excluded from Defendant’s response.

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel a full and adequate response to Interrogatory

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No. 11 is GRANTED. Defendant is DIRECTED to respond to the interrogatory on a nationwide

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basis for all Continuing Unit claims supervisors similarly situated to Plaintiff.

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III.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to compel (Dkt. No. 13) is GRANTED in

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part and DENIED in part. Defendant is DIRECTED to provide information responsive to

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Interrogatory No. 11, as described above, within fifteen (15) days of this order.

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DATED this 27th day of April 2018.

A

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John C. Coughenour
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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