Floyd v. Geico Insurance Company
Filing
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ORDER denying Plaintiff's 47 Motion for Sanctions signed by U.S. District Judge John C Coughenour. (TH)
THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
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JOHN ANDREW FLOYD,
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Plaintiff,
CASE NO. C17-1154-JCC
ORDER
v.
GEICO INSURANCE COMPANY,
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Defendant.
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This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to enforce court order and for
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sanctions (Dkt. No. 47). Having thoroughly considered the parties’ briefing and the relevant
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record, the Court hereby DENIES the motion for the reasons explained herein.
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The Court has described the facts of this case in previous orders (Dkt. Nos. 22, 32) and
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will not repeat them here. Plaintiff now seeks an order enforcing this Court’s previous order that
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Defendant produce all communications between Plaintiff and the claims adjusters on the Ozog,
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Mealing, and Musselman claims (Dkt. No. 46) (“the July 25th order”). (Dkt. No. 47.) Plaintiff
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also asks for the following sanctions: (1) the option of re-deposing any of Defendant’s witnesses,
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at Defendant’s expense, (2) because Mr. White was an unprepared Rule 30(b)(6) witness,
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requiring Defendant to pay for Mr. White’s previous deposition, and (3) an order prohibiting
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Defendant from asserting that Plaintiff did not adequately supervise the Ozog, Mealing, and
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Musselman claims. (Id.) Defendant asserts that it has complied with the July 25th order and that
ORDER
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Plaintiff’s requested sanctions are unnecessary and baseless. (Dkt. No. 54.) As previously stated,
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the Court strongly disfavors discovery motions and prefers that the parties resolve the issues on
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their own.
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I.
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COMPLIANCE WITH THE JULY 25TH ORDER
Plaintiff argues that because Defendant did not comply with the July 25th order,
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Defendant should be prohibited from arguing that Plaintiff failed to adequately supervise the
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Ozog, Mealing, and Musselman claims. (Dkt. No. 47 at 4.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant has
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not complied with the July 25th order because Defendant has not produced emails between
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Plaintiff and his claims adjusters. (Id. at 11–12.) However, Defendant certifies that, even prior to
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the July 25th order, it had already produced all reasonably accessible communications between
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Plaintiff and his claims adjusters, with regard to the Ozog, Mealing, and Musselman claims.
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(Dkt. No. 54 at 5–6.) In an effort to ensure compliance with the July 25th order, Defendant
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backed up additional Outlook records and determined that, it had indeed produced all
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communications between Plaintiff and his claims adjusters with regard to the three claims and
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that any communications found in the Outlook records were duplicative of those already
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produced. (Id. at 7.)
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Plaintiff appears to be arguing that Defendant should be responsible for restoring and
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backing up monthly Outlook records and either (1) producing that duplicative information to
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Plaintiff or (2) ensuring that there is no additional, non-duplicative communications in any of
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those records. What Plaintiff asks for is unnecessarily burdensome and duplicative, and not
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required under the Federal Rules. The Outlook records contain the same information that the
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Atlas database contains (see, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 54 at 5–8, 60-2 at 46) and communications stored on
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the Atlas database have already been produced to Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 54 at 6). The July 25th order
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did not require Defendant to produce identical copies of the communications on all of the
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different servers or databases that Defendant uses; it only required Defendant to produce any
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communications regarding the Ozog, Mealing, and Musselman claims that had not already been
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produced.
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II.
RE-DEPOSING DEFENDANT’S WITNESSES
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Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to the option of re-deposing any of Defendant’s
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witnesses, at Defendant’s expense, because Defendant produced relevant communications either
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right before or after depositions. (Dkt. No. 47 at 5–11.) Plaintiff argues that these productions
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were prejudicial because Plaintiff was unable to question the deponents about the late-produced
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documents. (Id.)
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First, after reviewing the sequence of discovery production and depositions, the Court
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does not find any sequence of production and deposition so prejudicial to Plaintiff that it
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warrants reopening discovery or sanctioning Defendant. Second, Plaintiff did not seek a
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discovery plan and the Federal Rules do not require Defendant to produce all relevant documents
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prior to the deposition of each and every witness. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(3). It would be one
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thing if Plaintiff was requesting to re-depose a specific witness on a specific subject due to
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Defendant’s late disclosure of relevant documents, but Defendant need not pay for additional
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depositions for all of its witnesses merely because Plaintiff would prefer document production
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was completed prior to depositions.
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III.
RE-DEPOSING JOSEPH WHITE
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Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to the cost of Mr. White’s deposition and that
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Defendant should be required to pay for the costs of re-deposing Mr. White, in Seattle, because
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Mr. White was an unprepared Rule 30(b)(6) deponent. (Dkt. No. 47 at 14–15.) Federal Rule of
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Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) allows a party to gather information about a corporation from a person
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designated to serve as the voice of the corporation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). “In determining
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whether a corporation has met its Rule 30(b)(6) obligation, courts examine the degree and type
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of effort made by the corporation to prepare the witness.” Shapiro v. America’s Credit Union,
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Case No. C12-5237-RBL, 2013 WL 12310679, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Wash. 2013). “Broad topics
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of inquiry, however, do not ‘give rise to an obligation to prepare a witness to answer every
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conceivable detailed question relating to the topic.’” Id. (citing United States v. Guidant Corp.,
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Case No. 3:08-0842, 2009 WL 3103836, slip op. at 3 (M.D. Tenn. 2009)). “[T]he fact that the
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corporate designee cannot answer every question posed during the deposition does not mean that
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the corporation failed to satisfy its Rule 30(b)(6) obligation to prepare the witness.” Id.
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Upon review of Mr. White’s deposition, Defendant met its Rule 30(b)(6) obligation to
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prepare the witness. To prepare for the deposition, Mr. White reviewed the relevant systems and
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documents, and conferred with many people to fill any gaps in his knowledge. (Dkt. Nos. 55 at 2,
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60-2 at 6–7.) Although Plaintiff points out deficiencies in Mr. White’s testimony, Mr. White was
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an overall competent and knowledgeable witness. He provided much of the information Plaintiff
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sought and where there were shortcomings that were brought to Defendant’s attention,
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Defendant followed up with supplemental information and offered to have Mr. White provide the
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supplemental information via declaration. (See Dkt. Nos. 54 at 13, 57-1 at 76.) Mr. White cannot
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be expected to know every detail about the many broad topics in the deposition notice.
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Defendant met its Rule 30(b)(6) obligation and is not required to bear the costs of Mr. White’s
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initial deposition or to pay for another deposition.
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For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to enforce court order and for sanctions
(Dkt. No. 47) is DENIED.
DATED this 25th day of October 2018.
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John C. Coughenour
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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ORDER
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