Venice PI, LLC v. Doe 1 et al

Filing 63

MINUTE ORDER granting plaintiff Venice PI, LLC's 59 Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Defendant Christina Brumann Without Prejudice. Authorized by Judge Thomas S. Zilly. (SWT)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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VENICE PI, LLC,

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Plaintiff,

CHRISTINA BRUMANN (formerly
known as Christina Bannon-Durant),

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MINUTE ORDER

Defendant.

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C17-1219 TSZ

v.

The following Minute Order is made by direction of the Court, the Honorable
Thomas S. Zilly, United States District Judge:
(1)
Plaintiff Venice PI, LLC’s motion, docket no. 59, to dismiss its claims
against defendant Christina Brumann, formerly known as Christina Bannon-Durant,
without prejudice is GRANTED. Plaintiff initiated this action against ten defendants
associated with different Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses that were allegedly part of a
“swarm” infringing plaintiff’s copyrights in the motion picture “Once Upon a Time in
Venice.” Christina Brumann is the sole remaining defendant. On April 22, 2019,
plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, docket no. 59, which the Court treated as a
motion to dismiss without prejudice. See Minute Order (docket no. 60). Brumann has
responded and requested that the Court dismiss plaintiff’s claims against her with
prejudice and award her attorney’s fees under the Copyright Act in an amount to be
determined later. Under the Copyright Act, attorney’s fees are discretionary, and the
Court can decline to award them. See Killer Joe Nevada, LLC v. Does 1-20, 807 F.3d
908, 911 (8th Cir. 2015); Palladium Music, Inc. v. EatSleepMusic, Inc., 398 F.3d 1193,
1200-01 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19
(1994) (setting forth the following nonexclusive factors: frivolousness, motivation,
objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal components of the case),

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MINUTE ORDER - 1

1 and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and
deterrence). When plaintiff filed this action, the law was unsettled, and the copyright
2 infringement claim asserted by plaintiff was arguably “plausible.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Even if the Court dismissed plaintiff’s claims
3 against Brumann with prejudice, the Court would not award Brumann attorney’s fees
under the Copyright Act. Thus, the prospect of attorney’s fees is not a basis to dismiss
4 this matter with prejudice. Brumann contends that, unless this action is dismissed with
prejudice, she will live in fear of plaintiff filing another lawsuit against her. Brumann’s
5 concern should be alleviated by Cobbler Nevada, LLC v. Gonzales, 901 F.3d 1142 (9th
Cir. 2018), which set forth a binding pleading standard for these types of cases. In the
6 absence of “something more” than just an IP address as evidence, see id. at 1145, any
renewed pursuit of copyright infringement claims against Brumann might constitute the
7 type of bad faith and vexatious conduct that could subject plaintiff and/or its attorney to
sanctions under the Court’s inherent power and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See Chambers v.
8 NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1106-09
(9th Cir. 2002).
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(2)
The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Minute Order to all counsel of
10 record and to CLOSE this case.
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Dated this 17th day of June, 2019.

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William M. McCool
Clerk

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s/Karen Dews
Deputy Clerk

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MINUTE ORDER - 2