Ng v. Bing Kung Association et al

Filing 52

ORDER Dismissing Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint with prejudice. Dkt. # 34 . Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are DENIED as moot. Dkt. ## 35 , 38 , 39 . The Court also DENIES as moot Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Res pond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Consolidated Response to Motions to Dismiss, and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Overlength Pages of Plaintiff's Consolidated Response. Dkt. ## 36 , 42 , 46 . Signed by Judge Richard A. Jones. (TH) (cc: Plaintiff via USPS)

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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SING CHO NG,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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Defendant.

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I.

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Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (FAC). Dkt. # 35, 38, 39. Plaintiff opposes those
motions. Dkt. # 47. For the reasons below, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FAC with
prejudice. Dkt. # 34. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are DENIED as moot. Dkt. ## 35,
38, 39.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sing Cho Ng alleges that agents of his landlord, Defendant Bing Kung
Association (BKA), broke into his single room occupancy unit (SRO) on October 8, 2014.
Dkt. # 34, ¶1a. Plaintiff claims that this was a racially motivated civil rights violation and
part of a larger conspiracy between BKA, Defendant Seattle Chinatown International
District Preservation and Development Authority (SCIDpda), and Defendant Department
of Planning and Development of the City of Seattle (DPD). According to Plaintiff,

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INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss pro se

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ORDER

BING KUNG ASSOCIATION, et al.,

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Case No. 2:17-cv-01515-RAJ

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Defendants conspired to evict tenants in Plaintiff’s building through unlawful rent

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increases, unlawful housing practices, targeted discrimination, and harassment. Id., ¶ 6b.

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Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ ultimate goal was to displace tenants in furtherance the

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“7th and Jackson Development” real estate project. Id., ¶ 2d. Plaintiff further alleges that

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DPD encouraged BKA’s “profiteering business” by issuing “a RRIO Certificate” in the

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face of housing violations. Id., ¶¶ 4b & 14.5. Plaintiff was eventually evicted from his

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SRO for nonpayment of rent by court order after an unlawful detainer action in 2015. Id.,

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¶ 2a.

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On October 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed this action against BKA, SCIDpda, DPD, and

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individual Defendants Yao Shen Chin, Ping Mark, Kin Chuen Leung, Tom K. Cheng,

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Sunny Lew, Shek Lau, Jim Locke, Francis Wong, Ming Bo Fung, Paul Mar, Cara Bertron,

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Jim Metz, Geoff Tallent, Faith Lumsden, Diane Sugimura, Melissa Lawrie, John Does and

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Jane Does. Dkt. # 1. Plaintiff also submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis.

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Dkt. # 1. The Honorable Brian A. Tsuchida granted the application. Dkt. # 3. On July 30,

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2018, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Dkt.

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# 30. On August 22, 2018, Plaintiff filed this FAC against the same Defendants except for

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Melissa Lawrie. Dkt. # 34. The FAC also adds DPD official, Don Masoero, as an

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individual Defendant. Id. Plaintiff alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985,

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and asserts various pendant state claims, including civil conspiracy and violations of

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Washington fair-housing statutes. Id.
III. DISCUSSION

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The Court’s authority to grant in forma pauperis status derives from 28 U.S.C. §

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1915. The Court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis plaintiff’s case if the Court

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determines that “the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on

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which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

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immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

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1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints,

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ORDER – 2

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not just those filed by prisoners.”). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks a basis in law or

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fact. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). A complaint fails to state a

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claim if it does not “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007).

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“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under 28

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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels that used when ruling on dismissal under Federal Rule

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of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Day v. Florida, No. 14-378-RSM, 2014 WL 1412302, at *4

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(W.D. Wash. Apr. 10, 2014) (citing Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129). Rule 12(b)(6) permits a

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court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. The rule requires the court to

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assume the truth of the complaint’s factual allegations and credit all reasonable inferences

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arising from those allegations. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). The

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plaintiff must point to factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

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face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). Where a plaintiff proceeds

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pro se, the court must construe the plaintiff’s complaint liberally. Johnson v. Lucent Techs.

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Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th

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Cir. 2010)).

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The allegations in the FAC effectively mirror those pled in Plaintiff’s initial

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complaint. As such, the Court reaches the same conclusion: despite the length of the

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complaint and the amount of supporting documents submitted, none of the evidence

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provides a factual basis to raise Plaintiff’s allegations above mere speculation. Dkt. # 30

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at 4 (noting that Plaintiff’s allegations were based on “rumors, theories, and seemingly

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unrelated events”). Plaintiff fails to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,

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whether under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985, or under Washington state law.

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In the Court’s previous Order, Plaintiff was informed that if he filed an amended

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complaint that does not state a cognizable claim for relief or is otherwise untenable under

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§ 1915(e), the Court would dismiss this action. Dkt. # 30 at 5. As explained above,

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Plaintiff’s FAC does not state a cognizable claim for relief. Therefore, for the reasons

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ORDER – 3

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stated above, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FAC with prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION

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For the reasons stated above, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint with

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prejudice. Dkt. # 34. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are DENIED as moot. Dkt. ## 35,

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38, 39. The Court also DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to

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Respond to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a

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Consolidated Response to Motions to Dismiss, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File

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Overlength Pages of Plaintiff’s Consolidated Response. Dkt. ## 36, 42, 46.

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DATED this 28th day of March, 2019.

A

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The Honorable Richard A. Jones
United States District Judge

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ORDER – 4