Talley v. Superindent of the Clallam Bay Correctional Center

Filing 51

ORDER affirming Judge Donohue's denial of Petitioner's 46 Motion of Bias and Prejudice. The Court finds no evidence upon which to reasonably question Judge Donohue's impartiality and AFFIRMS his denial of Petitioner's request that he recuse himself. Signed by Judge Ricardo S Martinez. **2 PAGE(S), PRINT ALL**(Jerome Talley, Prisoner ID: 631354)(PM) cc: Judge Donohue

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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JEROME TALLEY,
Case No. C17-1586 TSZ-JPD

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Petitioner,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE CLALLAM
BAY CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
Respondent.

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ORDER AFFIRMING JUDGE
DONOHUE’S DENIAL OF MOTION TO
RECUSE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner’s Motion and Declaration of Bias
and Prejudice, in which he seeks the recusal of U.S. Magistrate Judge James P. Donohue from this
case. Dkt. #46. On February 27, 2018, Judge Donohue declined to recuse himself. Dkt. #50. In
accordance with the Local Rules of this District, the matter was then referred to the Undersigned
for review. LCR 3(e).
Petitioner asserts that Judge Donohue should recuse himself because he made “an
erroneous” decision on a habeas petition in 2015. Dkts. #46 at 2 and #49 at 4-5. Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
his impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.” Federal judges also shall disqualify themselves
in circumstances where they have a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).

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ORDER - 1

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Under both 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455, recusal of a federal judge is appropriate

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if “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality

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might reasonably be questioned.” Yagman v. Republic Insurance, 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th

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Cir.1993). This is an objective inquiry concerned with whether there is the appearance of bias, not

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whether there is bias in fact. Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir.1992); United

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States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 881 (9th Cir.1980). In Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540

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(1994), the United States Supreme Court further explained the narrow basis for recusal:

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[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion. . . . [O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts
introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of
prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion
unless they display a deep seated favoritism or antagonism that would make
fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial
that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or
their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.

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Id. at 555.
In the instant motion, the only basis for the recusal request asserted by Petitioner is a
negative ruling made three years ago. Dkts. #46 at 2 and #49 at 4-5. No facts even suggesting
bias or prejudice have been asserted. Therefore, the Court finds no evidence upon which to
reasonably question Judge Donohue’s impartiality and AFFIRMS his denial of Petitioner’s request
that he recuse himself. The Clerk SHALL provide copies of this Order to Petitioner, all counsel
of record, and to Judge Donohue.
DATED this 2 day of March, 2018.

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A

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RICARDO S. MARTINEZ
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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ORDER - 2