Salas v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc et al

Filing 41

ORDER denying defendant PPG's 35 Motion for Protective Order, signed by Judge Ricardo S. Martinez. (SWT)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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v.

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PPG ARCHITECTURAL FINISHES, INC., a
Delaware Corporation, HOFAX PRODUCTS,
INC., a Washington Corporation, JOHN
DOES 1-4,
Defendants.

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This matter comes before the Court on Defendant PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc.’s

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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

Plaintiff,

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Case No. C17-1787RSM

LORENZO SANTIAGO SALAS,

(“PPG”)’s Motion for Protective Order.

Dkt. #35.

PPG seeks an order from the Court

protecting it from “unreasonable discovery demands by plaintiff relative to his notices of [Rule
30(b)(6)] depositions of PPG.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff Lorenzo Santiago opposes this Motion. Dkt.
#37.
A full background of this discovery dispute is unnecessary. This is a products-liability
action in which the plaintiff alleges an aerosol spray can exploded in his hands, causing injury.
See Dkt. #19 at 4.

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PPG contends that the 30(b)(6) topics proposed by Plaintiff are overly broad and unduly

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burdensome because they ask about the manufacturing of the can, which PPG did not do, and

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 1

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which “PPG has little to no insight or opinions on.” Dkt. #35 at 2. PPG believes other parties
and nonparties are more likely to have answers to Plaintiff’s questions. Id. at 5.

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In Response, Plaintiff argues that its topics for deposition meet the relevancy standard

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of Rule 26(b)(1), that Plaintiff is seeking knowledge of PPG and the company Homax that PPG

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acquired, and that, under Washington law, PPG’s “lack of knowledge about how testing is
done, the result of testing and the accuracy and appropriateness of warnings or instructions is

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relevant evidence on liability as if PPG were the actual manufacturer.” Dkt. #37 (emphasis

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added).

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On Reply, PPG argues, inter alia, that this deposition is being used for harassment and
it will drive up the costs of litigation. See Dkt. #38 at 2.

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“A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order

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in the court where the action is pending – or as an alternative on matters relating to a

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deposition, in the court for the district where the deposition will be taken.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

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26(c)(1). “The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from

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annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense…” Id. “The decision to

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issue a protective order rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Seiter v. Yokohama

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Tire Corp., 2009 WL 2461000, *1 (W.D. Wash. 2009).

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The Court has reviewed the briefing of the parties and submitted declarations, and is
once again disappointed that the parties have been unable to resolve this dispute. The parties
appear more interested in highlighting each other’s perceived procedural errors than in properly
exchanging information.
The Court finds PPG has failed to demonstrate good cause for a protective order. PPG,
as a defendant in this case, must have expected to participate in a 30(b)(6) deposition. Such a

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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 2

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deposition is not harassment; the costs of such a deposition are to be expected. If Plaintiff asks

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questions that PPG has “little to no insight or opinions on,” it is free to so answer. This may

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result in a shorter deposition than originally expected. In any event, most of the topics Plaintiff

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intends to inquire about appear to be relevant and answerable for the reasons articulated in

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Plaintiff’s briefing.
Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees under Rule 37(a) is denied. The Court finds that

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PPG’s efforts to limit the topics of deposition were in part an effort to streamline discovery in

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this case and were therefore substantially justified.

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Having reviewed the relevant briefing, the declarations and exhibits attached thereto,
and the remainder of the record, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS that Defendant PPG’s
Motion for Protective Order, (Dkt. #35) is DENIED.

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DATED this 31 day of October, 2018.

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A

RICARDO S. MARTINEZ
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 3