Lindsey v. Shore et al

Filing 5

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION failure to allege facts establishing grounds for the court's subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(2). Plaintiff granted leave to amend complaint with 14 days of this order. Signed by Judge James L. Robart. (PM) cc: plaintiff via first class mail

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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MATTHEW JAMES LINDSEY,
ESQ.,

CASE NO. C17-1841JLR
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION

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Plaintiff,
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v.
DAVID SHORE, et al.,

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Defendants.

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I.

INTRODUCTION

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Before the court are (1) pro se Plaintiff Matthew James Lindsey, Esq.’s 1 complaint
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against various defendants (Compl. (Dkt. # 4)), and (2) Magistrate Judge Brian A.
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Tsuchida’s order granting Mr. Lindsey in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status and
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recommending that the court review Mr. Lindsey’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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In the caption to his complaint, Mr. Lindsey refers to himself as Matthew James
Lindsey, Esq. (Compl. at 1; see also id. at 6.) However, in the body of his complaint, Mr.
Lindsey also refers to himself as Matthew James Lindsey Shore. (See id. at 1, 3.)

ORDER - 1

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§ 1915(e)(2)(B) (IFP Order (Dkt. #3) at 1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), district courts

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have authority to review IFP complaints and must dismiss them if “at any time” it is

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determined that a complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief

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may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

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relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000)

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(clarifying that “section 1915(e) applies to all [IFP] complaints,” not just those filed by

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prisoners). As discussed below, Mr. Lindsey’s complaint falls within the category of

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pleadings that the court must dismiss.

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II.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Lindsey brings suit against several individuals, including: Defendants David

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Shore, Carmencita Coranado, Stella Coranado, and Jacob Shore (collectively,

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“Defendants”). (Compl. at 2.) Mr. Lindsey alleges that the court has subject matter

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jurisdiction over his claims based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Id.

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at 3.) He alleges that the amount in controversy is $615,000.00. (Id. at 4.) He also

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alleges that he is a citizen of Washington State and that Ms. Carmencita Coranado is a

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citizen of California. (Id. at 3.) He further alleges California addresses for Mr. David

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Shore, Ms. Carmencita Coranado, and Ms. Stella Coranado. (Id. at 2.) Mr. Lindsey fails

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to allege an address, residence, or state citizenship for Mr. Jacob Shore.

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Mr. Lindsey’s factual allegations are sparse. His claims apparently involve the

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settlement of an estate. (See id. at 5.) He alleges that the events giving rise to his claim

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occurred in 1999 in Martinez, California. (Id. at 4.) He further alleges that “[t]he

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administrators and attorney’s [sic] failed to give notice and obtain consent for the

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compensations and disbursements to the ‘Existing Beneficiaries’ of the ‘Estate of Marvel

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Shore.’” (Id.) He does not identify who the administrators, attorneys, or existing

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beneficiaries are. (See generally id.) He further alleges that “[t]he beneficiaries are

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requesting that the venue be changed to the state of residency of the remaining

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beneficiaries.” (Id.) He does not allege why the beneficiaries’ request to change venue

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gives rise to a legal claim. (See generally id.) Finally, he alleges that “[i]t has been

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almost 20 years in default, and unsettled.” (Id.) The court presumes that this allegation

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refers to the Estate of Marvel Shore (“the Estate”), but Mr. Lindsey never alleges what

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his connection, if any, is to the Estate, why the Estate is “in default,” why the Estate

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remains “unsettled,” or why any of these circumstances give rise to a claim entitling him

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to relief. (See generally id.) Mr. Lindsey alleges no other facts concerning his possible

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claim or claims. (See generally id.)

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III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The party invoking jurisdiction must allege facts that establish the court’s subject

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matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see also

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short

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and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.”). Further, the court has

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an independent obligation to assess whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case.

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See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that district

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courts are “obligated to consider sua sponte whether [they] have subject matter

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jurisdiction”). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

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jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

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Mr. Lindsey asserts that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims

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based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Compl. at 3.) A federal court’s diversity jurisdiction

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extends to “all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds . . . $75,000 . . . and

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is between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Federal diversity

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jurisdiction requires complete diversity of citizenship between the parties, where each of

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the plaintiffs is a citizen of a different state than each of the defendants. See Morris v.

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Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Mr. Lindsey has

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failed to allege the state citizenship or residency of Mr. Jacob Shore, the court cannot

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determine if the state of citizenship for each of the defendants is different from Mr.

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Lindsey’s state of citizenship. Accordingly, the court cannot establish its jurisdiction and

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must dismiss Mr. Lindsey’s complaint.

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B.

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Dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
Section 1915(e)(2)(B) of Title 28 authorizes a district court to dismiss an IFP

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complaint “at any time” if the court determines: (1) the action is frivolous or malicious;

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(2) the action fails to state a claim; or (3) the action seeks relief from a defendant who is

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immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Section 1915(e)(2) parallels the

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language of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27. The

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complaint therefore must allege facts that plausibly establish the defendant’s liability.

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See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). An IFP complaint must

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contain factual allegations “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

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Id. at 555. An IFP complaint must also comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8,

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which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(1)(2). Although Rule 8’s pleading standard does

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not require “detailed factual allegations,” it demands more than “an unadorned,

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the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

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(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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Even liberally construed, Mr. Lindsey’s factual allegations are wholly inadequate

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to plausibly establish the defendants’ liability and or raise Mr. Lindsey’s “right to relief

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above the speculative level.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although his complaint

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appears to involve the settlement of an estate (see generally Compl.), there is no way for

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either the court or Defendants to discern the nature of Mr. Lindsey’s claims based on his

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sparse allegations. Any such attempt would be mere speculation. Mr. Lindsey’s

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complaint must “contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and

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to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d

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1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Mr. Lindsey’s complaint fails to accomplish this

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requirement. Although his complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, in order

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to overcome the foregoing deficiencies, he must allege sufficient factual matter to place

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Defendants on notice of what his claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Twombly,

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550 U.S. at 555-56. Because Mr. Lindsey fails do so, the court concludes that Mr.

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Lindsey’s complaint fails to state a claim against Defendants, and the court dismisses his

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complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(2).

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ORDER - 5

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C.

Leave to Amend the Complaint
When a court dismisses a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, the court must give the

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plaintiff leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that amendment could not cure the

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defects in the complaint. Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995).

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Thus, the court grants Mr. Lindsey fourteen (14) days to file an amended complaint that

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corrects the deficiencies identified herein. If Mr. Lindsey fails to timely comply with this

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order or fails to file an amended complaint that remedies the aforementioned deficiencies,

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the court will dismiss his complaint without leave to amend.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court DISMISSES Mr. Lindsey’s complaint for

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failure to allege facts establishing grounds for the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and

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for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(2). The court, however,

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GRANTS Mr. Lindsey leave to file an amended complaint with fourteen (14) days of the

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filing of this order.

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Dated this 12th day of January, 2018.

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A

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JAMES L. ROBART
United States District Judge

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