Goetz v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation

Filing 70

ORDER granting 57 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Punitive Damages. Signed by Judge Benjamin H. Settle. (MGC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

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CASE NO. C18-93 BHS

CECILIA GOETZ,
Plaintiff,

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v.
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION, d/b/a AMTRAK,

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

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Defendant.
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This matter comes before the Court on Defendant National Railroad Passenger

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Corporation d/b/a Amtrak’s (“Amtrak”) motion for summary judgment on punitive

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damages. Dkt. 57. The Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of and in

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opposition to the motion and the remainder of the file and hereby grants the motion for

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the reasons stated herein.

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I.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

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This is the third motion for summary judgment on punitive damages arising from

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the same train accident. See Garza v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., C18-5106BHS, 2019

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WL 4849489 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 1, 2019) (“Garza”); Wilmotte v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger

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Corp., C18-0086BHS, 2019 WL 3767133 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2019) (“Wilmotte”).

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Because those citations provide a detailed version of the facts, the Court will only briefly

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address the procedural history of this matter.

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On January 9, 2018, Plaintiff Cecilia Goetz (“Goetz”) filed a complaint for

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damages in King County Superior Court for the State of Washington. Dkt. 1-2. Goetz

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seeks actual and punitive damages. Id. On January 22, 2018, Amtrak removed the

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matter. Dkt. 1.

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On August 21, 2019, Amtrak filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 57. On

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September 9, 2019, Goetz responded. Dkt. 59. 1 On September 13, 2019, Amtrak replied.

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Dkt. 62.

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II. DISCUSSION
A.

Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

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materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

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fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party

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fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the case on which

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the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

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323 (1986). There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record, taken as a whole,

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could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec.

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Goetz filed a redacted version of her response on the electronic docket and provided the Court
with a courtesy copy of the unredacted version. Under the local rules, Goetz must provisionally file an
unredacted version under seal along with a motion to seal. Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 5(g).

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Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (nonmoving party must

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present specific, significant probative evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt”).

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See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a material fact exists

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if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or

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jury to resolve the differing versions of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

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U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d

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626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

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The determination of the existence of a material fact is often a close question. The

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Court must consider the substantive evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must

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meet at trial—e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil cases. Anderson, 477

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U.S. at 254; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. The Court must resolve any factual

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issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party only when the facts specifically

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attested by that party contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party. The

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nonmoving party may not merely state that it will discredit the moving party’s evidence

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at trial, in the hopes that evidence can be developed at trial to support the claim. T.W.

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Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630 (relying on Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Conclusory,

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nonspecific statements in affidavits are not sufficient, and missing facts will not be

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presumed. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888–89 (1990).

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B.

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Merits
“In resolving conflict of law tort questions, Washington has abandoned the lex loci

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delicti rule and follows the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws’ most significant

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relationship test.” Singh v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., 151 Wn. App. 137, 143 (2009)

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(citing Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wn.2d 577, 580 (1976)). This is a two-step

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inquiry involving a weighing of the parties’ contacts with the two jurisdictions and then,

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if the contacts are evenly balanced, evaluating the public policies and governmental

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interests of the concerned states. Id. at 143–44 (citing Johnson, 87 Wn.2d at 58–82).

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“Washington courts have held that these same choice of law principles apply to the issue

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of punitive damages.” Id. at 144–45 (examining Kammerer v. W. Gear Corp., 96 Wn.2d

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416 (1981); Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank of Tampa, Fla., 96 Wn.2d 692 (1981)).

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In determining which jurisdiction has the most significant relationship to a
particular issue, which in this case is the availability of punitive damages, the Court

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weighs “(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing

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the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and

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place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between

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the parties is centered.” Id. at 143 (citing Johnson, 87 Wn.2d at 581). Although the

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Court should consider each category of contacts, the Court starts with the general

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“presumption that in personal injury cases, the law of the place of the injury applies . . . .”

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Zenaida-Garcia v. Recovery Sys. Tech., Inc., 128 Wn. App. 256, 261–62 (2005).

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In this case, as in Garza and Wilmotte, the significant dispute involves the place

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where the conduct causing the injury occurred. Goetz fails to provide any additional

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evidence or argument that persuades the Court that Delaware law should apply. This is

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not a situation in which the majority of relevant decisions or omissions clearly occurred

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in another state. For example, in Singh, the defendant discovered the error in its software

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in California, and it made the decision not to recall the product in California. 151 Wn.

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App. at 146–47. Even though the injury occurred in Washington, the court held that

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California law applied because “the conduct that serves as the basis of the punitive

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damage award here occurred in California and that state has an interest in deterring its

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corporations from engaging in such fraudulent conduct.” Id. at 148.

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Contrary to the facts in Singh, the relevant facts here establish decisions that

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permeated Amtrak’s local and Delaware offices. The initial planning, construction, and

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training occurred in Washington. The local office then sent incorrect information to

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Delaware employees who allegedly failed to adequately review and correct the

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information or travel plan. Then the local employees initiated the trip and failed to heed

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speed warnings immediately before the accident. Based on this multiplicity of contacts,

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Goetz has failed to overcome the presumption that Washington law applies as the place

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of the injury. Thus, Goetz’s punitive damages claim is dismissed for these reasons and

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the reasons set forth in the Court’s orders in Garza, 2019 WL 4849489, and Wilmotte,

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2019 WL 3767133.

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III. ORDER
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that Amtrak’s motion for summary judgment
on punitive damages, Dkt. 57, is GRANTED.
Dated this 16th day of October, 2019.

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BENJAMIN H. SETTLE
United States District Judge

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