Rosas et al v. Sarbanand Farms, LLC et al

Filing 34

ORDER denying Defendant Nidia Perez's 20 Motion to Dismiss signed by U.S. District Judge John C Coughenour. (TH)

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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BARBARO ROSAS, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. C18-0112-JCC
ORDER

v.

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SARBANAND FARMS LLC, et al.,

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Defendants.

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This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Nidia Perez’s motion to dismiss (Dkt.

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No. 20). Having thoroughly considered the parties’ briefing and the relevant record, the Court

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hereby DENIES the motion for the reasons explained herein.

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I.

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BACKGROUND 1
Plaintiffs bring this employment class action arising out of Defendants’ recruitment,

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employment, and treatment of foreign H-2A farm workers. (Dkt. No. 12 at 1.) The sole claim

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against Defendant Nidia Perez is for violation of the Washington Farm Labor Contractor Act

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(“FLCA”). (Id. at 31.)

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Defendant Munger Bros. (“Munger”) is a California blueberry producer owned by Kewel
and Baldev Munger. (Id. at 3–4.) The Mungers also own Defendant Sarbanand Farms

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This section summarizes the facts as set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint, which are
assumed to be true, as is appropriate on a motion to dismiss.
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(“Sarbanand”), a Washington blueberry producer. (Id.)

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Ms. Perez, a California resident, was employed by Munger, but also performed work for

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Sarbanand. (Id. at 3, 10.) Ms. Perez contacted putative class members in Mexico to recruit them

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to harvest blueberries for Munger in California and for Sarbanand in Washington. (Id. at 10.)

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Sarbanand paid Ms. Perez a fee to recruit workers who could be transferred to Sarbanand’s

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harvest after completing the blueberry harvest in California. (Id.) Ms. Perez also recruited

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workers on behalf of a third company owned by the Mungers, Crowne Cold Storage (“Crowne”).

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These workers were recruited to package blueberries in California and then be transferred to

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Sarbanand in Washington. (Id. at 10.) Ms. Perez directed the workers she recruited to Defendant

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CSI Visa Processing’s (“CSI”) office to facilitate required H-2A visas. (Id.) She also provided

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CSI with lists of workers to be given visas to work for Crowne, Munger, and Sarbanand. (Id. at

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11.)

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Ms. Perez is not registered or licensed in Washington as a farm labor contractor, nor did

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she obtain a bond to operate as a licensed farm contractor. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that by failing to

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do so, Ms. Perez violated the FLCA. (See Dkt. No. 12). Ms. Perez moves to dismiss pursuant to

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that she is exempt from the FLCA. (See Dkt. No. 20.)

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II.

DISCUSSION

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A.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Standard

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A defendant may move to dismiss when a plaintiff “fails to state a claim upon which

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relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts all

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factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the

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nonmoving party. Vasquez v. L.A. County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). However,

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conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences will not defeat an otherwise proper

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Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Id.; Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

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To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a

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claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). A
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claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw

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the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 678.

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B.

Analysis

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Under FLCA, all farm labor contractors must be licensed. Wash. Rev. Code § 19.30. A

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farm labor contractor is any person who for a fee recruits, solicits, employs, supplies, transports,

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or hires agricultural employees. Wash. Rev. Code § 19.30.010(4)–(5). However, FLCA does not

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apply to persons performing these activities “only within the scope of his or her regular

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employment for one agricultural employer on whose behalf he or she is so acting, unless he or

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she is receiving a commission or fee, which commission or fee is determined by the number of

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workers recruited.” Wash. Rev. Code § 19.30.010(8).
Ms. Perez argues that FLCA exempts employees of agricultural employers, thus, the

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statute does not apply to her. (See Dkt. Nos. 20, 28.) She relies on the FCLA exception for

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persons working within the scope of their employment for “one agricultural employer” who are

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not paid a fee based on the number of workers recruited. Wash. Rev. Code § 19.30.010(8).

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The fact that Ms. Perez is an agricultural employee does not, by itself, bring her under the

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FLCA exception. Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint alleges that Ms. Perez was employed by

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Munger, that she recruited workers to harvest and package blueberries on behalf of three entities

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in both California and Washington, and that Sarbanand paid her a separate fee to recruit workers

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for its harvest. (Dkt. No. 12 at 3, 10.) The Court finds Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts for

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the Court to infer that Ms. Perez performed labor contracting activities on behalf of more than

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one agricultural employer.

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Ms. Perez argues that the FCLA exempts “grower employees” like herself even when

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they recruit workers for more than one employer. (Dkt. No. 28 at 3.) She reasons that the statute

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was “aimed at transient labor contractors” who are difficult to locate and to hold accountable.

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(Id.) This argument relies on a district court’s interpretation of the comparable federal statute, the

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Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”), 29 U.S.C Section 1801, et
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seq. (See Dkt. No. 28 at 9–11) (discussing Escobar v. Baker, 814 F. Supp. 1491 (1993)).

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However, the Washington Supreme Court has since found significant differences between the

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AWPA and the FLCA, holding that the “legislature intended the FLCA to provide farm workers

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protections greater than those provided under the federal scheme.” Perez-Farias v. Glob.

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Horizons, Inc., 286 P.3d 46, 51 (2012). In Perez-Farias, the court cautioned that the FLCA

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“must be liberally construed to further [its] intended [purpose], which . . . includes promoting the

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enforcement of the [statute] and deterrence.” Id. at 52. Thus, the Court finds that the FCLA

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“agricultural employee” exemption does not reach to agricultural employees performing labor

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contracting duties for multiple employers.

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On this basis, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to allow the

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Court to draw a reasonable inference that Ms. Perez is liable under the FCLA.

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III.

CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 20) is DENIED.

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DATED this 7th day of June 2018.

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A

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John C. Coughenour
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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ORDER
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