Langworthy v. State of Washington, et al

Filing 29

ORDER denying Plaintiff's 27 Petition Requesting Dismissal be Set Aside and for Appointment of Counsel, signed by Judge Ricardo S Martinez. (SWT) (cc: Plaintiff via USPS)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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GENEVA LANGWORTHY,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DISMISSAL AND FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Defendant.

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Case No. C18-135RSM

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Geneva Langworthy’s “Petition
Requesting Dismissal be Set Aside and for Appointment of Counsel.” Dkt. #27. Although Ms.

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Langworthy does not set forth the basis for her request to set aside the dismissal of her claims,

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the Court interprets this filing as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule

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60(b), as well as a motion to appoint counsel. Defendants State of Washington and Governor

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Jay Inslee oppose these Motions. Dkt. #28. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES

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these Motions.
A motion for relief from judgment under Rule 59(e) should be granted when the Court:

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“(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence; (2) committed clear error or the initial

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decision was manifestly unjust; or (3) if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.”

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In re Syncor ERISA Litigation, 516 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Rule

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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL - 1

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60(b) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
any of the following six reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Plaintiff Langworthy has failed to present sufficient evidence for relief under either of

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these rules. Ms. Langworthy essentially argues that the Court’s Order dismissing this case was

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based on “questions of form, not content” and that it would be unjust to dismiss her case. Dkt.

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#27. The only specific detail Ms. Langworthy discusses is her explanation for a delay in

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mailing her Amended Complaint. Id. at 2. The Court finds that dismissal was warranted in this

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case under both the Rule 12(b)(5) standard and the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, and that Ms.

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Langworthy has not provided any justification for her failure to respond to Defendants’ Motion

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to Dismiss. See Dkt. #25.

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Ms. Langworthy also argues that her procedural mistakes would not have been
committed if she had counsel. In civil cases, the appointment of counsel to a pro se litigant “is
a privilege and not a right.” United States ex. Rel. Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th

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Cir. 1965) (citation omitted). “Appointment of counsel should be allowed only in exceptional

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cases.” Id. (citing Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1963)). A court must consider

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together “both the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the petitioner to

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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL - 2

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articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Weygandt
v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983).

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The Court notes that Ms. Langworthy previously filed a Motion for court-appointed

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counsel, but withdrew that Motion prior to the Court’s Order dismissing this case. See Dkt.

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#18. Ms. Langworthy has not set forth exceptional circumstances for counsel, nor is there a
likelihood for success on the merits given the Court’s dismissal of her claims. In any event, the

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Court finds that counsel need not be appointed now, after the case has been dismissed.

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Dismissal of Ms. Langworthy’s claims was without prejudice to her filing her claims again in

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the future.
Having reviewed the relevant pleadings and the remainder of the record, the Court

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hereby finds and ORDERS that Plaintiff Geneva Langworthy’s “Petition Requesting Dismissal

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be Set Aside and for Appointment of Counsel,” Dkt. #27, is DENIED. The Clerk shall send a

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copy of this Order to Plaintiff at PO Box 748, Clear Lake, WA 98235.

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DATED this 10 day of July, 2018.

A

RICARDO S. MARTINEZ
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF
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