Sial v. AT&T Services Inc et al

Filing 24

ORDER on Motions to Dismiss and Motion to Remand. The Court grants the motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice (Dkt. # 20 ), DISMISSES Mr. Sial's Title VII claims with prejudice, DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the rem aining state law claims, GRANTS the motion to remand (Dkt. # 15 ), and DENIES the motion to dismiss as moot (Dkt. # 11 ). All further proceedings in this case are REMANDED to the Superior Court for King County in the State of Washington.Per LCR 3(I), case will be remanded 14 days from the date of this Order, on 7/24/2018. Signed by Judge James L. Robart. (TH)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

8
9
10

MUHAMMAD EJAZ SIAL,

11

CASE NO. C18-0458JLR

Plaintiff,

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO
DISMISS AND MOTION TO
REMAND

v.
12
AT&T SERVICES, INC., et al.,

13

Defendants.

14
15

I.

INTRODUCTION

16

Before the court are three motions: (1) Defendant Jie McKnight’s motion to

17

dismiss (MTD (Dkt. # 11)); (2) Plaintiff Muhammad Ejaz Sial’s motion to remand (MTR

18

(Dkt. # 15)); and (3) Mr. Sial’s motion to voluntarily dismiss his Title VII employment

19

claims (MTD (Dkt. # 20)). The court has considered the motions, the parties’

20

submissions in support of and in opposition to the motions, the relevant portions of the

21

//

22

//

ORDER - 1

1

record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised,1 the court grants Mr. Sial’s motion

2

for voluntary dismissal, grants his motion to remand, and denies as moot Ms. McKnight’s

3

motion to dismiss for the reasons set forth below.

4

II.

BACKGROUND

This case arises from Mr. Sial’s contract employment with Defendant AT&T

5
6

Services, Inc. (“AT&T”).2 (See Compl. (Dkt. # 1) ¶ 1.1.) Mr. Sial worked as a

7

contractor for Mobile Integration Workgroup (“MIW”) from February 2013, through

8

February 2015. (Id. ¶ 4.3.) MIW placed Mr. Sial at AT&T where he was Lead Architect.

9

(Id.) Mr. Sial performed his work at AT&T facilities under Ms. McKnight’s supervision.

10

(Id.)

11

According to Mr. Sial, throughout 2013 and 2014, Ms. McKnight told him that he

12

was a “top performer” and offered him permanent employment at AT&T. (Id. ¶ 4.4; see

13

also id. ¶ 4.7.) In December 2014, Mr. Sial requested leave to take care of his infant and

14

wife in February and March of 2015. (Id. ¶ 4.5.) Ms. McKnight told Mr. Sial he could

15

work remotely during that time period. (Id.) Mr. Sial alleges that throughout December

16

2014 and January 2015, he worked on “assigned tasks” while the other members of his

17

team “were out of the office.” (Id. ¶ 4.6.)

18

//

19
20
21
22

1

No party requests oral argument (see MTD at 1; MTR at 1; MVD at 1), and the court
determines that oral argument would not be helpful to its disposition of the motions, see Local
Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4).
2

The court refers collectively to Ms. McKnight and AT&T as “Defendants.”

ORDER - 2

1

In early February 2015, Mr. Sial reminded Ms. McKnight that he would be

2

working remotely, and Ms. McKnight said that he “could not work remotely and would,

3

instead, be given the entire time off.” (Id. ¶ 4.8.) Mr. Sial then met with Ms. McKnight

4

to “offer[] to change his scheduled plans to accommodate [Ms.] McKnight’s wishes.”

5

(Id. ¶ 4.9.) Mr. Sial alleges that Ms. McKnight “screamed and yelled at [him] during this

6

conversation, causing [him] emotional distress.” (Id.)

7

Mr. Sial alleges that despite the fact that no one ever complained about his

8

performance, MIW terminated him at AT&T’s request on February 20, 2015. (Id.

9

¶¶ 4.10, 4.12.) After his termination, Mr. Sial applied for and accepted several other

10

contract jobs at AT&T’s facilities, but each time, he was ultimately barred from returning

11

to work there. (See id. ¶¶ 4.13-4.23.)

12

Mr. Sial is an Asian man of Pakistani origin. (Id. ¶ 4.2.) He alleges that Ms.

13

McKnight made culturally insensitive remarks on at least one occasion. (Id. ¶ 4.4.) Mr.

14

Sial alleges that he was treated differently than his co-workers because he was not

15

allowed to work remotely as they had done. (Id. ¶ 4.11.) He further alleges that

16

Defendants “placed a permanent block on [Mr. Sial’s] ability to work for . . . AT&T or

17

any of its partners because of [Mr. Sial’s] status as a male, Asian, Pakistani who had

18

taken medical leave while working as a contractor for AT&T.” (Id. ¶ 4.17.)

19

Based on the foregoing allegations, Mr. Sial brings claims against AT&T for

20

gender, race, and national original discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

21

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., and the Washington Law Against

22

Discrimination (“WLAD”), RCW 49.60, et seq., (id. ¶¶ 5.1-5.4); “violation of public

ORDER - 3

1

policy” (id. ¶¶ 5.5-5.8); negligent supervision and retention (id. ¶¶ 5.15-5.18); outrage

2

(id. ¶¶ 5.19-5.22); negligent infliction of emotional distress (id. ¶¶ 5.23-5.25); and breach

3

of contract (id. ¶¶ 5.26-5.29). Against Ms. McKnight, Mr. Sial brings claims of

4

intentional interference with business expectancy (id. ¶¶ 5.9-5.14); outrage (id.

5

¶¶ 5.19-5.22); and negligent infliction of emotional distress (id. ¶¶ 5.23-5.25).

6

On March 23, 2018, AT&T removed this case from state court. (Not. of Rem.

7

(Dkt. # 2).) Ms. McKnight then moved to dismiss the claims against her for failure to

8

state a claim. (See MTD (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).) Three days after Ms.

9

McKnight filed her motion, Mr. Sial attempted to voluntarily dismiss his federal Title VII

10

claims. (See Not. (Dkt. # 14) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i)).) Based on that

11

purported dismissal of his only federal claims, he moves to remand the case to state court.

12

(See MTR.) Because Defendants respond that Mr. Sial could not voluntarily dismiss the

13

Title VII claims because AT&T has already answered the complaint (see MTR Resp.

14

(Dkt. # 18)), Mr. Sial moves to voluntarily dismiss those claims with prejudice (see

15

MVD). The court now addresses the parties’ motions.

16
17
18

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Voluntary Dismissal
The court first addresses voluntary dismissal of the Title VII claims. Federal Rule

19

of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) states that a “plaintiff may dismiss an action without a

20

court order by filing . . . a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an

21

answer or a motion for summary judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Otherwise,

22

“an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that

ORDER - 4

1

the court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Because AT&T answered Mr.

2

Sial’s complaint on April 4, 2018—over 20 days before Mr. Sial’s notice of voluntary

3

dismissal—Mr. Sial could not dismiss his Title VII claims without a court order. (See

4

Answer (Dkt. # 6); Not.); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Thus, the court considers

5

whether to grant Mr. Sial’s motion to dismiss those claims with prejudice. (See MVD.)

6

Mr. Sial contends that AT&T will not suffer any prejudice from the dismissal of

7

the Title VII claims, particularly because AT&T denies that Mr. Sial is entitled to any

8

relief on that basis. (Id. at 1-2.) “A district court should grant a motion for voluntary

9

dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) unless a defendant can show that it will suffer some plain

10

legal prejudice as a result.” Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal

11

footnote omitted). The court discerns no plain legal prejudice from dismissal, nor do

12

Defendants identify any prejudice they would suffer. (See Dkt.) Accordingly, the court

13

grants Mr. Sial’s motion and dismisses his Title VII claims with prejudice.

14

B.

Remand

15

Having dismissed the federal claims, the court considers Mr. Sial’s motion to

16

remand, which concerns the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. (See MFR at 2.) Mr. Sial

17

argues that the court has no subject matter jurisdiction after dismissal of the federal

18

claims. (Id.) Defendants disagree and urge the court to exercise supplemental

19

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. (See MTR Resp. at 4.)

20

The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C.

21

§ 1367(a) (“[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims

22

that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form

ORDER - 5

1

part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”).

2

“A state law claim is part of the same case or controversy when it shares a ‘common

3

nucleus of operative fact’ with the federal claims and the state and federal claims would

4

normally be tried together.” Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004)

5

(quoting Trs. of Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. v. Desert Valley

6

Landscape & Maint., Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2003)).

7

The court may, however, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state

8

law claims when the court has dismissed “all claims over which it has original

9

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Indeed, “[t]here is a strong preference in the Ninth

10

Circuit for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction once the federal claim is

11

dismissed.” Wallace v. Smith & Smith Constr., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123 (D. Or.

12

1999) (citing Danner v. Himmelfarb, 858 F.2d 515, 523 (9th Cir. 1988)) (declining to

13

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the plaintiff’s

14

Title VII claims); see also Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir.

15

1997) (en banc) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988))

16

(“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the

17

balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the

18

remaining state-law claims.”). “[V]alues of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity”

19

inform the court’s discretion in deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

20

over the remaining state law claims. See Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001.

21
22

The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Sial’s state law
claims. The court has not yet addressed those claims, issued a scheduling order, or ruled

ORDER - 6

1

on any substantive motions, so judicial economy would not be served by retaining

2

jurisdiction in the early stages of litigation. (See Dkt.); Otto v. Heckler, 802 F.2d 337,

3

338 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The district court . . . has the discretion to determine whether its

4

investment of judicial energy justifies retention of jurisdiction, or if it should more

5

properly dismiss the claims without prejudice.” (internal citation omitted)); Patterson v.

6

Two Fingers LLC, No. CV-15-00494-PHX-NVW, 2015 WL 4537469, at *3 (D. Ariz.

7

July 27, 2015) (stating that retaining jurisdiction would “not promote judicial economy or

8

convenience” because the case “began only four months ago, and the court has not yet

9

issued a scheduling order or ruled on any substantive motions”). In addition, “the lack of

10

any urgency associated with trial preparation ensures that [remand] of the state

11

claims . . . will not compromise any general interest in judicial economy, convenience,

12

fairness, and comity.” La Fontaine v. Vollucci, No. CV 10-7797-GW(SSx), 2012 WL

13

13005844, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2012). Lastly, principles of comity counsel in favor of

14

allowing Washington courts to adjudicate Washington law. (See MTR at 2); Patterson,

15

2015 WL 4537469, at *3; Pittman v. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr.,

16

No. 2:14-cv-07857-SVW-FFM, 2015 WL 13604251, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015)

17

(stating that although the remaining state law claims were “not necessarily complex,”

18

those claims “now predominate what remains of the case”); Almgren v. Shultz,

19

No. C 16-2611 CW, 2016 WL 5815889, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2016) (“Because only

20

state law claims remain, comity strongly favors dismissal.”).

21
22

Defendants’ arguments in favor of the court retaining jurisdiction do not outweigh
those factors. (MTR Resp. at 3-4.) Defendants contend that if the court remands, Ms.

ORDER - 7

1

McKnight will have to refile her motion to dismiss, and if the state court grants that

2

motion, AT&T will then remove the case to federal court on the basis of diversity

3

jurisdiction. (Id. at 4.) Although some efficiency might be gained by retaining

4

jurisdiction, that relatively minor efficiency—especially given its contingent nature—

5

does not obviate the judicial economy and comity concerns outlined above. Cf.

6

Patterson, 2015 WL 4537469, at *3 (“A concern for ‘fairness’ does not require an

7

exemption for all the normal burdens of litigation.”). And most importantly, “remand

8

will not impair [Defendants’] rights.” Newman v. Stanford Health Care,

9

No. 16-cv-01131-BLF, 2016 WL 6393516, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2016).
Nor does Defendants’ contention that Mr. Sial is engaging in forum-shopping

10
11

warrant a different conclusion. Even if it is “obvious” that Mr. Sial seeks “to avoid the

12

[c]ourt’s ruling” on Ms. McKnight’s motion (MTR Resp. at 4), “the Ninth Circuit has

13

treated a plaintiff’s decision to eliminate his federal causes of action upon removal as a

14

tactical decision, rather than one manipulating the forum,” Kisaka v. Univ. of S. Cal.,

15

No. CV 17-01746 BRO (MRWx), 2017 WL 1960636, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2017)

16

(citing Baddie v. Berkeley Farms, Inc., 64 F.3d 487, 491 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also

17

Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 357; Hubbard v. Blue Shield of Cal., No. C 05-2169 SBA,

18

2005 WL 2437047, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005) (stating that forum-shopping is only

19

one factor for consideration).

20

//

21

//

22

//

ORDER - 8

1

Because the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

2

claims, the court grants Mr. Sial’s motion to remand.3 Consequently, the court denies as

3

moot Ms. McKnight’s motion to dismiss.

4

IV.

5

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS the motion for voluntary dismissal

6

with prejudice (Dkt. # 20), DISMISSES Mr. Sial’s Title VII claims with prejudice,

7

DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims,

8

GRANTS the motion to remand (Dkt. # 15), and DENIES the motion to dismiss as moot

9

(Dkt. # 11). The court ORDERS that:

10

1. All further proceedings in this case are REMANDED to the Superior Court for

11

King County in the State of Washington;

12

2. The Clerk shall send copies of this order to all counsel of record for all parties;

13

3. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the Clerk shall mail a certified copy of the

14

order of remand to the Clerk for the Superior Court for King County,

15

Washington;

16

4. The Clerk shall also transmit the record herein to the Clerk of the Court for the

17
18

Superior Court for King County, Washington;
//

19
20
21
22

3

In removal actions, district courts that have declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction have remanded the state law claims to state court rather than dismissed those claims.
See, e.g., McConnell v. Genetech, Inc., No. C 11-4976 SBA, 2012 WL 851190, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 13, 2012) (declining to retain supplemental jurisdiction and remanding to the state court);
Wellisch v. Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 17-cv-00213-BLF, 2018 WL 2463088,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2018) (same); Newman, 2016 WL 6393516, at *1 (same).

ORDER - 9

1

5. The parties shall file nothing further in this matter, and instead are instructed to

2

seek any further relief to which they believe they are entitled from the courts of

3

the State of Washington, as may be appropriate in due course; and

4

6. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case.

5

Dated this 10th day of July, 2018.

6
7

A

8

JAMES L. ROBART
United States District Judge

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

ORDER - 10