Marcos-Chavela v. State of Utah et al

Filing 6

ORDER. This Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. #5 ) with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as legally and factually frivolous and 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Signed by Judge John H. Chun. (SB) (cc: Plaintiff via USPS)

1
2
3
4
5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

6
7
8

SUSAN MARCOS-CHAVELA,
Plaintiff,

9
10
11

CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00975-JHC
ORDER

v.
STATE OF UTAH, et al.,
Defendants.

12
13
14

I.

15

INTRODUCTION

16
17
18

This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. The Court has examined Plaintiff Susan
Marcos-Chavela’s complaint (Dkt. # 5) and for the reasons discussed below DISMISSES it with
prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
II.

19
20
21
22

BACKGROUND
Magistrate Judge Michelle L. Peterson granted pro se Plaintiff in forma pauperis (“IFP”)
status and recommended the complaint be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) before
issuance of summons. Dkt. # 4.

23
24
ORDER - 1

Plaintiff’s claim is difficult to decipher because it is largely illegible. In terms of the

1
2

defendants, all that the Court could discern from the complaint is that Plaintiff intends to sue the

3

State of Utah, the State of South Carolina, and “New England States Collective” for an alleged

4

religious conspiracy. Dkt. # 5. Under the section entitled “Statement of the Claim,” Plaintiff

5

appears to write: “In each State a Religion [undecipherable] collusion to another

6

[undecipherable] have committed heinous acts to inclusion viola[undecipherable]

7

[undecipherable], civil and criminal laws up to Treason.” Id. at 5. In the margin, it appears there

8

is something unintelligible about the “U.S. Navy.” Id. Under the section entitled “Relief,”

9

Plaintiff appears to write: “Remove . . . Amy Coney from Bench. [Undecipherable] protection

10

for [undecipherable] + State of Utah for [undecipherable] for ‘sperm donors.’” Id. In the

11

margin, it appears that it says “Allow [undecipherable] Roman Catholics not [undecipherable].”

12

Id.
III.

13

ANALYSIS

14
A.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

15
Courts must dismiss an IFP complaint if it fails to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
16
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
17
the action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”). Rule 8 requires “a short
18
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
19
P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
20
speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While the law does
21
not require “detailed factual allegations,” it demands more than “an unadorned, the-defendant22
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.
23
Corp., 550 U.S. at 555). A claim must be “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at
24
ORDER - 2

1

570 (“Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable

2

to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.”). Courts need not accept as true a legal

3

conclusion presented as a factual allegation. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Courts construe a pro se

4

plaintiff’s pleadings liberally. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).
Even liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations do not raise their “right to relief above the

5
6

speculative level.” See Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. The Court cannot determine who the

7

parties are, what factual allegations are being asserted, and the legal basis of Plaintiff’s claim.

8

Plaintiff has not stated a claim on which relief may be granted.

9

B.

10

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)
Courts must dismiss an IFP complaint if it is frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)

11

(“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action . . . is

12

frivolous.”). An action is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke

13

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is legally frivolous if it is “based on an

14

indisputably meritless legal theory.” Smith v. Washington, No. C17-5680, 2017 WL 6816511, at

15

*1 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV C17-5680, 2018

16

WL 309786 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2018). A claim is factually frivolous if it is “fanciful.” Neitzke,

17

490 U.S. at 325 (“[The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint, embraces not only the

18

inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.”).

19
20

To the extent that the Court can determine what Plaintiff is saying in their complaint, the
factual allegations appear fanciful and frivolous.

21

It also appears that Plaintiff intends to sue multiple States but has pleaded no facts that

22

would suggest that these States have waived their Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

23

See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 532 (2021) (“Generally, States are

24

immune from suit under the terms of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign

ORDER - 3

1

immunity.”). Nor does the Court have the authority to “remove” Justice Coney Barrett from the

2

“bench.” See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6–7 (conferring the Senate the “sole power to try all

3

impeachments”). The Court cannot grant Plaintiff the remedy they seek and Plaintiff’s legal

4

theory appears wholly meritless. As a result, Plaintiff’s claim is legally frivolous.

5

C.

6

Leave to Amend
When a court dismisses a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, the court must give the plaintiff

7

leave to amend “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect” in the

8

complaint. Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Lopez v. Smith,

9

203 F.3d 1122, 1126–31 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing a district court’s dismissal of a pro se IFP

10
11

claim without leave to amend when the deficiency in the complaint was curable).
Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim. Plaintiff’s complaint is also both factually and

12

legally frivolous. There is no reasonable basis for concluding that amendment could cure this

13

complaint so leave to amend is inappropriate. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed under 28

14

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) with prejudice.
IV.

15

CONCLUSION

16

This Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint (Dkt. #5) with prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
17
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as legally and factually frivolous and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(B)(ii) for failure to
18
state a claim on which relief may be granted.
19
The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record and
20
to any party appearing pro se at said party’s last known address.
21
Dated this 29th day of July, 2022.
22
23

24

John H. Chun
United States District Judge
ORDER - 4