City of Burien v. King County et al

Filing 20

ORDER granting Plaintiff's 14 Motion to Remand. The clerk shall remand this case to Snohomish County Superior Court. Per LCR 3(i), case will be remanded on the 15th day following the date of this Order, on 10/9/2024. Signed by Judge Richard A. Jones. (SB)

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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CITY OF BURIEN, a municipal
coporation,

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO REMAND

Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. 3:24-cv-00433-RAJ

v.
PATRICIA COLE-TINDALL, in her
official capacity as the King County
Sheriff and KING COUNTY, a home
rule charter county,
Defendants.

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I.

INTRODUCTION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. Dkt. # 14.
Defendants assert counterclaims against Plaintiff, Dkt. # 16, and oppose remand of this
matter, Dkt. # 17. The parties do not request oral argument, and the Court does not find
it necessary. The Court has reviewed the motions, the materials filed in support of the
motions, the balance of the record, and the governing law. For the reasons stated below,
the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion.

ORDER - 1

II.

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BACKGROUND

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This matter arises out of a dispute regarding the non-enforcement of a local

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ordinance. Pursuant to the Interlocal Agreement (“ILA”), King County through King

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County Sheriff’s Office (“KCSO”) provides law enforcement services to Plaintiff, the

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City of Burien. See Dkt. # 14 at 5.

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The City Council of Burien adopted Ordinance 832 (the “Ordinance”), titled

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“Unlawful Public Camping,” on March 4, 2024. Dkt. # 16 at 16-20. The Ordinance

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prohibits the use of nonresidential public property as a living space. Id. The Ordinance

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defines this as, “to camp, dwell, lodge, reside, sleep, or exercise nontransitory exclusive

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control over any portion of nonresidential public property.” Id. The nonresidential public

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property includes “any Burien park, street, sidewalk, or any other open area where Burien

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or another governmental agency has a property interest, including easements.” Id. There

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is an exception to the general prohibition when there is no available overnight shelter and

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the use of nonresidential public property as a living space occurs between 7 p.m. and 6

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a.m. the following morning. See id. Noncompliance with the Ordinance is classified as

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a misdemeanor offense. See id.

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In providing services to Burien, Sheriff Patricia Cole-Tindall instructed her

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department not to enforce the Ordinance. Id. King County and Sheriff Cole-Tindall

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(“King County Defendants”) contend that the Ordinance violates federal caselaw. See

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Dkt. # 17 at 3. Defendants acknowledge that KCSO has refused to enforce the Ordinance

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to date. Dkt. # 17 at 2.

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On March 11, 2024, Defendants in the instant action, King County and Sheriff

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Patricia Cole-Tindall, initiated a related lawsuit in federal court seeking declaratory and

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injunctive relief (“federal action”). See Cole-Tindall v. City of Burien, 24-cv-00325-RAJ

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(March 11, 2024). There, Plaintiffs ask this Court to evaluate the constitutionality of the

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Ordinance. See id.

ORDER - 2

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When King County and Sheriff Cole-Tindall brought the federal action instead of
following the procedure outlined in the ILA, the City of Burien filed the instant lawsuit
in Snohomish County Superior Court (“state court action”). Plaintiff, the City of Burien
(“Plaintiff” or “Burien”), argues that pursuant to the ILA, this dispute should have been
referred to an oversight committee. Dkt. # 14 at 5-7. In the state court action, Burien
assert a breach of contract claim requesting specific performance and injunctive relief.
Dkt. # 1-1 ¶¶ 5.1-5.7. King County Defendants then filed a notice of removal to federal
court, Dkt. # 1, and filed counterclaims seeking declaratory judgment regarding the
constitutionality of the Ordinance, Dkt. # 16 ¶¶ 58-61. Burien now asks this Court to
remand this matter to Snohomish County Superior Court. Dkt. # 14
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

A civil action brought in a state court may be removed to a federal district court if
the federal district court could have exercised original jurisdiction over the action. See
28 U.S.C. § 1441. In general, federal jurisdiction exists when a claim either (1) arises
under the Constitution and laws of the United States, or (2) arises between citizens of
different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. §§
1331, 1332.

Federal courts strictly construe the removal statute and must reject

jurisdiction if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.

See

Hawaii ex rel. Louie v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 761 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014);
Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, the defendant has the burden
of establishing that removal is proper. See Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980
(9th Cir. 2005).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “in order for a claim to arise ‘under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,’ ‘a right or immunity created by
the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of

ORDER - 3

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the plaintiff’s cause of action.’” Philips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127
(1974) (quoting Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936)). This essential federal
element must appear in the plaintiff’s own statement of its cause of action. Louisville &
N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); see also Franchise Tax Bd. of State of
Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (“For better or
worse . . . a defendant may not remove a case to federal court unless the plaintiff’s
complaint establishes that the case ‘arises under’ federal law.”).
Whether a complaint raises a federal question is determined by the “well-pleaded
complaint rule,” which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal
question is present on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “The rule makes the plaintiff the master of
the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.”
Id. The well-pleaded complaint rule does not permit a finding of jurisdiction “predicated
on an actual or anticipated defense” or “upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim.”
Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009). It is “settled law that a case may not
be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if the defense is
anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal
defense is the only question truly at issue.” Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 393 (citing
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 12).

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ORDER - 4

IV.

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ANALYSIS

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As all parties in this action are citizens of Washington, see Dkt. #1-1, removal is

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only proper if the court could have exercised federal question jurisdiction over this action

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when it was filed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441. Burien argues this matter must be

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remanded to state court because the Complaint concerns a contract dispute and does not

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present a federal question. See generally Dkts. # 14, 18. King County Defendants assert

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removal is appropriate because Burien’s breach of contract claim raises federal questions

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and “Burien has ‘artfully pleaded’ its complaint as framed a by state claims.” Dkt. # 17

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at 2.

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Under the artful pleading doctrine, “a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting

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to plead necessary federal questions.” Hansen v. Grp. Health Coop., 902 F.3d 1051,

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1057 (9th Cir. 2018). Federal question jurisdiction will exist despite no federal claim

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appearing on the face of the complaint in a “small category of cases” in which a state law

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claim “necessarily raises a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which

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a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance

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of federal and state power.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manning,

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578 U.S. 374, 383 (2016); see also ARCO Env’t Remediation, LLC v. Dep’t of Health &

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Env’t Quality, 213 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that a state-created cause of

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action can be deemed to arise under federal law “where the claim is necessarily federal

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in character”).

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King County Defendants state that the “constitutionality of Ordinance No. 832 is

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an essential element of Burien’s breach of contract and injunctive relief claims.” Dkt. #

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17 at 7. Defendants are wrong. The Complaint alleges breach of contract and seeks

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injunctive relief and damages. Under Washington law, a breach of contract claim

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requires proof of three elements—the existence of a contract, its breach, and resulting

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damages. See Nw. Indep. Forest Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 78 Wash. App. 707,

ORDER - 5

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713 (1995). The basis of this cause of action is King County Defendants’ failure to
perform and comply with the ILA’s dispute resolution process. See Dkt. # 1-1 ¶ 5.2.
Burien does not have the burden to plead or prove the constitutionality of the Ordinance
in asserting a breach of contract claim. There is nothing to suggest that Burien pleaded
the breach of contract claim in a manner to avoid asserting a federal question. Therefore,
the nature of this dispute is not necessarily federal in character and the artful pleading
doctrine does not support removal to federal court.
At most, the disputed constitutionality of the Ordinance relates to a potential
defense against the breach of contract claim. King County Defendants do not dispute
their nonperformance. See Dkt. # 17 at 2. Defendants seem to ask the Court to excuse
their conduct based on the belief that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and ask this Court
to rule on the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Dkts. # 16, 17. This is insufficient to
support removal of the state law claims to federal court.
Defendants have failed to establish removal jurisdiction under the well-pleaded
complaint rule or the artful pleading doctrine. The face of Burien’s Complaint does not
implicate a substantial federal question.

Burien’s state law contract claim is not

necessarily federal in character. Nor is a federal question an element of their state law
contract claim. Instead, Defendants’ argument about the constitutionality of the
Ordinance only raises a federal question defense. Likewise, Defendants’ counterclaims
seeking declaratory judgment of the constitutionality of the Ordinance are insufficient to
support removal to federal court.

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ORDER - 6

V.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion. Dkt. # 14.
The clerk shall remand this case to Snohomish County Superior Court.

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Dated this 24th day of September, 2024.

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A

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The Honorable Richard A. Jones
United States District Judge

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ORDER - 7