Rindal v. Inslee et al

Filing 44

ORDER denying Plaintiff's 32 Motion for Change of Venue. Signed by Judge Tana Lin.(cc: Plaintiff via USPS) (MJV)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

8
9
10
11

STEVEN MICHAEL RINDAL,

12

Plaintiff,

13

v.

CASE NO. 2:24-cv-00890-TL
ORDER ON MOTION FOR CHANGE
OF VENUE

JAY ROBERT INSLEE, et al.,

14

Defendants.

15
16

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Change of Venue. Dkt. No. 32

17

(“Demand for Change of Venue”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), Plaintiff seeks to have this

18

case transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. at 2. Having

19

reviewed the Plaintiff’s motion, Defendants’ Response (Dkt. No. 36), and the relevant record, the

20

Court DENIES the Motion.

21

I.

BACKGROUND

22

This case arises from Plaintiff Steven Michael Rindal’s allegations that the State of

23

Washington violated his federal constitutional rights; committed against him the torts of tortious

24

interference, defamation, and invasion of privacy; and violated Washington’s Administrative

ORDER ON MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE - 1

1

Procedure Act, RCW 34.05, when it revoked his license to practice chiropractic medicine during

2

the COVID-19 pandemic. See Dkt. No. 18 at 2–6. On October 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant

3

motion, asserting that the “unique circumstances of this case and the potential conflicts of

4

interest within the 9th Circuit” require that the Court transfer this case to the U.S. District Court

5

for the District of Columbia. Dkt. No. 32 at 2.
II.

6
7

LEGAL STANDARD

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court

8

may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or

9

to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). As

10

evidenced by their Response to Plaintiff’s Motion, Defendants do not consent to such a transfer.

11

See generally Dkt. No. 36. Therefore, transfer is only appropriate to a district where this case

12

might have been brought, and not to “any other district or division.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

13

The movant must show that the transferee district or division is one in which the suit

14

could have been brought in the first instance—i.e., that venue is proper in the transferee district.

15

See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1979). Venue is

16

proper in:

17
18
19
20
21
22

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is
no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as
provided in this section, any judicial district in which any
defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect
to such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

23
24
ORDER ON MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE - 2

III.

1

DISCUSSION

2

The Court must determine whether the District of Columbia is a proper venue for this

3

case. Because Plaintiff is the movant, it is Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate as much. See Savage,

4

611 F.2d at 279. Upon application of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), it is clear that Plaintiff has not met his

5

burden.

6

As an initial matter, the Court notes that, in his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

7

pleaded that, “Venue is proper in [the Western District of Washington] pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

8

§ 1391(b) because all Defendants are residents of the State of Washington and a substantial part

9

of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this district.” Dkt. No. 18 ¶ 20. As

10

to whether the District of Columbia is also a proper venue, § 1391(b)(1) does not apply, because

11

Plaintiff has not shown that any party to this case is a resident of the District of Columbia.

12

Likewise, § 1391(b)(2) does not apply, because Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint indicates

13

that the proceedings surrounding the suspension of his chiropractic license took place in the State

14

of Washington, and Plaintiff’s Motion does not suggest that anything relevant to his causes of

15

action took place in the District of Columbia. See generally Dkt. Nos. 18, 32. Third, § 1391(b)(3)

16

only applies where venue cannot be brought pursuant to § 1391(b)(1) or (2). As discussed—and

17

as Plaintiff asserted in his Second Amended Complaint—this is plainly not the case here.

18

Moreover, even if venue could not be established under § 1391(b)(1) or (2), Plaintiff has

19

not demonstrated that “any defendant is subject to the [District Court for the District of

20

Columbia’s] personal jurisdiction with respect to” the instant case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3).

21

As to general personal jurisdiction, it exists “where a defendant has continuous and systematic

22

contacts with the forum state such that the defendant is essentially at home in the forum.” Miley

23

v. Hard Rock Hotel & Casino Punta Cana, 537 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2021) (quoting

24

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (internal quotation
ORDER ON MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE - 3

1

marks omitted). None of the Defendants in the instant case is “essentially at home” in the District

2

of Columbia. As to specific personal jurisdiction, the court may exercise it over a nonresident

3

defendant where there is an “affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy.”

4

Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Here, no such affiliation exists:

5

The state government has conducted its business from Olympia, Washington, and its agencies

6

and officers have exclusively directed their inquiries and correspondence regarding the subject

7

matter of the instant complaint toward Plaintiff and his business in Washington. See, e.g., Dkt.

8

No. 18 at 10, 67–111. In short, Plaintiff has not alleged any plausible connection between any

9

Defendant and the District of Columbia.

10

Therefore, because the instant complaint could not have been brought in the District of

11

Columbia, the Court finds it inappropriate to transfer the case there now. Accordingly, the Court

12

DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Change of Venue (Dkt. No. 32).

13

IV.

CONCLUSION

14

Accordingly, the Court orders as follows:

15

Plaintiff’s Motion for Change of Venue (Dkt. No. 32) is DENIED.

16
17

Dated this 25th day of November 2024.

18
19

Tana Lin
United States District Judge

20
21
22
23
24
ORDER ON MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE - 4