United States of America v Steven C. Nagy, et al

Filing 31

ORDER by Judge Benjamin H Settle striking 24 Motion to Dismiss; granting 28 Motion to strike Motion to Dismiss.(TG; cc mailed to defendants)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

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Plaintiff,

CASE NO. C11-5066BHS

v.
STEVEN C. NAGY, aka STEPHEN C.
NAGY, et al.,

ORDER STRIKING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS SULTAN TRUST
ESTATES

Defendants.

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This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Stephen C. Nagy’s (“Nagy”)

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motion to dismiss Defendant Sultan Estates Trust (Dkt. 24) and Plaintiff’s (the “United

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States”) motion to dismiss Nagy’s motion to dismiss Sultan Trust Estates (Dkt. 28). The

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Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the motions

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and the remainder of the file and hereby strikes Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 24)

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for the reasons stated herein.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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The United States brought this action to reduce the income tax liabilities of Nagy

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to judgment and to foreclose federal tax liens upon certain of his real property. See

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Complaint (Dkt. 1) at 2. On February 23, 2011, the United States also served Sultan

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Estates Trust through service of the summons and complaint to Nagy and Lilian Nagy,

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trustees for Sultan Estates Trust. See Dkts. 14, 26.

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On June 15, 2011, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Sultan Trust Estates.

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Acting pro se, Nagy authored and submitted the motion to dismiss to the Court. See Dkt.

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24 (signed by Nagy). On June 30, 2011, the United States responded in opposition. Dkt.

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27. Defendants did not reply.

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ORDER - 1

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On the same day, the United States filed a motion to strike Defendants’ motion to
dismiss. Dkt. 28. No additional briefing has been filed on this motion.
II. DISCUSSION

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Nagy is not a lawyer and appears in this matter pro se. The United States argues

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that these facts prevent Nagy from representing the Sultan Trust Estates. On that basis,

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the United States moves to strike Nagy’s motion to dismiss.

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The general rule in federal litigation is that a non-attorney can represent himself on

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his own behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (stating that “[i]n all courts of the United States the

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parties may plead and conduct their own cases . . . .”); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United

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States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987). However, although an individual has the right

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to represent himself, an individual does not have the right to appear on behalf of anyone

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other than himself. C.E. Pope Equity Trust, 818 F.2d at 697 (citing Russell v. United

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States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962)); see also Knoefler v. United Bank of Bismark, 20

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F.3d 347 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing C.E. Pope Equity Trust, and holding that pro se purported

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trustees had no right to represent trusts). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

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permitted motions to strike and motions to dismiss pleadings filed by pro se parties on

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behalf of entity defendants such as trusts. C.E. Pope Equity Trust, 818 F.2d at 698.

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Further, pursuant to this Court’s local rules, “[a] business entity, except a sole

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proprietorship, must be represented by counsel.” General Rule 2(g)(4)(B). Case law

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within the Ninth Circuit is in accord. It is well-settled that “[a] corporation may appear in

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federal court only through licensed counsel.” United States v. High Country Broad. Co., 3

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F.3d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); see also Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony,

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Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993) (acknowledging that courts

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have held that the rationale for the rule requiring that corporations appear in federal court

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through an attorney “applies equally to all artificial entities”); Church of the New

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Testament v. United States, 783 F.2d 771, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying rule to

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unincorporated associations).

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ORDER - 2

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The rule requiring entity defendants to appear only through counsel applies equally

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to partnerships. As to business entities taking the form of partnerships, the Ninth Circuit

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Court of Appeals has held that a partnership is the sort of entity that may appear only by

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an attorney. D-Beam Ltd. P’ship v. Roller Derby Skates, Inc., 366 F.3d 972, 973-74 (9th

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Cir. 2004) (holding that it is “a longstanding rule that [c]orporations and other

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unincorporated associations must appear in court through an attorney” and applying that

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rule to partnerships) (citation omitted).

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Similarly, the rule requiring entity defendants to appear only through counsel

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applies to trusts. C.E. Pope Equity Trust, 828 F.2d at 698 (holding that even a party’s

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status as trustee does not include the right to present pro se arguments in federal court.

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Further, and more specifically, while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) authorizes a

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trustee of an express trust to sue on behalf of the trust without joining the trust

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beneficiaries, it does not authorize the trustee to proceed pro se. Id.; see also Alpha Land

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Co. v. Little, 238 F.R.D. 497, 502 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“a trust can only be represented by an

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attorney in federal court”) (emphasis in original) (citing C.E. Pope Equity Trust, 828 F.2d

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at 697 and 28 U.S.C. § 1654).

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Nagy has not provided the Court with adequate authority on which to permit him

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to proceed pro se on behalf of Sultan Trust Estates. As such Defendants’ motion to

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dismiss is not properly before the Court.
III. ORDER

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Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the United States’ motion to strike (Dkt.
28) is GRANTED and Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 24) is STRICKEN.
DATED this 10th day of August, 2011.

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A

BENJAMIN H. SETTLE
United States District Judge

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ORDER - 3