Lucas et al v. Camacho et al

Filing 188

ORDER by Judge Benjamin H Settle finding as moot 113 Motion to Disqualify; finding as moot 155 Motion for Reconsideration ; finding as moot 159 Motion to Disqualify; granting 163 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 170 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 175 Motion to Strike; finding as moot 176 Motion to Strike; denying 185 Motion to Strike; denying 186 Motion to Strike.(TG)

1
2
3
4
5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

6
7

8 CHASSIDY F. LUCAS, et al.,
9

Plaintiffs,

10

v.

11 JOE CAMACHO, et al.,
12

Defendants.

CASE NO. C11-5350 BHS
ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO
STRIKE AND GRANTING
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

13
14

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Joe Camacho, Deborah

15 Camacho, and Angela Stephenson’s (“Camacho Defendants”) motion for summary
16 judgment (Dkt. 163), Defendants George and Lori Parker’s (“Parker Defendants”) motion
17 for summary judgment (Dkt. 170), the Parker Defendants’ motion to strike (Dkt. 185),
18 and the Camacho Defendants’ motion to strike (Dkt. 186). The Court has considered the
19 pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the motions and the remainder of the
20 file and hereby denies the motions to strike and grants the motions for summary judgment
21 for the reasons stated herein.
22

ORDER - 1

1

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

2

On May 5, 2011, Plaintiffs Chassidy and Bianca Lucas (“Plaintiffs”) filed a

3 complaint against the Camacho Defendants and the Parker Defendants alleging
4 infringement of intellectual property rights as well as other mostly incomprehensible
5 federal and state law claims. Dkt. 1.
6

On June 5, 2012, the Camacho Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment

7 (Dkt. 163) and the Parker Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 170).
8 On June 13, 2012, Plaintiffs responded. Dkt. 177. On July 5, 2012, the Camacho
9 Defendants replied. Dkt. 178. On July 6, 2012, the Parker Defendants replied.
10

On July 10, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a document titled “Response to Summary

11 Judgment.” Dkt. 184. On July 13, 2012, the Parker Defendants moved to strike the
12 Plaintiffs response. Dkt. 185. On July 16, 2012, the Camacho Defendants moved to
13 strike the Plaintiffs response. Dkt. 186.
14

II. DISCUSSION

15 A.

Motions to Strike

16

Pursuant to Local Rule CR 7(d)(3), any opposition to a dispositive motion shall be

17 electronically filed no later than the Monday before the noting date or mailed no later
18 than the Friday before the noting date.
19

The noting date for both summary judgment motions was July 6, 2012. Plaintiffs

20 filed their second response (Dkt. 184) on July 10, 2012. The Camacho Defendants and
21 the Parker Defendants move the Court to strike the untimely response because it violates
22 the Local Rules and because consideration of the unanswered response would be

ORDER - 2

1 prejudicial. The Court agrees that the response was untimely and could possibly be
2 prejudicial. However, upon review of the late response, it does not alter the Court’s
3 decision as to the merits of the pending motions for summary judgment. Therefore, the
4 Court denies the motions to strike and considers the untimely response (Dkt. 184).
5 B.

Motions for Summary Judgment

6

1.

7

Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

Standard

8 materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
9 fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
10 The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party
11 fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the case on which
12 the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
13 323 (1986). There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record, taken as a whole,
14 could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec.
15 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (nonmoving party must
16 present specific, significant probative evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt”).
17 See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a material fact exists
18 if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or
19 jury to resolve the differing versions of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
20 U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d
21 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
22

ORDER - 3

1

The determination of the existence of a material fact is often a close question. The

2 Court must consider the substantive evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must
3 meet at trial – e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil cases. Anderson, 477
4 U.S. at 254; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. The Court must resolve any factual
5 issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party only when the facts specifically
6 attested by that party contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party. The
7 nonmoving party may not merely state that it will discredit the moving party’s evidence
8 at trial, in the hopes that evidence can be developed at trial to support the claim. T.W.
9 Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630 (relying on Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Conclusory,
10 nonspecific statements in affidavits are not sufficient, and missing facts will not be
11 presumed. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990).
12

2.

13

The Camacho and Parker Defendants move for summary judgment on all of

Defendants’ Motions

14 Plaintiffs’ claims. Whatever the claims may be, Plaintiffs carried the burden on
15 submitting admissible evidence that creates a material issue of fact for trial. Plaintiffs
16 have completely failed to meet this burden. Although Plaintiffs have submitted
17 numerous documents and other materials to the Court, Plaintiffs have failed to show how
18 any particular document is either relevant to one of their claims or admissible. A party
19 may not prevail in opposing a motion for summary judgment by simply overwhelming
20 the court with a miscellany of unorganized documentation. Zoslaw v. MCA Distributing
21 Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Moreover,
22

ORDER - 4

1
2

[i]t is not our task, or that of the district court, to scour the record in search
of a genuine issue of triable fact. We rely on the nonmoving party to
identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary
judgment.

3
Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). Therefore, the Court grants both
4
the Camacho Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the Parker Defendants’
5
motion for summary judgment because Plaintiffs have failed to identify any admissible
6
evidence in support of any claim.
7
III. ORDER
8
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the Camacho Defendants’ motion for
9
summary judgment (Dkt. 163) and the Parker Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
10
(Dkt. 170) are GRANTED and the Parker Defendants’ motion to strike (Dkt. 185) and
11
the Camacho Defendants’ motion to strike (Dkt. 186) are DENIED. The Clerk is
12
directed to enter JUDGMENT for the Camacho and Parker Defendants. All other
13
pending motions (Dkts. 113, 155, 159, 175 & 176) are moot.
14
Dated this 19th day of July, 2012.
15

A

16
17

BENJAMIN H. SETTLE
United States District Judge

18
19
20
21
22

ORDER - 5