Eagle Harbor Holdings, LLC, et al v. Ford Motor Company

Filing 345

ORDER Adopting Claim Constructions by Judge Benjamin H. Settle re #333 Notice-Other filed by Lawrence D. Graham. (TG; cc mailed to Mr. Graham)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 8 9 EAGLE HARBOR HOLDINGS, LLC, and MEDIUSTECH, LLC, 10 Plaintiffs, 11 v. 12 FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 13 Defendant. CASE NO. C11-5503 BHS ORDER ADOPTING CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 This matter comes before the Court on the Special Master Lawrence Graham’s (“Special Master”) proposed claim construction order (Dkt. 333) and Plaintiffs Eagle Harbor Holdings, LLC and MediusTech, LLC’s (“Plaintiffs”) objections (Dkt. 336). The Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the motions and the remainder of the file and hereby adopts the Special Master’s constructions for the reasons stated herein. 21 22 ORDER - 1 1 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 On June 30, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a complaint for patent infringement against 3 Ford. Dkt. 1. On October 20, 2011, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint asserting 4 U.S. Patents Nos. 6,615,137, 6,629,033, 6,778,073 (“‘073 Patent”), 7,146,260, 7,778,739, 5 7,793,136, 8,006,117, 8,006,118, 8,006,119, 8,020,028, and 8,027,268 (the “‘268 6 Patent”) (the “Patents in Suit”). Dkt. 33. 7 On February 24, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint asserting the 8 Patents in Suit. Dkt. 61. On February 25, 2013, the parties agreed to a stipulated 9 dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim of infringement of the 6,629,033 patent. Dkt. 135. 10 On March 18, 2013, the Court appointed Lawrence Graham as a Special Master to 11 assist the Court with the issues of claim construction. Dkt. 140. 12 On July 29, 2013, the Special Master filed an order regarding claim constructions 13 of certain terms of the Patents in Suit. On November 13, 2013, the Court adopted the 14 Special Master’s constructions. Dkt. 184. 15 On May 21, 2014, the Court issued a revised scheduling order setting a schedule 16 for a second claim construction proceeding. Dkt. 275. On June 13, 2014, both parties 17 submitted opening claim construction briefs. Dkts. 284 & 288. On June 30, 2014, both 18 parties responded. Dkts. 310 & 314. On July 9, 2014, the Special Master held a claim 19 construction hearing. Dkt. 326. 20 On August 8, 2014, the Special Master issued an order regarding construction of 21 the terms “download” and “move.” Dkt. 333. On August 15, 2014, Plaintiffs filed 22 objections. Dkt. 336. On August 22, 2014, Ford responded. Dkt. 339. ORDER - 2 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 In this case, Plaintiffs argue that (1) the terms in question should not have been 3 construed, (2) the Special Master erred by assigning a specific narrow meaning, (3) the 4 Special Master erred by relying on expert testimony to contradict the plain and ordinary 5 meaning of the terms, and (4) the terms in question should not be used synonymously. 6 A. Necessity 7 The meaning of language used in a patent claim is construed as a matter of law. 8 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), 9 aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The purpose of claim construction is to “determin[e] the 10 meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed.” Id. at 976. “Claim 11 construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify 12 and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the 13 determination of infringement.” U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 14 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Although “district courts are not (and should not be) required to 15 construe every limitation present in a patent’s asserted claims, . . . it is the court’s duty to 16 resolve [a fundamental dispute regarding the scope of a claim term].” O2 Micro Int’l v. 17 Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 18 In this case, Plaintiffs argue that “the Court should issue an order stating that no 19 construction is required for the disputed terms.” Dkt. 336 at 6. Although the Special 20 Master did not directly address this issue, he implicitly rejected Plaintiffs’ argument by 21 providing constructions for the terms in question. What the Special Master implicitly 22 recognized, the Court explicitly concludes: the parties have presented a fundamental ORDER - 3 1 dispute that relates to the scope of the patent claims. The Special Master summarized the 2 dispute as follows: 3 This is the essence of the dispute, in which Ford argues that loading/downloading in the context of the patents requires the entire application to be made available in an address space for execution while Medius contends that it would be understood to encompass the transfer of only a tiny part of an application from a permanent memory to a working memory so that it can be executed. 4 5 6 Dkt. 333 at 5. “In this case, the ‘ordinary’ meaning of a term does not resolve the parties' 7 dispute . . . .” O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361. Instead, “each party [has provided] an 8 argument identifying the alleged circumstances when the requirement specified by the 9 claim term must be satisfied . . . .” Id. Therefore, the Court concludes that the parties 10 have presented a fundamental legal dispute that must be resolved as a matter of law. 11 B. Meaning 12 “Unless otherwise compelled, when different claims of a patent use the same 13 language, we give that language the same effect in each claim.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc. 14 v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 15 In this case, Plaintiffs argue that the Special Master erred by construing similar 16 terms in the narrowest possible sense. Dkt. 336 at 6–8. First, Plaintiffs assert that 17 “absent a disavowal or definition, when a patentee uses terms interchangeably, all assume 18 the full scope of the broadest term’s ordinary meaning.” Dkt. 336 at 6 (citing Safari, 381 19 at 1120). This proposition is not a rule of law, and, absent such a rule, the Court finds no 20 error of law in the Special Master’s synonymous construction of the terms “move,” 21 “download,” and “load.” To the extent Plaintiffs argue the Special Master construed the 22 ORDER - 4 1 terms in the narrowest possible sense, Plaintiffs have failed to show that such a 2 construction is erroneous in the context of these particular patents. 3 Second, Plaintiffs argue that the Special Master “justified his decision on the 4 grounds that Ford’s expert had proposed a definition of ‘load’ that was based on treatises, 5 and Medius had not.” Dkt. 336 at 7. The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ assessment of 6 the Special Master’s order. In fact, the Special Master specifically stated how a person of 7 ordinary skill in the art would have understood the patents and the terms in question. 8 Dkt. 333 at 17. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ argument on this issue is 9 without merit. 10 C. Expert Testimony 11 In this case, Plaintiffs argue that the Special Master erred by admitting and 12 considering expert opinions. First, Plaintiffs contend that “it is error to consider expert 13 testimony at all in claim construction without first finding that the terms at issue are 14 ambiguous in light of the intrinsic record.” Dkt. 336 at 8 (citing Bell & Howell 15 Document Mgmt. Products Co. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 16 Plaintiffs, however, are simply wrong. Extrinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony 17 is useful for a variety of reasons, and “it is permissible for the district court in its sound 18 discretion to admit and use such evidence.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 19 1318–1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 20 Second, Plaintiffs contend that “even when it is properly considered, expert 21 testimony may not be used to ‘vary or contradict’ disputed claim language.” Dkt. 336 at 22 9 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). ORDER - 5 1 Plaintiffs argue that it is “undisputed that the sense of ‘load’ chosen by Ford’s expert and 2 the Special Master is unrelated to any ordinary meaning of the terms ‘move’ or 3 ‘download’ themselves . . . .” Dkt. 336 at 9. Plaintiffs, however, fail to recognize that 4 the terms of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as they 5 would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the 6 invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. The fact that terms may vary from their 7 ordinary meaning is different than construing terms that vary from how an ordinary 8 person of skill in the art would understand those terms. On the latter issue, the Special 9 Master stated that “the patent seems to presume that a person of ordinary skill would 10 understand what happens when an application is downloaded or moved to a processor.” 11 Dkt. 333 at 9. In other words, the intrinsic evidence does not resolve the parties’ dispute, 12 and the Special Master accepted extrinsic evidence to help fill that void. Therefore, the 13 Court concludes that the Special Master’s use of extrinsic evidence was not legal error. 14 D. Synonymous Terms 15 In this case, Plaintiffs argue that the patents do not use “move” or “download” 16 synonymously with “load.” Plaintiffs essentially disagree with the Special Master’s 17 reasoning. Dkt. 336 at 9–13. The Special Master provided a thorough explanation for his 18 constructions and Plaintiffs fail to provide the Court with alternative rational 19 constructions. Therefore, the Court adopts the Special Master’s constructions. 20 21 22 ORDER - 6 1 III. ORDER 2 Therefore, the Court hereby ADOPTS the Special Master’s order construing 3 “download” and “move.” The Clerk shall issue a partial scheduling order pursuant to 4 Dkt. 275. 5 Dated this 22nd day of September, 2014. A 6 7 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 ORDER - 7

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