Ramirez v. Hart et al

Filing 23

ORDER denying 21 Plaintiff's Motion for Recusal, by Judge Marsha J. Pechman.(MD)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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MARICELA RAMIREZ,

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Plaintiff,

CASE NO. C13-5873 RJB
ORDER ON MOTION FOR
RECUSAL

v.
JOHN L HART, et al.,
Defendant.

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On March 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed “Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Judge to

17 Be Disqualified or Recused.” Dkt. No. 21. The presiding judge, U.S. District Judge Robert J.
18 Bryan, reviewed the motion and declined to recuse himself voluntarily. Dkt. No. 22. In
19 accordance with the Local Rules of this district, the matter has been referred to this Court for
20 review. LCR 3(e).
DISCUSSION

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in

23 any proceeding in which his impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.” A federal judge also
24 shall disqualify himself in circumstances where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a

ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECUSAL- 1

1 party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. 28 U.S.C.
2 § 455(b)(1).
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Under both 28 U.S.C. §144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455, recusal of a federal judge is appropriate

4 if “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s
5 impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Yagman v. Republic Insurance, 987 F.2d 622, 626
6 (9th Cir.1993). This is an objective inquiry concerned with whether there is the appearance of
7 bias, not whether there is bias in fact. Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 734 (9th
8 Cir.1992); United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 881 (9th Cir.1980). In Liteky v. United
9 States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), the United States Supreme Court further explained the narrow basis
10 for recusal:
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[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion. . . . [O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or
events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings,
do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep
seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus,
judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or
even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias
or partiality challenge.

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Id. at 555.
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Reviewing Plaintiff’s motion and accompanying documentation, it is clear that her
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argument that Judge Bryan should recuse himself is based solely on a series of rulings with
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which she disagrees. See Dkt. No. 21, pp. 1-2. This is not a legally sufficient basis for a recusal.
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A judge’s conduct in the context of pending judicial proceedings does not constitute the requisite
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bias under 28 U.S.C. § 144 or § 455 if it is prompted solely by information that the judge
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received in the context of the performance of his duties. Bias is almost never established simply
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because the judge issued an adverse ruling.
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ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECUSAL- 2

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Plaintiff may disagree with Judge Bryan’s rulings, but that is a basis for appeal, not

2 disqualification. Upon review of the record, the Court finds that Judge Bryan’s impartiality
3 cannot reasonably be questioned. There being no evidence of bias or prejudice, Plaintiff’s
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request for recusal is DENIED.

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CONCLUSION
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There is no reasonable basis for a voluntary recusal in this instance.
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Accordingly it is hereby ORDERED that the undersigned DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to
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recuse Judge Bryan..
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The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to Plaintiff and to all counsel.
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Dated this 13th day of March, 2014.
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A

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Marsha J. Pechman
United States Chief District Judge

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ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECUSAL- 3