Nash vs. Lucas

Filing 135

ORDER granting 99 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 134 Plaintiff's Motion to File a Surreply; this matter is closed; signed by Judge Ronald B. Leighton.**4 PAGE(S), PRINT ALL**(Keith Nash, Prisoner ID: 769885)(DN)

HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

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CASE NO. C14-5851-RBL

KEITH L NASH,
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Plaintiff,
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v.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

GARY E LUCAS, et al.
DKT. #99

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Defendants.

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THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt.

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#99]. Plaintiff Keith Nash claims the Defendants, employees of Clark County Jail, violated his

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civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by delaying his access to a notary and to the law library.

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Defendants ask the Court to dismiss his claims, arguing (1) Nash was provided a notary to

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execute a power of attorney, (2) notary service unrelated to litigation is not a civil right, and (3)

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he never filed a grievance about a lack of legal supplies, so failed to exhaust the administrative

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remedies available to him. Nash asserts, in a conclusory fashion, that the Defendants ignored his

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requests for access to the law library and to a notary, which forced him to submit unauthenticated

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pleadings and led to the loss of his car. He similarly asserts he exhausted his administrative

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options by filing a grievance about his need for a notary.

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

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DISCUSSION
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Standard of Review.

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Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

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the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact which would preclude summary

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judgment as a matter of law. Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, it is entitled to

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summary judgment if the non-moving party fails to present, by affidavits, depositions, answers to

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interrogatories, or admissions on file, “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

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trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of

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evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is not sufficient.” Triton Energy Corp. v.

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Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). Factual disputes whose resolution would not

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affect the outcome are irrelevant to the consideration of a motion for summary judgment. See

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In other words, “summary judgment

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should be granted where the nonmoving party fails to offer evidence from which a reasonable

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[fact finder] could return a [decision] in its favor.” Triton Energy, 68 F.3d at 1220.

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B.

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Right to a Notary is Limited.
According to Nash, he requested a notary to execute a power of attorney, and was

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provided one within one month. He argues this delay violated his right to access the courts.

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Defendants argue Nash cannot show he was denied access to a notary for a non-personal matter,

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and the Court agrees.

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) a violation of his

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rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was

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committed by a person acting under the color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 452 U.S. 527, 535,

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DKT. #99 - 2

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101 S. Ct. 108 (1981). To be liable, the wrongdoer must personally cause the violation. Leer v.

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Murphy, 844. F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988).
Notary services are a secured civil right only under limited circumstances. State prison

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authorities must provide indigent inmates “with paper and pen to draft legal documents with

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notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.

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817, 825, 97 S.Ct. 1491 (1977). This access to the courts does not extend indefinitely, however.

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The tools prison authorities must provide “are those that the inmates need in order to attack their

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sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement.

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Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly

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constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,

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355, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (1996) (emphasis in original).
Nash has not shown he requested a notary to challenge his sentence or confinement, and

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that the Defendants denied him such access. Therefore, under Triton Energy Corp., he cannot

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sustain his § 1983 claim against them. See 68 F.3d at 1221.

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C.

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Exhaustion Requirement.
Nash also argues the Defendants delayed his access to the prison’s law library and legal

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supplies. Defendants argue Nash never submitted a grievance regarding access to the law library

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related to challenging his sentence or confinement, and so failed to exhaust his administrative

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remedies.

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The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires inmates in correctional facilities to exhaust

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their administrative remedies through the correctional facility’s grievance process before filling a

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lawsuit related to the conditions of their confinement. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

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DKT. #99 - 3

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Nash has failed to show he filed a grievance about an alleged denial of access to the law

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library or to legal supplies. He therefore failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available

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to him, and cannot now pursue such a claim.

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CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #99] is GRANTED. Nash’s pending
motion [Dkt. #134] is DENIED as moot. The case is closed.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated this 30th day of May, 2017.

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A

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Ronald B. Leighton
United States District Judge

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DKT. #99 - 4