Holmes v. Tacoma Public School District No. 10 et al

Filing 37

ORDER granting 30 Motion for Summary Judgment signed by Judge Benjamin H. Settle.(TG)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

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SANDRA HOLMES,

CASE NO. C16-5317 BHS
Plaintiff,

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v.

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TACOMA PUBLIC SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 10, et al.,

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Defendants.
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This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Tacoma Public School District

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No. 10’s (“District”) motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 30). The Court has considered

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the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the motion and the remainder of the

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file and hereby grants the motion for the reasons stated herein.

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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On January 29, 2016, Plaintiff Sandra Holmes (“Holmes”) filed a complaint

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against the District in Pierce County Superior Court for the State of Washington. Dkt. 1-

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1. Holmes asserts causes of action for wrongful termination and discrimination on the

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basis of her race, disability, and age. Id.

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On April 29, 2016, the District removed the matter to this Court. Dkt. 1.

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On June 28, 2017, the District filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 30. On

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July 17, 2017, Holmes responded. Dkt. 34. On July 21, 2017, the District replied. Dkt.

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35.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

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Holmes was an elementary school teacher for the District from 2006 until the

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District placed her on administrative leave on February 10, 2014. Dkt. 1-1, ¶ 6. On May

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13, 2014, the District officially terminated Holmes. Dkt. 31-2. Holmes appealed the

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termination that same day. Dkt. 31-3. On March 5, 2015, Hearing Officer Robert

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Peterson upheld the termination. Dkt. 31-4.

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On October 5, 2015, Holmes filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

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Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Dkt. 31-5. Holmes alleged that the

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discrimination took place from February 10, 2013, to February 7, 2014. Id. On

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November 2, 2015, the EEOC notified Holmes that her charge “was not timely filed with

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the EEOC.” Dkt. 31-6.

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III. DISCUSSION

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The District argues that Holmes’s claims are barred by her failure to timely

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exhaust her administrative remedies. Dkt. 30. The Court agrees.

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A.

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Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

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materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

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fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party

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fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the case on which

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the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

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323 (1986). There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record, taken as a whole,

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could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec.

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Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (nonmoving party must

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present specific, significant probative evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt”).

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See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a material fact exists

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if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or

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jury to resolve the differing versions of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

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U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d

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626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

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The determination of the existence of a material fact is often a close question. The

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Court must consider the substantive evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must

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meet at trial – e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil cases. Anderson, 477

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U.S. at 254; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. The Court must resolve any factual

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issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party only when the facts specifically

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attested by that party contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party. The

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nonmoving party may not merely state that it will discredit the moving party’s evidence

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at trial, in the hopes that evidence can be developed at trial to support the claim. T.W.

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Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630 (relying on Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Conclusory,

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nonspecific statements in affidavits are not sufficient, and missing facts will not be

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presumed. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990).

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B.

Federal Claims
A plaintiff alleging employment discrimination under Title VII must file a charge

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with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Nat’l Passenger Railroad Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,

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104–105 (2002). Likewise, a plaintiff alleging disability discrimination under the ADA

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must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 42

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U.S.C. § 12117; Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 874, 878 (5th Cir. 2003).

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In this case, the District argues that Holmes did not timely file a charge with the
EEOC. Dkt. 30 at 7–8. Holmes alleged that the discrimination took place from February

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10, 2013, to February 7, 2014, and she filed her charge on October 5, 2015. Dkt. 31-5.

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The Court agrees with the District and the EEOC that her charge was clearly untimely

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because the charge was filed more than 300 days after the alleged discrimination.

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Holmes, however, argues that her termination did not become final until the

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administrative judge upheld the termination. Dkt. 34 at 7. Holmes cites no authority for

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this proposition. Even if this was the alleged unlawful employment practice, Holmes

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failed to include it in her charge to the EEOC. Instead, she only mentioned her

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termination on February 10, 2013 and her union’s denial of her appeal on February 7,

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2014. Therefore, the Court concludes that Holmes failed to timely file a charge with the

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EEOC.

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Although Holmes did not timely file her charge, the Supreme Court has held that

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the “time period for filing a charge is subject to equitable doctrines such as tolling or

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estoppel.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113. “Equitable tolling is, however, to be applied only

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sparingly.” Nelmida v. Shelly Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1997). For

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example, the Supreme Court has allowed equitable tolling when “the statute of

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limitations was not complied with because of defective pleadings, when a claimant was

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tricked by an adversary into letting a deadline expire, and when the EEOC’s notice of the

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statutory period was clearly inadequate.” Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 268 (9th

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Cir. 1992) (collecting cases). “Courts have been generally unforgiving . . . when a late

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filing is due to claimant’s failure ‘to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal

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rights.’” Id. (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)).

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Holmes simply fails to show that she diligently pursued her federal rights. The

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District sent her a termination letter on May 13, 2014, and she could have proactively

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filed a claim with the EEOC that would have been held in suspension until her union

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rights were investigated. Moreover, Holmes asserts that the District’s directive to not

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communicate with any other District employee while she was on paid administrative

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leave stood in her way to fully investigate the facts of the alleged discrimination. Dkt. 34

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at 7. This assertion is undermined by the fact that her union representative was

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investigating the matter on her behalf and Holmes defied the directive and communicated

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with staff regarding the facts surrounding her termination. See Dkt. 31-2 at 9 (“You

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stated that since you have been on [administrative] leave, you have talked with another

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[District] staff member regarding the subject matter of the investigation . . . .”).

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Therefore, the Court concludes that Holmes has failed to show that she is entitled to

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equitable tolling and grants the District’s motion for summary judgment on Holmes’s

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federal claims because Holmes did not timely file an EEOC claim.

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C.

State Claims
RCW 4.96.010(1) states that a party must file a claim for damages with a local

governmental entity before commencing a tort action against that entity.
In this case, the District argues that Holmes failed to comply with the notice claim

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statute. Dkt. 30 at 8–10. Holmes contends that this statute only applies to common law

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tort causes of action and does not apply to her claim under the Washington Law Against

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Discrimination, RCW Chapter 49.60. Dkt. 34 at 5. Holmes cites no authority for this

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proposition. In fact, Holmes’s position is directly contrary to multiple authorities. See,

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e.g., Blair v. Washington State Univ., 108 Wn.2d 558, 576 (1987) (“The legislative

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histories of the statutes provide no additional support for the plaintiffs’ contention that

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discrimination actions are exempt from the requirements of” the similar claim notice

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statute applicable to state entities). Therefore, the Court grants the District’s motion for

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summary judgment on Holmes’s state law claims because she failed to comply with the

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notice claim statute.

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IV. ORDER

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Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the District’s motion for summary

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judgment (Dkt. 30) is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter JUDGMENT for the District

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and close this case.

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Dated this 9th day of August, 2017.

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A

BENJAMIN H. SETTLE
United States District Judge

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