Lindberg v. Mabus

Filing 53

ORDER, signed by Judge Ronald B. Leighton. Re 40 Amended Complaint, 41 Motion to Withdraw Document, 43 MOTION to Compel FOR DISCOVERY 3:16-cv-05671, 44 Emergency MOTION to Compel, 49 MOTION to Consolidate Cases 3:16-cv-05671, and 51 MOTION for Order OF CONSOLIDATION OF 3:16-CV-05671. (DK)

HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

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CASE NO. C16-5671RBL

ANNE LINDBERG,
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Plaintiff,
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v.

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ORDER

RAY MABUS,

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Defendant.

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THIS MATTER is before the Court on the following:

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(1)

Plaintiff Lindberg’s “Motion to Withdraw Document # 40” (so titled in CM/ECF)

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[Dkt. #41]. The title of the document itself is “Motion for Amend Case.” Document #40 is a

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(proposed) amended complaint, filed without leave of court. The purpose of the filing is not

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clear, but the court will treat Dkt. #41 as a Motion for Leave to Amend, and to file the amended

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complaint she already filed at Dkt. # 40.

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Leave to amend a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) “shall be freely given when

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justice so requires.” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Services, LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir. 2010)

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(citing Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). This policy is “to be applied with extreme

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liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003)

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ORDER - 1

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(citations omitted). In determining whether to grant leave under Rule 15, courts consider five

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factors: “bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and

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whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” United States v. Corinthian

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Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). Among these factors, prejudice to

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the opposing party carries the greatest weight. Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052.

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A proposed amendment is futile “if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to

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the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Gaskill v. Travelers

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Ins. Co., No. 11-cv-05847-RJB, 2012 WL 1605221, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 8, 2012) (citing

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Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997)).

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Neither Lindberg’s proposed amended complaint nor the motion meet even the liberal

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Rule 15 standard. First, despite their length, none of Lindberg’s complaints articulates any fact or

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allegation to the Defendant—the Secretary of the Navy—she sued. Her recent filing does not

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state a plausible claim against anyone, certainly not Spencer. Instead, it is a long, vague list of

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complaints by other people and about other people, including Alison McKay:

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ORDER - 2

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[Dkt. # 41 at 4] This has nothing to do with Richard Spencer, or the Navy, or Lindberg’s

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employment there. It does have something to do, apparently, with a series of cases filed by Joe

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Ann West, and Lindberg implausibly claims that she learned about West (and McKay) through

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“Google.” But this Court already pointed out the similar “McKay” allegations—and the similar

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use of “assistant” Ceu Alves—in a prior Order in this case. [See Dkt. # 38] In any event, McKay

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has not appeared in this case. Any claim based on the argument that she practiced law without a

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license and thus that Lindberg (or West) was wrongly discharged, (or that the Navy is liable to

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Lindberg for McKay’s conduct) is nonsensical. The proposed pleading does not state a plausible

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claim against the defendant, it articulates no basis for relief or demand for relief, it has no

ORDER - 3

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coherent statement of facts about the Plaintiff or her employment or termination, and permitting

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its filing would be futile. Furthermore, it has been more than a year and a half since this case was

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filed, and much more than that since the events outlined in Lindberg’s filings. There is no reason

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for the undue delay in asserting these “claims” even if they were plausible or related to Lindberg.

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The Motion to Amend to file the proposed amended complaint is DENIED. The
operative complaint remains Dkt. #1, the sex discrimination employment complaint.
(2)

Lindberg’s Motion to Compel Discovery [Dkt. # 43] and related “Emergency

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Motion to Compel” [Dkt. # 44]. Lindberg seeks broad discovery into cases and events that

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appear to have no connection to her. For example, she seeks information about her assistant Ceu

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Alves, and she seeks salary information about DOJ attorneys who may or may not have played

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some role in the case:

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[Dkt. # 44 at 5]. The Secretary opposes the requests as well beyond the scope of legitimate

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discovery in this sex discrimination case. He also points out that Lindberg’s Motion fails to

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follow the Civil Rules. He is correct. It is not clear what Lindberg is trying to accomplish with

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these discovery requests. They have nothing to do with her case. The Motions to Compel are

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DENIED.

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ORDER - 4

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(3)

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Cases” [Dkt. #51] Lindberg asks the Court to consolidate into this federal court action three

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“civil cases,” which she identifies as: 15-4523A-03311, 16-4523A-1226 and 16-4523A-02785.

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These numbers apparently refer to prior EEOC or other action(s) brought by Lindberg. The

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attachments to her motion demonstrate that each was already dismissed. These cases are not in

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this Court, and the Court has no ability to order them consolidated with this case, even if they

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were still pending. The Motions to Consolidate are DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Motion to Consolidate Cases [Dkt. # 49] and “Motion for Order of Consolidation of

Dated this 21st day of February, 2018.

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A

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Ronald B. Leighton
United States District Judge

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ORDER - 5