Lindberg v. Mabus

Filing 75

ORDER finding as moot 59 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 60 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 64 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 65 Plaintiff's Motion for J udgment; finding as moot 70 Plaintiff's Motion Sanctions for Willful Violation Laws; finding as moot 71 Plaintiff's Motion to Introduce Material/Evidence; finding as moot 73 Defendant's Motion for Relief; Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to amend; this matter is closed; signed by Judge Ronald B. Leighton.(DN)

HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

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Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. C16-5671 RBL

ANNE LINDBERG,
v.

ORDER

RICHARD SPENCER,

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Defendant.

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THIS MATTER is before the Court on the following Motions: Defendant Spencer’s

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Motions for Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 60], and for Relief from deadlines [Dkt. # 73]; and on

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Plaintiff Lindberg’s Motions for Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 59]; to add Joe Ann West’s

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Affidavit [Dkt. #64]; for Judgment Cases Dockets for Case No. 16-5671 [Dkt. # 65]; for

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Sanctions for Willful Violation Laws by Morehead [Dkt. # 70] and to Introduce

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Material/Evidence of Violation of Protective Order [Dkt. # 71].

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Lindberg has been employed at the Navy Shipyard in Bremerton since 1980. She

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received a variety of promotions and positive evaluations, and apparently had a good relationship

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with her employer until 2012.

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ORDER - 1

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Lindberg claims that she was moved from one position to another in 2012. She engaged

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in “EEO activity” regarding that move in May, and in June she was offered a promotion. That

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offer was rescinded, and she was reprimanded for failing to do her then-current job. She claims

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the higher paying job she sought was given to a male, instead. In August, 2012 Lindberg was

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suspended for one day for leaving the job site. She claims that both adverse employment actions

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were instead in retaliation for her EEO activity. She filed another EEOC complaint, for sex

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discrimination that month. Lindberg claims she was denied another promotion in 2014 due to her

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EEO activity. Her EEOC process ended in May 2016 with an “Order/Dismissal in favor of US

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District Court Action.” [Dkt. # 1 at 7]

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She sued shortly thereafter, claiming sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Her
attorney withdrew and Lindberg is proceeding pro se1.

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Spencer now seeks Summary Judgment. He argues, and demonstrates, that Lindberg was

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in fact promoted several times after her initial EEO activity [See Rider Dec. Dkt. #63 at ⁋⁋ 7-10]

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Spencer also demonstrates that Lindberg failed to perform her job duties dating to April 2012,

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prior to her initial EEO activity. He provides excerpts of Lindberg’s own deposition conceding

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some of these points. He also argues, and demonstrates, that Lindberg walked off the job June

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13, 2012, angered when she was given a written reprimand. He argues that that incident—and

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not Lindberg’s prior EEO activity—led to the rescission of the promotion offer made to Lindberg

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just a week before. In fact, in claims, the person who rescinded the offer did not know of the

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EEO complaint. See generally Dkt. # 60 at 2-7, and Declarations and Exhibits referenced therein.

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Since her attorney withdrew, Lindberg has filed motions and other documents wholly unrelated to the facts alleged
in her complaint. Most are complaints and accusations against the Court and the attorneys representing the
Defendant. Some relate to events in her various EEO proceedings, but those events and the players are never
described and none of the records are provided. Lindberg has filed almost nothing that actually addresses the merits
of the claims asserted in the complaint her former attorney filed on her behalf.

ORDER - 2

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Lindberg’s own Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #59] is a long list of repeated

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complaints, accusations, and rhetorical questions. At times it hints at the underlying facts related

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to her employment and the claims she put at issue in her complaint, but it includes no evidence;

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instead it claims that “emails are available” and that evidence will be provided at trial. It

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references the underlying EEO process but does not include any of the evidence she apparently

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wants the Court to review. The following excerpt is typical of the entire document:

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ORDER - 3

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[Dkt. 59 at 14-15]. Lindberg concludes her Motion by asking the Court to rule in her favor as a

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matter of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to her:

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[Dkt. # 59 at 19]. But that is not the summary judgment standard.
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on
file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether
an issue of fact exists, the Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Anderson Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986) (emphasis added); Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194,
1197 (9th Cir. 1996). A genuine issue of material fact exists where there is sufficient evidence
for a reasonable factfinder to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The
inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52.
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is no evidence which supports an
element essential to the nonmovant’s claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Once the movant has met this burden, the nonmoving party then must show that there is a

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ORDER - 4

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genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. If the nonmoving party fails to establish the

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existence of a genuine issue of material fact, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

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matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24.

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There is no requirement that the moving party negate elements of the non-movant’s case.

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Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). Once the moving party has met its

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burden, the non-movant must then produce concrete evidence, without merely relying on

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allegations in the pleadings, that there remain genuine factual issues. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

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Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

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Lindberg has not met her burden of demonstrating that, viewed in the light most

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favorable to Spencer, the evidence (of which she has supplied none2) demonstrates that she is

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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Her Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #59] is

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therefore DENIED.

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The Court will consider this Motion (and each of Lindberg’s other recent motions and
filings) as part of her response to Spencer’s own Motion.
But on their own, Lindberg’s other Motions have no merit. She seeks to “add” the

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affidavit of Joe Ann West [Dkt. # 64] That Motion is GRANTED and the Court has reviewed

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the affidavit. But West’s affidavit (similar in tone and content to Bishop’s) does not address

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Lindberg’s actual claims, or Spencer’s Motion for Summary Judgment on them. West is not a

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member of Lindberg’s “class”; this is not a class action. And her repeated accusations about

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attorney Alison McKay, the U.S. Attorneys’ office and the Court are not relevant to any issue in

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Lindberg’s case.

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The Court read the Declaration of Kelley Bishop [Dkt. #50], filed in connections with a prior set of Lindberg
Motions. It repeats many of the accusations in Lindberg’s filings about the U.S. Attorneys’ office and its conduct in
some underlying EEO process but it includes very little that could be construed as admissible evidence, and it does
not touch on the claims in Lindberg’s complaint, at all.

ORDER - 5

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Lindberg’s Motion for Sanctions against Spencer’s attorney in this case [Dkt. # 65] is

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difficult to follow. She apparently complains that her EEO proceedings have been “moved into

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this case,” despite the Court’s order denying her motion to consolidate:

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ORDER - 6

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[Dkt. # 65 at 2-3]. The meaning of this is unclear, but it is clear that Lindberg has not
demonstrated that anyone engaged in sanctionable conduct. The Motion [Dkt. # 65] is DENIED.
Lindberg’s “MOTION Sanctions against the defendant for willful violation of local, state,
and federal laws by Morehead. To adjourn on Plaintiff's favor” [Dkt. # 70] actually purports to
be a reply to Spencer’s response [Dkt. # 69] to her prior Motion for sanctions [Dkt. #65]. It is
similarly off-point and accusatory. To the extent it is a stand-alone Motion, Dkt. # 70 is
DENIED.
Lindberg’s Motion to Introduce Evidence [Dkt. # 71] is also difficult to comprehend. She
again complains about the manner in which the case was defended, but does not address the
substance of her claims or the merits of the pending dispositive Motion. The following excerpt is
typical of the entire filing:

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ORDER - 7

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[Dkt. #71 at 3-4].

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Rhetorical questions, threats, accusations, and references to unknown proceedings

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witnesses and depositions are not “evidence.” A party responding to a summary judgment

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motion does not have to move the Court for leave to file evidence in response. But this sort of

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filing is wholly unhelpful. Lindberg’s Motion to “introduce” this “evidence” [Dkt. # 71] is

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DENIED.

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This leaves Spencer’s summary judgment motion. Lindberg has now filed a response

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[Dkt. # 74] to the motion. Unfortunately, it is not in fact responsive. It is instead a continuation

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of a consistently unproductive strategy of attacking defense counsel and the Court, demanding to

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know “what claim?” led to “the subpoenas,” presumably of witnesses:

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***

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ORDER - 9

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[Dkt. # 74 at 3-5]
The answer, presumably, is the “claim” that Lindberg filed in her complaint this case

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[Dkt. # 1] alleging that she was denied a promotion because of sex discrimination and in

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retaliation for engaging in EEO activity.

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In any event, that is the claim before the Court. The only actual, admissible evidence

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about the claim is supplied by Spencer. He demonstrates that the promotion offer was rescinded

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after Lindberg walked off the job.

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Lindberg’s numerous filings rarely address, and do not support this claim. Buried deeply

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in her final filing, Lindberg does repeat one statement that she attributes to Timothy Morris (who

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she apparently claims rejected her promotion):

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[Dkt. # 74 at 24]. But her quoting it in a brief is not evidence, and the statement alone is not

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enough establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. It certainly is not enough to

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demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered basis for the promotion’s rescission—Lindberg

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walked of the job in a fit of anger—was pretextual. Lindberg does not address this event. Nor

ORDER - 10

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does she ever address her sex discrimination claim. She instead asks the Court if it thinks she

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ever experienced sex discrimination in 37 years at a shipyard. That is a rhetorical question, and it

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is not evidence that something actionable happened.
There is simply no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Lindberg was

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the victim of sex discrimination, or that the Navy retaliated against her in 2014 for her 2012 EEO

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activity. Spencer’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 60] is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s

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Lindberg’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to amend.
The Motion for Relief from Deadlines [Dkt. # 73] is DENIED as moot. The matter is

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closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated this 7th day of May, 2018.

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A

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Ronald B. Leighton
United States District Judge

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ORDER - 11