Boshears et al vs. Kitsap County et al

Filing 54

ORDER denying 50 Defendant Boyer and Newlin Motion to Dismiss without prejudice; signed by Judge Ronald B. Leighton.(DN)

HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

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CASE NO. C16-6012RBL

WILLIAM BOSHEARS, et al,
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Plaintiffs,
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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS
BOYER’S AND NEWLIN’S MOTION
TO DISMISS

v.
KITSAP COUNTY, et al,

DKT. #50
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Defendants.

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THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Steve Boyer’s and Ned Newlin’s

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Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. #50] Plaintiffs Christina Boshears’, her Estate’s, and surviving family

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members’ claims against them under Federal Civil Rule 12(b)(6). Boshears died while in custody

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at the Kitsap County Jail. At the time, Boyer was the Sheriff of Kitsap County and Newlin was

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the Chief of the Kitsap County Correctional facility. Boshears alleges a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 denial

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of prisoner medical care claim against them.

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I. DISCUSSION
In their Amended Complaint [Dkt. #11], Plaintiffs allege Boyer and Newlin were the

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final policymakers of the Kitsap County Sheriff Office Jail (KCSOJ), where practices, policies,

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and customs demonstrated “deliberate indifference” to inmates’ constitutional right to receive

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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS BOYER’S
AND NEWLIN’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1

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necessary healthcare for “serious medical needs,” such as when “the failure to treat a prisoner’s

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condition could result in further significant injury”—in this case death—or could cause

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“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” See Estella v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct.

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285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). They allege that as the final policymakers, Boyer and Newlin were

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ultimately responsible for the operation, and actual practices, of KCSOJ. They also allege Boyer

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and Newlin failed to assure KCSOJ met minimum federal standards, and instead promulgated

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policies and practices that prioritized aggressively cutting and containing costs over redressing

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inmates’ serious medical needs. This “unwritten” prioritization is allegedly evidenced by the

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Jail’s allowing licensed practical nurses to assess inmates’ health, which Plaintiffs claim exceeds

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the training and licensure of LPNs, and by discouraging transfers of inmates to hospitals, even

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when necessary for treatment of serious, life-threatening medical conditions.

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Upon a motion to dismiss under Federal Civil Rule 12 (b)(6), the Court limits its review

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to the allegations of material fact set forth in the Complaint, which are taken to be true and

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viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party together with all reasonable

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inferences therefrom. See Pierce v. NovaStar Mortg., Inc., 422 F.Supp.2d 1230, 1233 (2006)

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(citing Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998)). Dismissal can be based on both the

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lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable

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legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to

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dismiss and need not be accepted as true. Id.; see also Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121

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(9th Cir. 1992). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need

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detailed factual allegations … , a plaintiff’s obligations to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

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‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

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DKT. #50 - 2

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elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

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555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry

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and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d, 247, 251 (C.A.7 1940)).
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is replete with references to “written” policies requiring

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KCSOJ staff to monitor and to treat inmates withdrawing from opiate addiction that contradict its

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“actual” policy of not monitoring for drug withdrawal. It also references to the contract between

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Defendant Kitsap County and Defendant ConMed (the on-site health services provider), which

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allegedly articulates customs, practices, and policies prioritizing and incentivizing savings. It

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also alleges Boyer and Newlin, as signatories to the contract, had to know, or at the least, should

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have known, the true intent of the KCSOJ’s contract with ConMed: “save money, put safety

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last.”

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As a slogan, this allegation might make a catchy bumper sticker, but as the Supreme

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Court admonishes, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of their entitlement to relief

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requires more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

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555 (2007). On the face of the Complaint, it is evident something went terribly wrong in the jail

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between December 12, 2013 and December 15, 2013 involving Christina Boshears. Whether it

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involved the personal participation of Boyer and/or Newlin cannot be gleaned from Plaintiffs’

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factual assertions, but she has raised a plausible-enough-on-its-face assertion that as contract

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signatories, they had a role in setting the jail’s unwritten policies, or at least should have known

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the effect of those policies on inmates in need of serious medical attention. The Court will

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therefore defer deciding on the claims against Boyer and Newlin until Plaintiffs have had an

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opportunity on summary judgment to present evidence making more concrete the viability of

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their claims against these two individuals.

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DKT. #50 - 3

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II. CONCLUSION

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The Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. #50] is DENIED without prejudice.

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Dated this 22nd day of June, 2017.

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A

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Ronald B. Leighton
United States District Judge

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DKT. #50 - 4