Caffall v. Berryhill

Filing 25

ORDER Denying 22 Motion to Amend Judgment signed by Hon. Mary Alice Theiler. (KMP)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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SCOTT R. CAFFALL,
Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. C17-5051-MAT

v.
ORDER

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NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,

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Defendant.
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This matter comes before the Court on the Commissioner’s motion to alter or amend the

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order and judgment previously entered in this case (Dkt. 19, 21), under Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 59(e). Dkt. 22. The Commissioner contends that the Court’s order contains clear error

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in finding that Plaintiff met Listing 12.05C, and that even if Plaintiff did meet that listing, the

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Court should have remanded the case for further proceedings to consider the impact of Plaintiff’s

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drug addiction and alcoholism (DAA) before finding him disabled. Id. For the reasons explained

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herein, the Commissioner’s motion (Dkt. 22) is DENIED.

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“In general, there are four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted:

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(1) if such motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment

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rests; (2) if such motion is necessary to present newly discovered or previously unavailable

ORDER
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evidence; (3) if such motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) if the amendment is

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justified by an intervening change in controlling law.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101,

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1111 (9th Cir. 2011). Rule 59(e) provides an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly

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in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources. McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d

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1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999).

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The Commissioner argues that the Court committed manifest error in finding that Plaintiff
met Listing 12.05C, which has three prongs:
(1)

Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive
functioning initially manifested during the developmental period; i.e., the evidence
demonstrates or supports onset of impairment before age 22;

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(2)

A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ score of 60 to 70; and

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(3)

A physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant
work-related limitation of function.

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20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.05C (2011). Specifically, the Commissioner argues that

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the Court’s order contains an error of law because it refers to unpublished decisions holding that a

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claimant’s special education and unskilled work history is evidence of deficits in adaptive

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functioning, for purposes of the listing’s first prong. Dkt. 22 at 2-3. The Commissioner

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acknowledges, however, that the Ninth Circuit has published no authority addressing this issue,

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and further acknowledges that unpublished cases “provide a helpful framework for the Court’s

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analysis.” Dkt. 22 at 3.

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The Commissioner also cites 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(b)(7)(iv) (2016), as evidence that

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special education is not per se evidence of deficits in adaptive functioning, is misplaced, because

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this regulation pertains to childhood disability benefits, which are not at issue here, and does not

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pertain to the requirements of Listing 12.05C. The Commissioner has therefore not established

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error in the Court’s finding that Plaintiff satisfied the “deficits in adaptive functioning” prong of

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Listing 12.05C, which is the only prong that was disputed by the parties in light of the ALJ’s

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finding that the other two prongs were satisfied. Dkt. 23 at 3 (citing Dkt. 17 at 3).

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The Commissioner also goes on to argue that even if Plaintiff did meet Listing 12.05C, he

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would not be entitled to benefits if his DAA was “material” to his disability. Dkt. 22 at 3-7. The

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Commissioner fails to explain how if DAA was factored out, Plaintiff would not meet Listing

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12.05C, particularly in light of the Commissioner’s prior concession that Plaintiff meets the second

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and third prongs of the listing. Dkt. 17 at 3 (“There is no dispute that Plaintiff satisfied the second

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and third criteria . . .”). The Commissioner cites no evidence that Plaintiff’s deficits in adaptive

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functioning during the developmental period resulted from DAA. Although she cites Plaintiff’s

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statements indicating that he started smoking marijuana at 15 and used street drugs during the

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decade in which he graduated from high school (Dkt. 24 at 4 n.2), the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s

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learning disabilities and special education spanned his entire educational career. (Administrative

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Record (Dkt. 9) 32.)

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Because the Commissioner has not shown that any of the requirements of Listing 12.05C

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would be impacted by factoring out Plaintiff’s DAA, the Commissioner has failed to show clear

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error in the Court’s order that this matter be remanded for a finding of disability. Accordingly, the

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Commissioner’s motion for relief under Rule 59(e) is DENIED.

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DATED this 12th day of December, 2017.

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A

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Mary Alice Theiler
United States Magistrate Judge

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ORDER
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