Hankins v. US Rof II Legal Title Trust 2015-1 et al

Filing 24

ORDER granting 18 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; Defendant Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. was previously dismissed with prejudice; this matter is DISMISSED with prejudice; signed by Judge Ronald B. Leighton.(DN)

HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

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CASE NO. C17-5142RBL

KIM M HANKINS,
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Plaintiff,
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v.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS

US PROF-2014-S2 LEGAL TITLE
TRUST, et al.,

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Defendants.
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THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ motion1 to dismiss [Dkt. #18]. The
Court previously permitted Hankins to amend her complaint to allege a plausible claim [Dkt.
#15]. She attempted to do so [Dkt. #16]. Defendants seek dismissal again, arguing that Hankins’s
three claims against them depend on her plausibly pleading that they accelerated her debt to

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The moving defendants are: U.S. ROF II Legal Title Trust 2015-1, by U.S. Bank National
Association, as Legal Title Trustee (erroneously sued herein as US ROF II LEGAL TITLE
TRUST 2015-1, by US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Legal Trustee) and PROF2014-S2 Legal Title Trust, by U.S. Bank National Association, as Legal Title Trustee
(erroneously sued as US PROF-2014-S2 LEGAL TITLE TRUST, by US BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, as Legal Trustee). The remaining defendant has already been dismissed. [Dkt.
#23]

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 1

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them—absent acceleration her “foreclosure is time-barred” (or limitations period) claims fail as a

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matter of law and must be dismissed.

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Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal

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theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

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Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff’s complaint must allege

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facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

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1937, 1949 (2009). A claim has “facial plausibility” when the party seeking relief “pleads factual

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content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

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misconduct alleged.” Id. Although the Court must accept as true the Complaint’s well-pled facts,

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conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences will not defeat a Rule 12(c) motion.

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Vazquez v. L. A. County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007); Sprewell v. Golden State

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Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’

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of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

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recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to

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raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

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(2007) (citations and footnotes omitted). This requires a plaintiff to plead “more than an

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unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing

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Twombly).

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On a 12(b)(6) motion, “a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to

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amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured

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by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., 911 F.2d 242,

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247 (9th Cir. 1990). However, where the facts are not in dispute, and the sole issue is whether

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 2

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there is liability as a matter of substantive law, the court may deny leave to amend. Albrecht v.

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Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195–96 (9th Cir. 1988).
The limitations period on an installment note does not begin to run—a claim to enforce

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the note does not accrue—until the note either matures or is accelerated by the creditor. See

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Edmundson v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 740116-4-I I (Washington Court of Appeals Division

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I, July 11, 2016). Where a contract instead calls for payment of an obligation by installments, the

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statute of limitations begins to run for each installment at the time such payment is due. See 25

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Washington Practice §16:20 at 196 (2012-13 Supp.). There is no plausible claim that either has

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occurred here.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Hankins’ first and second claims is GRANTED and those

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claims are dismissed. Because Hankins has already amended once, and because it is clear that

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she cannot plausibly plead that Defendants accelerated her debt to them, leave to amend again is

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DENIED and the dismissal is with prejudice.
Defendants also seek dismissal of Hankins’ third, related declaratory judgment claim,

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asking the court to declare that installment loan payments that she has not made for more than

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six years are not enforceable, even by foreclosure. That is not the law, and as the Defendants

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point out, would not be good policy. That claim too is DISMISSED with prejudice.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated this 31st day of August, 2017.

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A

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Ronald B. Leighton
United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 3