Mason v. Mason

Filing 55

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 40 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 47 Motion to Dismiss; signed by Judge Ronald B. Leighton.(DN)

HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

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TERRENCE J. DONAHUE, Chapter 7
Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of
TATYANA I MASON,

ORDER

Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. C17-5289RBL

v.
JOHN A MASON,

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Defendant.

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THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Bankruptcy Trustee Donahue’s Motion
for Summary Judgment on Defendant John Mason’s affirmative defenses [Dkt. # 40], and on
Mason’s own Motion for Summary Judgment on the Bankruptcy Trustee’s claims. [Dkt. # 47].
The case involves John Mason’s “I-864 affidavit of support,” executed in connection with his
fiancée’s (Plaintiff Tatyana’s) K-1 visa.
John and Tatyana were married in August 1999, had two children, and were divorced in
June 2008. Tatyana filed for bankruptcy in late 2008, and received a discharge in March 2009. In
2017, Tatyana sued to enforce John’s I-864 support obligations to her. [Dkt. # 1]
John moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that Tatyana’s failure to list his
I-864 obligation to her as an asset meant she had no standing to pursue her claim. [Dkt. # 28]. As

ORDER - 1

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a result, Tatyana moved to re-open her bankruptcy and to permit the substitution of the

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Bankruptcy Trustee (Donahue) as the real party in interest. Tatyana sought to remain a plaintiff

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in “order to preserve any interest in the claim that may ultimately be found to be outside the

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bankruptcy estate.” [Dkt. # 32 at 2; see also Dkt. #s 33 & 34]. That unopposed request was

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granted. [Dkt. # 36].

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Donahue argues that the only factual issue in the case is whether John’s I-864 obligations

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were terminated under the various laws outlining those obligations—IRRIRA and the regulations

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implemented under it. See 8 C.F.R. §213a.2(e) (2006). Donahue argues that the obligation has

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not terminated.

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He claims that some of John’s affirmative defenses (Nos. 2-6—waiver, estoppel, res

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judicata, failure to mitigate, and limitations period) should be stricken, because he has pled no

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facts in support of them. John Mason concedes that these five affirmative defenses do not apply

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and the Motion to Strike and for Summary Judgment on them is GRANTED. They are

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DISMISSED with prejudice.

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Donahue argues that John Mason’s primary affirmative defense (No. 1)—lack of standing

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because the obligation does not belong to the bankruptcy trustee—is not supportable because the

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claim accrued prior to her bankruptcy filing.

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John’s own Motion for Summary Judgment is on this primary defense as well. He now

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argues he had not breached his I-864 “contract” obligations at the time Tatyana filed for

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bankruptcy protection, and that Donahue therefore does not have standing to assert them here:

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“the Chapter 7 Trustee . . . has no standing or authority to pursue post-bankruptcy contract

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payment for the benefit of Plaintiff’s pre-bankruptcy creditors.” [Dkt. # 47 at 1]. But he already

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argued (successfully) that Tatyana did not have standing to enforce the contract because her

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ORDER - 2

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claims belonged to her bankruptcy estate. His current claim that the bankruptcy trustee does not

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have standing to pursue this claim because it had not accrued when she filed is facially at odds

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with his prior position.

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Donahue points out this inconsistency in his Reply [Dkt. # 50], and reiterates that that

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obligation was not terminated. In his own Reply [Dkt. # 54], John Mason seems to concede that

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Tatyana does have standing to pursue post-petition obligations, and that the trustee has standing

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to pursue any pre-petition obligations. But he now contends that Donahue can properly pursue

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only those claims belonging to the estate (and not those that that accrued after Tatyana’s 2008

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Chapter 7 filing.)

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On the first point, it cannot be the case that neither has standing. One or the other has the

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requisite standing, and both are plaintiffs in this case. Donahue was substituted to be the real

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party in interest to resolve a problem John himself first raised, and Tatyana remained a plaintiff

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expressly to protect any right that she had in the obligation that did not belong to her bankruptcy

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estate. John’s Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing the Trustee’s claims on the basis that

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the obligations accrued after the petition was filed is DENIED, because it raises factual

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questions—Donahue (and Tatyana) claim the obligation accrued earlier, which is why John

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raised the issue, and why Donahue went to the trouble to enter the case.

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If and to the extent John objects to Donahue’s counsel simultaneously pursuing similar

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but later-accruing claims on Tatyana’s behalf, it is not clear that he has standing to raise that

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issue. There are two plaintiffs with complimentary claims. How they divide any recovery is up to

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them, not John. John’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this point is also DENIED.

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ORDER - 3

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Donahue’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this first affirmative defense (Donahue’s

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lack of standing) is GRANTED and that defense is DISMISSED to the extent that Donahue

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seeks to recover pre-petition obligations.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated this 3rd day of June, 2019.

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A

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Ronald B. Leighton
United States District Judge

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ORDER - 4