Seymour v. Berryhill
Filing
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ORDER ADOPTING 13 Report and Recommendation. This matter is REMANDED to the Social Security Administration for an immediate award of benefits. Signed by U.S. District Judge John C Coughenour. (TH)
THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
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BRIAN SEYMOUR,
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Plaintiff,
CASE NO. C17-5849-JCC
ORDER
v.
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NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
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Defendant.
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This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s objections (Dkt. No. 14) to United
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States Magistrate Judge Brian Tsuchida’s Report and Recommendations (“R&R”) (Dkt. No. 13).
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Having thoroughly considered the parties’ briefing and the relevant record, the Court finds oral
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argument unnecessary and hereby OVERRULES Defendant’s objections (Dkt. No. 14) and
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ADOPTS the R&R (Dkt. No. 13) for the reasons explained herein.
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I.
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BACKGROUND
This action involves Plaintiff Brian Seymour’s appeal of the Administrative Law Judge’s
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(“ALJ”) denial of disability benefits. (Dkt. No. 4.) Plaintiff is 39 years old with a high school
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education. (Dkt. No. 8-8 at 15.) He has previously worked as a boatswain and sales attendant.
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(Id. at 65–66.) Plaintiff has diabetes mellitus, post-traumatic stress disorder, a history of ADHD,
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and several other ailments. (Id. at 8.) He originally applied for benefits in October 2012, alleging
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disability as of January 1, 2009. (Dkt. No. 8-2 at 21.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not
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disabled in June 2014. (Id. at 35.) Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision, and the Honorable
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James L. Robart reversed and remanded for further administrative proceedings. (See Dkt. No. 8-
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9 at 35–36.) Judge Robart directed the ALJ to reassess the medical evidence presented by
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Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Engstrom. (Id. at 51–52.) He also found that the ALJ’s
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determination that Plaintiff would be off task 14% of the time was not “supported by substantial
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evidence in the record.” (Id. at 49.)
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On remand, the ALJ again determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Dkt. No. 8-8 at
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17.) Plaintiff appealed, and Judge Tsuchida issued an R&R recommending that the Court reverse
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the ALJ’s decision, find Plaintiff disabled, and remand for an award of benefits. (Dkt. No. 13.)
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Defendant timely objected to the R&R. (See Dkt. No. 14.)
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II.
DISCUSSION
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A.
Standard of Review
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When a party makes a specific objection to a portion of a magistrate judge’s R&R, a
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reviewing court conducts a de novo review of that portion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C.
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§ 636(b)(1)(C). After conducting the appropriate review, the district court may “accept, reject, or
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modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28
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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
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B.
Defendant’s Objections
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Defendant makes four objections to Judge Tsuchida’s R&R. First, Defendant asserts that
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the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Engstrom’s opinion. (Dkt. No. 14 at 2–5.) Second, Defendant
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argues that the ALJ appropriately found that Plaintiff’s cataracts were not a severe impairment.
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(Id. at 5–6.) Third, Defendant asserts that the ALJ reasonably found that Plaintiff would be off
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task 10% of the time. (Id. at 6–7.) Fourth, if the Court finds that the ALJ erred, Defendant
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contends that the case should be remanded for further proceedings rather than for an award of
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benefits. (Id. at 7–9.) The Court addresses each objection in turn.
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1. Dr. Engstrom’s Opinion
The opinions of treating physicians are entitled to special weight and “if the ALJ chooses
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to disregard them, ‘he must set forth specific legitimate reasons for doing so, and this decision
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must itself be based on substantial evidence.’” Embry v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir.
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1988) (quoting Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986)). “Substantial evidence is
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relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support the conclusion in
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light of the entire record.” Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir.
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1999). The Ninth Circuit has also made clear that “[t]he ALJ must do more than offer his
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conclusions.” Embry, 849 F.2d at 421.
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Dr. Engstrom opined that Plaintiff has marked social limitations, challenges coping with
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the activities of daily living and workplace stress, and that Plaintiff would miss at least two days
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of work per month due to his mental health issues. (Dkt. No. 8-7 at 283–84.) In his R&R, Judge
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Tsuchida found that the ALJ failed to give specific and legitimate reasons, supported by
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substantial evidence, to reject Dr. Engstrom’s opinion. (Dkt. No. 13 at 5.) Defendant argues that
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the ALJ correctly rejected the physician’s opinion because it contradicted other evidence in the
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record. (Dkt. No. 14 at 2–5.)
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The ALJ gave two reasons for giving Dr. Engstrom’s opinion only some weight. First,
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the ALJ found that Dr. Engstrom was unaware of certain of Plaintiff’s self-reported activities,
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including his parenting responsibilities and his relationships with his father and one friend. (Dkt.
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No. 8-8 at 13.) The ALJ reasoned that this evidence contradicted Dr. Engstrom’s opinion that
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Plaintiff had marked limitations with social functioning and the activities of daily living. (Id.)
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Second, the ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Engstrom’s opinion because Plaintiff admitted to being
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non-compliant with his diabetes treatment. (Id.) The Court finds the ALJ’s conclusions were not
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supported by substantial evidence.
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First, the record indicates that Dr. Engstrom was aware of Plaintiff’s parenting
responsibilities. Dr. Engstrom provided Plaintiff with therapy for three years, during which time
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he met with Plaintiff on a weekly or monthly basis. (Dkt. No. 8-7 at 282.) Nothing in the record
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indicates that Dr. Engstrom was unaware of the details of Plaintiff’s familial obligations. (Id. at
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282–85.) In fact, Dr. Engstrom wrote that Plaintiff “has considerable difficulty coping with day
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to day stressors, including the understandable challenge of supporting himself [and] his family.”
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(Id. at 284.) Thus, the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Engstrom was unaware of Plaintiff’s familial
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responsibilities is not supported by substantial evidence.
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Nor does the ALJ’s conclusion about Plaintiff’s personal relationships contradict Dr.
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Engstrom’s opinion. (Dkt. No. 8-8 at 13.) Two personal relationships do not negate Plaintiff’s
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other extreme behavior—including creating a disruption in a congressman’s office or pulling a
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knife on a supervisor—that supported Dr. Engstrom’s opinion. (Id. at 53; Dkt. No. 8-2 at 50.)
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The record amply supports Dr. Engstrom’s opinion that Plaintiff has marked social limitations, is
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hypervigilant, and wary of trusting others. (Dkt. No. 8-7 at 282–85.) Therefore, the ALJ’s
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decision to discount Dr. Engstrom’s opinion based on Plaintiff’s personal relationships is not
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supported by substantial evidence.
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The ALJ separately discounted Dr. Engstrom’s opinion because Plaintiff admitted to
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being non-complaint with his diabetes medication at the hearing, which was unknown to Dr.
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Engstrom when he issued his opinion. (Dkt. No. 8-8 at 13.) The ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff’s
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non-compliance suggested that Plaintiff had behavioral modifications within his control that
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could have increased his functioning. (Id.) The ALJ concluded that these factors had “a direct
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bearing on Dr. Engstrom’s treatment relationship with [Plaintiff] in terms of effectiveness and
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the resulting perceived limitations.” (Id.)
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Defendant argues that the ALJ’s reasoning is “legally valid because an ALJ may reject a
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medical opinion if the doctor has an inaccurate understanding of the claimant’s medical history.”
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(Dkt. No. 14 at 3) (citing Chaudry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2012)). However,
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Defendant’s reliance on Chaudry is misplaced. In Chaudry, the Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ
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properly discounted a treating physician’s opinion because the opinion was predicated on an
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erroneous belief that the plaintiff’s use of a wheelchair and cane were prescribed by a doctor. Id.
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Here, Dr. Engstrom did not indicate that his ultimate opinion depended on Plaintiff’s use of
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diabetes medication. (See Dkt. No. 8-7 at 282–85.) Rather, it appears that the ALJ used his own
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concerns about Plaintiff’s credibility to reject Dr. Engstrom’s opinion, which is an invalid basis
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to undermine a treating physician’s opinion. See Edlin v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th
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Cir. 2001) (finding that the ALJ appeared to have relied on personal doubts about the claimant’s
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overall credibility to reject a treating physician’s report). Therefore, the ALJ’s decision to
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discount Dr. Engstrom’s opinion based on Plaintiff’s non-compliance with his diabetes
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medication was not supported by substantial evidence.
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For these reasons, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s objection.
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2. Plaintiff’s Cataracts
Defendant objects to Judge Tsuchida’s conclusion that the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff’s
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cataracts to be non-severe. (Dkt. No. 14 at 5–6.) At step two of the five-step assessment process,
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a social security claimant must make a threshold showing that (1) he has a medically
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determinable impairment or combination of impairments, and (2) the impairment or combination
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of impairments is severe. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987); 20 C.F.R.
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§ 404.1520(c). “An impairment or combination of impairments can be found ‘not severe’ only if
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the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has ‘no more than a minimal effect on an
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individual’s ability to work.’” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting
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Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1988)). “The step-two inquiry is a de minimis
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screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Id. (citation omitted).
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Plaintiff’s ophthalmologist, Dr. Sorenson, diagnosed him with cataracts in both eyes that
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are functionally significant and hinder him from reading fine print. (Dkt. No. 8-7 at 286, 292.)
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Defendant argues that the ALJ correctly gave this opinion only some weight when he assessed
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whether Plaintiff’s cataracts were a severe impairment. (Dkt. No. 14 at 5.) The Court disagrees.
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The ALJ discounted Dr. Sorenson’s opinion because Plaintiff continued to drive despite
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his cataracts. (Dkt. No. 8-8 at 14.) The ALJ determined that this contradicted the doctor’s
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opinion and gave it only some weight in finding that Plaintiff’s cataracts were not a severe
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impairment. (Id.) However, in his 2014 opinion, the ALJ gave Dr. Sorenson’s opinion great
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weight despite knowing Plaintiff could drive. (Dkt. No. 8-2 at 30.) The ALJ failed to explain this
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discrepancy when discounting Dr. Sorenson’s opinion. (See Dkt. No. 8-8 at 14.) Moreover,
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Plaintiff’s ability to drive does not contradict Dr. Sorenson’s opinion, which did not deal with his
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ability to drive but with capacity to read fine print. (Dkt. No. 8-7 at 289–94.) When given proper
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weight, Dr. Sorenson’s opinion is sufficient to conclude that Plaintiff’s cataracts are severe. (Id.
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at 292.) Therefore, the ALJ erred by finding Plaintiff’s cataracts are not a severe impairment.
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Defendant argues that even if the ALJ erred, the error was harmless because none of the
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jobs identified by the vocational expert required reading fine print. (Dkt. No. 14 at 6.) When an
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ALJ errs in finding an impairment is non-severe, the error is harmless if the ALJ properly
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considered the limitations caused by the impairment at later steps. Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909,
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911 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff’s visual impairments as part of his
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residual functional capacity (“RFC”) findings. (Dkt. No. 8-8 at 14, 66–67.) Therefore, the
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vocational expert could not assess whether Plaintiff’s visual impairment would hinder him from
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performing the three jobs that she identified. (Id. at 69.) Thus, the ALJ’s err was not harmless.
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For these reasons, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s objection.
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3. Plaintiff’s Time Off Task
Defendant argues that the ALJ correctly found that Plaintiff would be off task 10% of the
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time. (Dkt. No. 14 at 6–7.) The Court disagrees. In his 2014 decision, the ALJ found that
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Plaintiff would be off task 14% of the time—a finding that Judge Robert held to be improperly
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results-oriented because it lacked adequate explanation. (See Dkt. Nos. 8-2 at 28, 8-9 at 49.) In
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the instant case, the Court again finds that the ALJ’s determination lacks adequate explanation.
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The ALJ based his 2017 finding on Plaintiff’s “self-reported activities,” which suggested that
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Plaintiff’s concentration and attention are seriously compromised. (Dkt. No. 8-8 at 13.) But the
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ALJ failed to explain how these factors lead to a finding that Plaintiff would be off task 10% of
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the time. (See id.) Absent this explanatory link, the ALJ’s RFC finding lacks adequate
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explanation to show that it is supported by substantial evidence.
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For these reasons, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s objection.
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4. Award of Benefits
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Defendant objects to Judge Tsuchida’s recommendation that ALJ’s determination be
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reversed and remanded for an award of benefits. (Dkt. No. 14 at 8.) The Court may remand for
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an award of benefits awarded where:
(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting [the
claimant’s] evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved
before a determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record
that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence
credited.
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Smolen, 80 F.3d 1273 at 1292. Each of the elements of this test are met. First, the ALJ failed to
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provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr. Engstrom’s and Dr. Sorenson’s opinions.
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Second, further development of the record is not needed, as there are no outstanding issues to
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resolve and two administrative hearings have already been held. Third, it is clear from the record
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that if the ALJ credited Dr. Engstrom’s opinion he would be required to find Plaintiff disabled.
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Dr. Engstrom opined that Plaintiff would miss two full workdays a month because of his
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impairments. (Dkt. No. 8-7 at 285). The Vocational Expert testified that missing that amount of
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work would make Plaintiff unable to maintain competitive employment. (Dkt. No. 8-8 at 71.)
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Thus, crediting Dr. Engstrom’s opinion would require finding that Plaintiff is disabled. Since
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nothing in the record creates serious doubt about Plaintiff’s disability, the Court finds that an
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award of benefits is appropriate.
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For these reasons, Defendant’s objection is OVERRULED.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s objections (Dkt. No. 14) are OVERRULED, the
R&R is ADOPTED (Dkt. No. 14). This matter is REMANDED to the Social Security
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Administration for an immediate award of benefits. The Clerk is DIRECTED to provide copies
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of this order to Judge Tsuchida and the parties.
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DATED this 25th day of July 2018.
A
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John C. Coughenour
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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