Boyce v. Division of Child Support Enforcement

Filing 17

ORDER by Judge Benjamin H. Settle granting 11 Motion for Summary Judgment.(TG; cc mailed to plaintiff)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

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ADRIAN BOYCE,

CASE NO. C18-5091 BHS
Plaintiff,

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v.

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT,

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Defendant.
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This matter comes before the Court on Defendant State of Washington,

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Department of Social and Health Services, Division of Child Support’s (“DCS”) motion

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for summary judgment (Dkt. 11). The Court has considered the pleadings filed in support

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of and in opposition to the motion and the remainder of the file and hereby grants the

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motion for the reasons stated herein.

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I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 7, 2018, Plaintiff Adrian Boyce (“Boyce”) filed a complaint against
DCS alleging that DCS garnished his wages without due process. Dkt. 3.
On May 18, 2018, DCS filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 11. On June
12, 2018, Boyce responded. Dkt. 14. On June 15, 2018, DCS replied. Dkt. 15.

ORDER - 1

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Boyce is the father of an eleven-year-old child. Dkt. 12, Declaration of Jerry

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Weible (“Weible Decl.”), Ex. 1 at 1. DCS is providing support enforcement services on

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behalf of his child. Id. ¶¶ 1, 2. Because there was no superior court order requiring

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Boyce to pay child support, DCS took action to set it administratively. Id. ¶ 3. On May

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3, 2016, DCS personally served Boyce with a Notice and Finding of Financial

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Responsibility (“Notice”). Id., Ex. 1. The Notice set Boyce’s child support obligation at

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$311 per month beginning March 1, 2016. Id. In addition, the Notice required Boyce to

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pay back child support of $1,324.24 to satisfy his obligation from October 25, 2015

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through February 29, 2016. Id.
The Notice informed Boyce that he had 20 days to request an adjudicative

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proceeding, which could have been requested by phone or by filling out and returning the

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provided hearing request form. Id. Because Boyce neither objected to the Notice nor

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timely requested an adjudicative hearing, the Notice became a final child support order.

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Id. ¶ 4. See also RCW 74.20A.055(4). The Notice expressly authorizes DCS to garnish

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wages, and take other collection action without further notice, as authorized by

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Washington law and mandated by federal child support program requirements. Weible

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Decl., Ex. 1, at 4, 6; RCW 26.23.060; 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(8). DCS collected its first

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payment in December 2017, and has been collecting child support regularly since that

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date. Weible Decl., ¶ 6.

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ORDER - 2

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III. DISCUSSION
DCS moves for summary judgment on the basis that neither the State nor its

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official are persons subject to suit under § 1983 and Boyce’s claims are barred by res

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judicata and/or collateral estoppel. Dkt. 11. Although the latter argument is interesting,

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the Court will only address the straightforward argument that the State is not subject to

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suit under § 1983.

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A.

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Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

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materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

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fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party

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fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the case on which

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the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

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323 (1986). There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record, taken as a whole,

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could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec.

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Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (nonmoving party must

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present specific, significant probative evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt”).

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See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a material fact exists

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if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or

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jury to resolve the differing versions of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

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U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d

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626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

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The determination of the existence of a material fact is often a close question. The

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Court must consider the substantive evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must

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meet at trial – e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil cases. Anderson, 477

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U.S. at 254; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. The Court must resolve any factual

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issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party only when the facts specifically

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attested by that party contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party. The

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nonmoving party may not merely state that it will discredit the moving party’s evidence

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at trial, in the hopes that evidence can be developed at trial to support the claim. T.W.

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Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630 (relying on Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Conclusory,

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nonspecific statements in affidavits are not sufficient, and missing facts will not be

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presumed. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990).

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B.

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§ 1983
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must show that the alleged

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deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,

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487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their

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official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491

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U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

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In this case, Boyce has failed to sue a person under § 1983. DCS is an agency of

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the State, which is not a person subject to suit. Therefore, the Court grants DCS’s motion

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for summary judgment.

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ORDER - 4

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IV. ORDER

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Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that DCS’s motion for summary judgment

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(Dkt. 11) is GRANTED and Boyce’s in forma pauperis status is REVOKED for the

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purposes of appeal.

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The Clerk shall enter a JUDGMENT and close the case.

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Dated this 19th day of July, 2018.

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BENJAMIN H. SETTLE
United States District Judge

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ORDER - 5