Coates v. Berryhill

Filing 11

ORDER RE: SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY APPEAL by Hon. Mary Alice Theiler. (KMP)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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LESLEE C.,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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CASE NO. C18-5406-MAT

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Deputy
Commissioner of Social Security for
Operations,

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ORDER RE: SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY APPEAL

Defendant.

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Plaintiff proceeds through counsel in her appeal of a final decision of the Commissioner of

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the Social Security Administration (Commissioner).

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application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) after a hearing before an Administrative Law

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Judge (ALJ). Having considered the ALJ’s decision, the administrative record (AR), and all

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memoranda of record, this matter is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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The Commissioner denied plaintiff’s

Plaintiff was born on XXXX, 1964.1 She graduated high school and completed a dental

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assistant program through a vocational school.

(AR 46.)

Plaintiff previously worked as

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merchandise displayer, physical therapy aide, and receptionist. (AR 74.)

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Dates of birth must be redacted to the year. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(2) and LCR 5.2(a)(1).

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Plaintiff protectively filed a DIB application on July 1, 2014 alleging disability beginning

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June 1, 2014. (AR 229-35.) She is insured for DIB through June 30, 2016 and was required to

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establish disability on or prior to that “date last insured” (DLI). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.131, 404.321.

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Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on reconsideration.

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On November 9, 2016, ALJ Kelly Wilson held a hearing, taking testimony from plaintiff

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and a vocational expert (VE). (AR 41-79.) On April 25, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision finding

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plaintiff not disabled. (AR 19-34.)

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Plaintiff timely appealed. The Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on

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March 19, 2018 (AR 1-6), making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.

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Plaintiff appealed this final decision of the Commissioner to this Court.
JURISDICTION

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The Court has jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
DISCUSSION

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The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining

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whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2000). At step one, it must

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be determined whether the claimant is gainfully employed. The ALJ found plaintiff had not

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engaged in substantial gainful activity from the alleged onset date through the DLI. At step two,

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it must be determined whether a claimant suffers from a severe impairment. The ALJ found the

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following impairments severe: fibromyalgia; degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar

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spine; affective disorder; anxiety disorder; and alcohol dependence. Step three asks whether a

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claimant’s impairments meet or equal a listed impairment. The ALJ found plaintiff’s impairments

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did not meet or equal the criteria of a listed impairment.

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If a claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal a listing, the Commissioner must assess

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residual functional capacity (RFC) and determine at step four whether the claimant has

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demonstrated an inability to perform past relevant work. The ALJ found plaintiff able to perform

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light work, with the following exceptions: frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb; avoid

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concentrated exposure to vibrations; perform simple and detailed tasks; and adapt to occasional

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changes in work setting. With that assessment, and with the assistance of the VE, the ALJ found

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plaintiff able to perform her past relevant work as a receptionist.

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If a claimant demonstrates an inability to perform past relevant work, or has no past

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relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate at step five that the claimant

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retains the capacity to make an adjustment to work existing in significant levels in the national

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economy. With the VE’s assistance, the ALJ also found plaintiff capable of performing other jobs,

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such as work as a storage facility rental clerk, office helper, and production assembler.

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This Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to whether the decision is in

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accordance with the law and the findings supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

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whole. See Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993). Accord Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d

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1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We will set aside a denial of benefits only if the denial is unsupported

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by substantial evidence in the administrative record or is based on legal error.”) Substantial

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evidence means more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it means such relevant

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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Magallanes v.

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Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). If there is more than one rational interpretation, one of

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which supports the ALJ’s decision, the Court must uphold that decision. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278

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F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinions of her treating providers,

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erred in evaluating her RFC, and erred in determining she could perform her past relevant work.

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She requests remand for an award of benefits or, in the alternative, for further administrative

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proceedings. The Commissioner argues the ALJ’s decision has the support of substantial evidence

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and should be affirmed.
RFC and Related Findings

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Plaintiff avers error in the ALJ’s evaluation of her RFC, and raises several related

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arguments. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes the ALJ erred in considering

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plaintiff’s symptom testimony, potentially implicating the RFC determination and other aspects of

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the ALJ’s decision.

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Absent evidence of malingering, an ALJ must provide specific, clear, and convincing

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reasons to reject a claimant’s testimony. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2014).

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“General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and

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what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th

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Cir. 1996). In considering the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of a claimant’s symptoms,

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the ALJ “examine[s] the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence; an

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individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms;

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statements and other information provided by medical sources and other persons; and any other

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relevant evidence in the individual’s case record.” Social Security Ruling (SSR) 16-3p.

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The ALJ here found plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and

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limiting effects of her symptoms not entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence in the

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record. (AR 25-30.) She found the generally unremarkable imaging studies, minimal treatment

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received, and evidence showing ambulation with a normal gait and full range of motion, strength,

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and reflexes in the extremities to support the conclusion plaintiff could perform limited light level

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work activity, with the inclusion of postural and environmental restrictions. (AR 28.) She also

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found the evidence to show plaintiff could perform work activity despite her mental health

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conditions. Plaintiff had minimal mental health treatment, and her symptoms significantly

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improved when she started taking Paxil. A consultative psychological examination revealed

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generally unremarkable concentration, memory, fund of knowledge, abstract reasoning, insight,

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and judgment, and supported a finding plaintiff could sustain simple and detailed tasks, with only

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occasional changes in the work setting. (AR 28-29.)

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In addition to the minimal treatment received for fibromyalgia and her back, plaintiff failed

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to follow-through with physical therapy and received minimal chiropractic care even though it

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improved her symptoms, and acknowledged she did not receive any medical treatment while in

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jail. (AR 29.) The ALJ found plaintiff’s contention financial constraints affected her ability to

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receive treatment highly questionable given her health insurance and negligible co-pays.

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Plaintiff’s benign treatment history and failure to comply with treatment recommendations

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strongly suggested the physical symptoms were not as debilitating as alleged. Likewise, the

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minimal mental health treatment received, including the discontinuation of Lamictal and absence

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of mental health therapy, suggested symptoms not as serious as alleged.

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The ALJ further found plaintiff demonstrated a level of physical functioning during the

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period at issue grossly inconsistent with the claimed limitations. She made “numerous exaggerated

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statements” during the hearing as to her difficulty sustaining even basic activities of daily living

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due to pain. (Id.) She stated, for example, she required a break even after chopping vegetables,

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loading the dryer, or unloading the dishwasher, that pushing herself to go for a walk caused her to

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be bedridden the following day, and that she could walk only five-to-ten minutes at one time. The

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ALJ found nothing in the record to establish this level of debilitation, and the evidence to show

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plaintiff’s ability to manage self-care, prepare meals for long periods, perform household chores

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like dishes and laundry, shop independently, exercise at the YMCA, take long walks, and train for

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a half marathon. This evidence clearly showed plaintiff’s ability to persist physically throughout

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the day with minimal limitations. The ALJ also found the record to show mental functioning

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inconsistent with alleged limitations. She contrasted alleged memory and concentration problems

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with evidence showing plaintiff was able to learn how to sell objects online and spend her time

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reading, and alleged difficulties being around large groups of people and loud noises with

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plaintiff’s ability to attend church, exercise at the YMCA, and participate in a half marathon. (AR

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29-30.)

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The ALJ is responsible for assessing a claimant’s symptom testimony and the medical

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evidence, and for resolving any conflicts or ambiguities in the record. See Treichler v. Comm’r of

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Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014); Carmickle v. Comm’r of SSA, 533 F.3d

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1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). When evidence

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reasonably supports either confirming or reversing the ALJ’s decision, the Court may not

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substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

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“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s

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conclusion that must be upheld.” Morgan v. Commissioner of the SSA, 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th

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Cir. 1999). In this case, while portions of the ALJ’s assessment withstand scrutiny, the ALJ erred

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in more than one respect.

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The ALJ misconstrued the record to show plaintiff trained for a half marathon during the

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period at issue. (See AR 29, 30, 32.) The evidence reflects such training as late as March 28,

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2014, two months prior to the June 1, 2014 alleged onset date. (AR 485-89.) At that time, plaintiff

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reported moderate pain, swelling, and stiffness to her ankles and feet for the past month, three

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months after she began training and following a change in shoe gear. (AR 485-86.) Dr. Eddie Lo

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found pain on palpation, a small, palpable bone spur on the left foot, and joint swelling. (AR 488.)

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At her next visit, on July 25, 2014, plaintiff reported sharp pain and swelling in her left foot, that

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she could not walk or exercise because of the pain, and wanted to consider surgery. (AR 490.)

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Dr. Lo made the same findings, worsened since the prior visit (AR 493), and plaintiff had surgery

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on her left foot in August 2014 (see AR 496). Five weeks after the surgery, plaintiff had been

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doing well, but her foot became swollen and painful after a long walk. (AR 502.)

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In finding evidence of half marathon training during the relevant time period, the ALJ

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relied on later records from Dr. Lo, dated in May/June 2016, but containing some of the prior,

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2014 records addressing the onset of plaintiff’s foot pain. (AR 641-42.) The 2016 records reflect

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the return of the bone spur, painful and swollen on the left foot. (AR 636-39.) Also, plaintiff

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reported “wanting to work out and . . . swimming at the YMCA” in early February 2014, some

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four months prior to the alleged onset date (AR 330), while her long walk in September 2014

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resulted in foot swelling and pain. (AR 502.) The ALJ did not reasonably rely on this evidence

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of exercise activity as showing a level of physical functioning grossly inconsistent with plaintiff’s

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claimed physical functioning, or as inconsistent with her testimony of social limitations.

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The ALJ also failed to adequately address evidence associated with plaintiff’s treatment.

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Treatments or other methods used to alleviate symptoms serves as an important indicator of the

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intensity and persistence of a claimant’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). An ALJ properly

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considers an absence of treatment, the failure to seek or follow through with treatment, favorable

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response to conservative treatment, or other inconsistency between the frequency or extent of

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treatment and a claimant’s subjective complaints. SSR 16-3p; Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d

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1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750-51 (9th Cir. 2007); Burch v.

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Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). However, before finding inconsistency on this basis,

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the ALJ must consider possible reasons for a failure to comply with or seek treatment, such as an

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inability to afford treatment or side effects less tolerable than symptoms. SSR 16-3p; SSR 82-59;

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Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039.

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The ALJ here questioned evidence of alleged financial constraints given plaintiff’s health

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insurance and negligible copays. (AR 29 (citing AR 345, 350, 354, and 271 (“Doctors have not

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helped and we can’t afford a $20 co-pay, 3 times a week for treatment that does not help. Other

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doctors have turned me away.”))

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stemmed from her deductible, this assessment appears rational. (See AR 343-44 (physical therapy

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discontinued following multiple no-shows and a cancelation at plaintiff’s request due to

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“insurance/financial reasons”) and AR 345-50 (authorizing twenty-five physical therapy

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appointments with no co-pays, but noting a $500.00 deductible).) The ALJ’s decision does not,

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however, reflect consideration of all reasons pertinent to absent treatment.

Excluding the possibility plaintiff’s financial constraints

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Plaintiff described her attempts at treating her fibromyalgia as unsuccessful, stating both

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acupuncture and the use of a TENS unit at physical therapy made things worse, and that she tried

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working with a chiropractor, but the attempts at adjustment either did not work or resulted in her

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being “pretty much out for two or three days literally.” (AR 52.) She refused to take more than

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over-the-counter medications for pain or as a sleep aid due to past experiences, including a suicide

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attempt she attributed to her use of Lyrica, and an incident in which she cooked a full meal in the

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middle of the night after taking Ambien. (AR 52-53, 58 (also describing incident in which,

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following several stressful situational factors and her inability to obtain a refill of her Paxil

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subscription, plaintiff began drinking, assaulted her husband, and spent more than a month in jail).)

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While noting the incident involving Ambien (AR 27), the ALJ did not otherwise address any of

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the possible non-financial reasons in the record for plaintiff’s failure to seek or comply with

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recommended treatment. At the least, the ALJ should have addressed the evidence associated with

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alleged serious medication side-effects. (See, e.g., AR 275 (“after Lyrica caused suicide attempt

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– refuse to take medication for fibro – too scared”); AR 518 (reported to Dr. Harrison that she

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“Once took Lyrica and tried to kill herself afterwards.”); and AR 591 (reported to Dr. Hawkins:

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“Cymbalta 2013. Lead to suicide attempt.”)) It further cannot be reasonably said the absence of

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medical treatment during plaintiff’s incarceration provides a basis for discounting her symptom

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testimony.

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Where an ALJ provides sufficient specific, clear, and convincing reasons for an assessment

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of a claimant’s symptom testimony, an error in the analysis may be deemed harmless. Carmickle,

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533 F.3d at 1162-63. See also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (error

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harmless where it is “‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’”) In this case,

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the Court finds the ALJ’s errors to substantially undermine the support for her conclusions. The

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ALJ also repeated the error regarding half marathon training several times in the decision. On

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remand, the ALJ should reassess plaintiff’s symptom testimony with consideration of evidence of

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her physical activity within the relevant time period and pertinent reasons associated with absent

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or a failure to seek or follow through with treatment.
Medical Opinions

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In general, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating physician than to a

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non-treating physician, and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than to a non-

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examining physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. Where the record contains contradictory opinions,

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as in this case, the opinion of a treating or examining physician can be rejected only with “‘specific

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and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record for so doing.” Id. at 830-

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31 (quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). Plaintiff here avers error in

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the consideration of two physician opinions.

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A.

Richard Hawkins

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Treating provider Dr. Richard Hawkins saw plaintiff on six occasions between April 2015

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and November 2015. (AR 590-635.) A questionnaire signed by Dr. Hawkins on August 10, 2015

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(AR 560-67) identifies clinical findings including diffuse tenderness, muscle spasms in low back

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and feet, muscle weakness in hands, arms, and low back, swelling in hands, joint instability,

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abnormal gait when her back goes out, abnormal posture “in pain,” and fibromyalgia in all eighteen

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tender points. (AR 560-61.) The limitations assessed on the questionnaire include, in an eight-

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hour day, sitting up to one hour and standing/walking up to one hour, an inability to do either

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activity continuously and requiring standing up from sitting every ten minutes, for ten minute

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intervals; the ability to frequently lift up to five pounds and occasionally up to ten pounds, but

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inability to carry anything; the need to elevate both legs for three minutes above her head, all day

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depending on her pain; pain, fatigue or other symptoms frequently interfering with attention and

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concentration; an inability to tolerate even low work stress; the need for unscheduled breaks every

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five minutes, for ten minute intervals; more than three absences per month; and psychological

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limitations, the need to avoid extreme temperatures and noise, and no pushing, pulling, kneeling,

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bending, or stooping. (AR 563-66.) The form also reflects, inter alia, pain interfering with

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plaintiff’s ability to ambulate effectively, that she cannot climb stairs without help of a handrail,

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cannot carry out activities of daily living independently without assistance, could prepare meals,

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but not every day, and can drive locally, but not on the freeway. (AR 563.)

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The ALJ acknowledged Dr. Hawkins’ treating relationship with plaintiff, but found his

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opinion regarding the severity of her physical and mental health problems grossly inconsistent

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with the overall medical evidence of record. (AR 31.) He found the evidence to strongly suggest

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plaintiff completed at least half or a portion of the questionnaire, which called into question the

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impartiality of Dr. Hawkins’ opinion. (AR 31-32; see also AR 31, n.1 (stating this suspicion is

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further confirmed with a comparison to plaintiff’s handwriting on her function report (citing AR

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273-80).) The ALJ found the opinion regarding physical limitations completely inconsistent with

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Dr. Hawkins’ treatment notes, which indicated he did not perform physical examinations and

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merely noted plaintiff’s general appearance and interaction as unremarkable. (AR 32 (citing AR

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592, 601, 607, 613, 618).) He also found inconsistency with plaintiff’s unremarkable consultative

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medical examination, minimal medical treatment history, and failure to follow-through with

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treatment recommendations. Dr. Hawkins further acknowledged he based his opinion of plaintiff’s

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mental health problems on “her reports.” (Id. (citing AR 565).) “But the claimant’s lack of mental

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health treatment, consultative psychological examination, and medical evidence showing that her

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mental health symptoms improved with Paxil completely contradicts the doctor’s opinion.” (Id.)

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Finally, plaintiff’s daily activities, such as preparing meals for her family, performing household

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chores, shopping, spending time with friends, exercising at the gym, and training for a half

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marathon, showed a level of functioning inconsistent with Dr. Hawkins’ opinion. The ALJ

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therefore gave the opinion little weight.

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The ALJ drew a reasonable inference in finding plaintiff had completed portions of the

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questionnaire. The form contains two distinct handwriting styles, one of which matches multiple

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other documents in the record containing plaintiff’s handwriting. (See, e.g., AR 273-79, 558, 571.)

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It is not clear who completed the portions of the form assessing work-related limitations. Plaintiff,

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for example, appeared to write she needed to get up from a sitting position every “10 minutes” and

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could not stand/walk “too long causes extreme pain – fatigue”, but there is no clear way to

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determine who circled or check-marked various answers on the form. (See, e.g., AR 563.) It is,

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on the other hand, apparent that Dr. Hawkins wrote that he based his conclusions regarding

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emotional factors on plaintiff’s reports. (AR 565.)

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The ALJ also accurately noted the absence of physical examinations in five of Dr.

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Hawkins’ six appointments with plaintiff. On those occasions, Dr. Hawkins took plaintiff’s vital

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signs and stated: “General appearance and interaction unremarkable.” (AR 592, 601, 607, 613,

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618.) However, in the sixth and final appointment, he added: “Ambulatory. Low back pain L4-

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S1. Tenderness along the SI joint areas. Tenderness in the pubic area, and LLQ. MRI report

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reviewed with her.” (AR 632.) He also included the following assessment: “MRI abnormalities

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– not much we can do about them, other than what we have been doing. Fibromyalgia. Painful.

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Left ovarian cyst. Episodic leg weakness.” (AR 633.) The record also contains a letter from Dr.

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Hawkins dated April 11, 2016, stating: “[Plaintiff] has fibromyalgia and degenerative joint

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disease. I have no new treatment recommendations for her.” (AR 571.) A written note from

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plaintiff on the letter states Dr. Hawkins read her MRI, said he could do nothing for her, and walked

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out, resulting in her need to find a new doctor.

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The ALJ reasonably identified inconsistency between Dr. Hawkins’ opinion and the

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medical record as a whole and with Dr. Hawkins’ own treatment notes. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at

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1041; Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). (But see AR 632-33 (examination

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findings included in November 2015 treatment notes).) The ALJ also reasonably considered the

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fact plaintiff completed a significant amount of the questionnaire, and that Dr. Hawkins noted his

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at least partial reliance on plaintiff’s subjective reporting. However, Dr. Hawkins’ reliance on

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plaintiff’s reporting is only problematic to the extent plaintiff’s reporting was properly discounted.

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See, e.g., Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (“An ALJ may reject a treating [or examining] physician’s

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opinion if it is based ‘to a large extent’ on a claimant’s self-reports that have been properly

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discounted as incredible.”) (quoting Morgan, 169 F.3d at 602). The ALJ also repeated his

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misunderstanding regarding the evidence of plaintiff’s activities.

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consideration of plaintiff’s symptom testimony necessitate further consideration of the opinion

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evidence from Dr. Hawkins.

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B.

The ALJ’s errors in the

Dr. Sorino Rhone

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Dr. Sorino Rhone conducted a consultative medical examination in January 2015. (AR

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553-54.) On examination, plaintiff had essentially normal ranges of motion, and normal gait,

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neurological findings, coordination, and negative Romberg, but tenderness at palpation of her

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gluteal muscles and paravertebrally in the lumbosacral area, spasm palpable on forward bend in

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lumbosacral area, and some Heberden nodes in hands consistent with osteoarthritis. (AR 554.)

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Dr. Rhone opined, based on objective findings, “physically she appears to be basically fit for

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sedentary-type work as she was doing before, although her former job required for her to do quite

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a bit of traveling and handling materials and lifting objects quite frequently heavier than 20

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pounds.” (Id.) Plaintiff therefore did not appear to be able to return to her former occupation and

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“ideally she should get involved in some type of sedentary work.” (Id.) Dr. Rhone further opined

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plaintiff could, in an eight-hour period, sit and work with her hands including fine manipulation,

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could occasionally stand and walk, seldom climb, twist, bend, could not squat, kneel, crawl, and

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reach or work above shoulders, and could occasionally handle fifteen pounds, lift, carry, pull and

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push.

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The ALJ noted Dr. Rhone’s knowledge of the Social Security disability program and his

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ability to examine plaintiff, but found his opinion of physical functioning grossly inconsistent with

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the overall medical evidence of record. (AR 30.) The ALJ described Dr. Rhone’s physical

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examination findings as completely unremarkable, the medical evidence as showing a benign,

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minimal treatment history, and her ability to engage in activities of daily living, as well as train for

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a half marathon and go on long walks to indicate she functioned at a much higher level than

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reflected in the assessment. She accorded the opinion little weight.

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As with the opinion of Dr. Hawkins, the ALJ reasonably found inconsistency between the

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opinion of Dr. Rhone and the medical evidence as a whole. However, because Dr. Rhone did

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identify some physical findings on examination, the ALJ overstated the examination findings from

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this physician as completely unremarkable. The ALJ also again repeated her error regarding the

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evidence of plaintiff’s physical activities during the relevant time period. Dr. Rhone’s opinion

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should be reconsidered on remand.
Steps Four and Five

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Plaintiff argues the errors in the consideration of the medical opinions implicate the ALJ’s

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determination she could perform her past relevant work as a receptionist. She further asserts that,

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when the ALJ posed a hypothetical to the VE matching the assessments of Drs. Hawkins and

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Rhone, the VE testified plaintiff would not be able to perform any of her prior work or any other

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work in the regional or national economy. (See AR 75.) Plaintiff argues this testimony provides

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clear evidentiary support for a finding of disability at step five and an award of benefits.

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The ALJ’s flawed assessment of plaintiff’s symptom testimony and medical opinions

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implicate her conclusions at steps four and five. This matter is not, however, appropriately

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remanded for an award of benefits. See generally Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th

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Cir. 2015) (a remand for an immediate award of benefits is an “extreme remedy,” appropriate

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“only in ‘rare circumstances.’”) (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099), and Strauss v. Comm’r of

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Social Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A claimant is not entitled to benefits

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under the statute unless the claimant is, in fact, disabled, no matter how egregious the ALJ’s errors

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may be.”) It is not clear the record in this case has been fully developed, that further proceedings

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would serve no useful purpose, or that, if improperly discredited evidence were credited, the ALJ

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would be required to find plaintiff disabled on remand. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 495.

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Outstanding issues must be resolved before a disability determination can be made, including a

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reassessment of plaintiff’s symptom testimony with consideration of all pertinent evidence, further

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consideration of the medical opinions of record, and a reevaluation of plaintiff’s RFC and her

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ability to perform both her prior sedentary work and other work existing in significant numbers in

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the regional and national economies.
CONCLUSION

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For the reasons set forth above, this matter is REMANDED for further administrative
proceedings.
DATED this 8th day of January, 2019.

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A

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Mary Alice Theiler
United States Magistrate Judge

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