Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Company v. Degasperin
Filing
45
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO LIFT STAY DKT. 38 , GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DKT. 21 , AND DENYING INTERVENORS CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DKT. 22 . Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 7/12/2011. (Copy counsel of record via CM/ECF)(jmm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
NATIONWIDE AGRIBUSINESS
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
//
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:08CV184
(Judge Keeley)
JAMES LOUIS DEGASPERIN,
Defendant,
v.
PAMELA CASTEEL, Administratrix
of the Estates of Lori Casteel,
Collin Casteel, and Angelina
Casteel.
Intervenor.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO LIFT STAY (DKT. 38), GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 21), AND DENYING INTERVENOR’S CROSS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 22)
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The question presented in this case is whether a liability
insurance policy issued by the plaintiff, Nationwide Agribusiness
Insurance Company (“Nationwide”), provides coverage for the deaths
of Lori Casteel, Collin Casteel, and Angelina Casteel, whom James
Louis Degasperin (“Degasperin”), Nationwide’s policyholder, killed
on April 15, 2007. The Court originally granted Nationwide’s motion
NATIONWIDE v. DEGASPERIN
1:08CV184
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
_________________________________________________________________
for summary judgment during
a hearing on January 5, 2010, holding
that the policy at issue excluded coverage for the intentional
killings. By an order dated January 12, 2010, however, the Court
stayed its ruling in order to allow Degasperin to pursue habeas
corpus relief in the West Virginia state court system.
Nationwide sought to lift the stay at a hearing on April 20,
2011.
Neither
intervenor,
Degasperin,
Pamela
by
Casteel,
his
on
appointed
behalf
counsel,
of the
estates
nor
the
of
the
deceased Casteels (“intervenor” or “Casteels”) raised sufficient
legal arguments establishing that a further stay in this case was
warranted.
Noting
that
little
progress
had
been
made
in
Degasperin’s collateral proceedings, the Court GRANTED Nationwide’s
motion to lift the stay.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case followed the brutal killings of Lori, Collin and
Angelina Casteel1 in Preston County, West Virginia, on April 15,
2007. Degasperin was convicted on three counts of second-degree
murder by a Preston County jury. Although his appeals of these
convictions were unsuccessful, as already noted, he is currently
1
Lori Casteel’s unborn child, given the name Angelina, was
considered a murder victim under the West Virginia Unborn Victims
of Violence Act, W. Va. Code § 61-2-30.
2
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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attempting to pursue collateral relief through a habeas proceeding
in state court.
Prior
to
Degasperin’s
convictions,
the
intervenor,
as
administratrix of all three estates, filed a wrongful death action
against him in the Circuit Court of Preston County. Degasperin made
a demand for defense and indemnity on Nationwide based on a farm
liability policy in effect at the time of the murders.
Following that demand, Nationwide filed this action, seeking
a
declaration
that
the
killing
of
the
Casteels
was
not
an
“occurrence” under the policy, and specifically was not covered by
virtue of the standard intentional acts exclusion contained in the
policy. The Court granted the intervenor’s request to join in this
action, and also appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the
interests of Degasperin. The Preston County wrongful death suit has
not progressed significantly pending the outcome of this action.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Intentional Acts Exclusion
The parties do not dispute that the farm liability policy
issued to Degasperin by Nationwide does not cover intentional acts
of an insured.2 Although the burden rests with the insurer to prove
2
“This insurance does not apply to . . . ‘Bodily injury’ . .
. which is expected or intended by the insured.” (Dkt. 21-1, 4.)
3
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that a policy exclusion applies, Syl. Pt. 7, Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v.
McMahon & Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488 (W. Va. 1987), Nationwide need
only show a low threshold of mental competency on the part of
Degasperin
at
the
time
of
the
murders.
“Coverage
under
an
intentional injury exclusion clause in a homeowners’ insurance
policy may be denied when one who commits a criminal act has a
minimal awareness of the nature of his act.” Syl., Municipal Mut.
Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Mangus, 443 S.E.2d 455 (W. Va. 1994); but see
id. at 459 (Miller, J., dissenting)(“By far the overwhelming
majority of courts that have considered the question of whether an
exclusion in a liability policy for acts ‘expected or intended by
the insured’ hold that it does not apply if the insured lacks the
mental capacity to intentionally commit the act.”).
Nationwide argues that, by virtue of his murder convictions,
Degasperin is collaterally estopped from disputing that his actions
in killing the Casteels constitute intentional acts. The intervenor
responds
that
the
criminal
convictions
do
not
bar
her
from
litigating the issue of intent in this case, and also that, as she
was not a party to the previous criminal case, the doctrine of
collateral estoppel cannot be applied against her.
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B. Collateral Estoppel
Both
Nationwide
and
the
intervenor
agree
that
Baber
v.
Fortner, 412 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 1991), controls the outcome here.
In Baber, the defendant was convicted of shooting and killing the
plaintiff’s
decedent.
The
victim’s
estate
then
sued
him
for
wrongful death, and the defendant attempted to defend the suit on
the basis that he had acted in self-defense. The defendant’s
automobile liability carrier intervened in the suit, seeking a
ruling that the killings did not arise out of the defendant’s
“operation, maintenance and use” of his pickup truck merely because
the assailant had been sitting in the vehicle while firing at the
victim, and that, in any event, the defendant was barred from
relitigating the issue of intent by virtue of his conviction.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals agreed with the
insurance company, concluding that the liability policy did not
cover the intentional acts underlying the suit. The court stated
that “the adjudication of a killing which results in a voluntary
manslaughter conviction conclusively establishes the intentional
nature of that act for the purposes of any subsequent civil
proceeding,” and thus the defendant was estopped from arguing that
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his actions were anything but intentional. Id. at 822 (emphasis
added).3
Baber plainly controls the result here. Although the factual
and procedural histories of the cases differ somewhat, they do not
compel a different conclusion. First, while Baber did not address
the matter at length, the result there clearly affected the rights
of the victim’s estate, just as the ruling in this case affects the
rights of the intervenor. By holding that there was no coverage for
the slaying, Baber precluded the victim’s estate from satisfying
any potential judgment with the insurance company’s funds. That the
ruling occurred in the context of a wrongful death suit, and not a
declaratory judgment action as is the case here, is irrelevant to
the analysis. In either context, the right of a victim in West
Virginia to recover from the insurance company depends entirely on
the contractual rights of the insured. See Conley v. Spillers, 301
S.E.2d 216 (1983)(collateral estoppel does not require mutuality of
3
Though Degasperin was convicted of second degree murder and
not voluntary manslaughter, the distinction is without effect here,
as both crimes require the prosecution to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the killer acted intentionally. State v.
Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995).
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parties and may be asserted against a person in privity to a party
of the prior action).4
The intervenor here attempts to distinguish Baber by pointing
out that, unlike the defendant in Baber, Degasperin did not raise
an insanity or diminished capacity defense at his criminal trial.
In further support of her argument, she cites Clemmer v. Hartford
Ins. Co., 587 P.2d 1098 (Cal. 1979), a case in which the Supreme
Court
of
California
collaterally
estopped
held
that
from
a
victim’s
arguing
that
estate
the
was
not
killing
was
unintentional due to mental incapacity, even though the killer had
been convicted of second-degree murder.
While in Clemmer the victim was permitted to “relitigate” the
issue of intent, having not had the opportunity to do so in the
criminal proceeding, in West Virginia “because the defendant had
the opportunity
to
fully
litigate
4
the
issue
in
the
criminal
Predating and presaging Baber is Erie Ins. Co. v. Belcher,
718 F.Supp. 475 (S.D.W. Va. 1989). There, Judge Hallanan ruled that
an insured’s second-degree murder conviction prevented him from
relitigating the issue of intent in the context of a declaratory
judgment action brought by his insurer against both the slayer and
the estate of his victim. Although Belcher discussed collateral
estoppel as it related to the killer, the fact that it did not
separately address the issue of whether the doctrine should be
applied to the detriment of the victim’s estate suggests that no
due process problem occurs in such an instance.
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proceeding,” he was estopped from arguing the point again. Baber,
412 S.E.2d at 822.5 Here, Degasperin clearly had the opportunity to
defend against a finding that he had intentionally killed Lori,
Collin, and Angelina Casteel. The jury, however, rejected his
arguments, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed
second-degree
murder,
a
finding
requiring
a
determination
of
intent.
Not only is Degasperin bound by this finding, but under Conley
v. Spillers, 301 S.E.2d at 220-21, the intervenor is as well. While
not a party to the criminal proceedings, she nevertheless is bound
by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because her rights are
coterminous with those of Degasperin, the policyholder. She may
perhaps religitate the issue of intent in her state court wrongful
death action, where she is situated directly adverse to Degasperin,
but not here, where she is asserting a derivative interest based on
his insurance contract. See Belcher, 718 F.Supp. at 478. In this
declaratory judgment action, the intervenor has no independent
claim against Nationwide; she merely supports Degasperin’s plea for
5
“‘A fundamental due process point relating to the
utilization of collateral estoppel is that any person against whom
collateral estoppel is asserted must have had a prior opportunity
to have litigated his claim.’” Baber, 412 S.E.2d. at 821-22
(quoting Syl. Pt. 8, Conley, 301 S.E.2d 216 (1983)).
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defense
and
indemnity
in
the
hope
that
such
funds
might
be
available to satisfy any judgment in her favor entered by the state
court.
IV. Conclusion
Although
Degasperin’s
suit
for
collateral
relief
still
proceeds in the Circuit Court of Preston County, his conviction is
long since final and compels the result the Court reaches today.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Nationwide’s motion to lift the stay
(dkt. 38). Furthermore, because Nationwide has established that no
genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Degasperin’s
acts are covered under his liability policy, the Court GRANTS
Nationwide’s Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 21), and DENIES
the intervenor’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 22).
It is so ORDERED.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 58, the Court directs the Clerk of
Court to enter a separate judgment order and to transmit copies of
both orders to counsel of record.
DATED: July 12, 2011.
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9
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