Consolidation Coal Company v. United Mine Workers of America International Union et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS 28 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS 29 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; ENFORCING THE ARBITRATION AWARD AND DENYING DEFENDANTS REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES. ORDERED that this civil action be DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the active docket of this Court. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 6/3/2010. (Copy counsel of record via CM/ECF) (jmm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 1:09CV11 (STAMP)

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, INTERNATIONAL UNION and LOCAL 9909, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; ENFORCING THE ARBITRATION AWARD AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES I. Procedural History

The plaintiff in the above-styled civil action, Consolidation Coal Company ("Consol"), filed a complaint in this Court against United Mine Workers of America, International Union and Local 9909, United Mine Workers of America pursuant to the Labor-Management Relations Act to vacate a labor arbitration award. The defendants

filed a counter-claim asking for specific enforcement of the arbitration award and for attorneys' fees. Thereafter, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. fully briefed and ripe for review. below, this Court grants the These motions are now

For the reasons set forth motion for summary

defendants'

judgment and denies the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, this Court orders that the arbitration award be

enforced. Finally, this Court declines to award attorneys' fees to the defendants. II. Facts

Consol and the defendants entered into a collective bargaining agreement, the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement ("CBA"). Thereafter, the parties negotiated Rules Concerning Drugs and Alcohol for Loveridge Mine ("Rules"). The CBA provides that no The CBA

employee may be discharged except for "just cause."

further provides that the arbitrator's decision shall be final. Mine workers in West Virginia are not allowed to "carry into any mine any intoxicants or enter any mine while under the Rudy

influence of intoxicants."

W. Va. Code § 22A-2-57(c).

Anthony ("Anthony") has worked for the plaintiff or the plaintiff's affiliates since 1979, holding such positions as foreman and crew leader. On December 8, 2008, Consol selected Anthony for a drug Anthony tested

test pursuant to its random testing procedures. positive for marijuana metabolites. with intent to discharge.

Consol then suspended Anthony On

The parties went to arbitration.

January 9, 2009, using "Arbitrator Daughtery's . . . seven tests of just cause," Arbitrator Cynthia Stanley found that Consol did not have just cause to dismiss Anthony because Consol did not show that the decision to discharge was made with Anthony's record in mind. The arbitrator ordered that Consol "reinstate Anthony immediately, without back pay, but in every other way to make him whole." 2

Consol then brought suit in this Court to have the award vacated, arguing that the arbitrator failed to stay within the contractual borders of her authority. III. A. Summary Judgment Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the Applicable Law

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The party seeking summary judgment bears the

initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. (1986). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23

"The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come

forward with facts sufficient to create a triable issue of fact." Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). However, as the United States Supreme Court noted in Anderson, "Rule 56(e) itself provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 256. "The

inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether 3

there is the need for a trial -- whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250; see also Charbonnages de France v.

Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979)(Summary judgment "should be granted only in those cases where it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved and inquiry into the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law." (citing Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 1950))). In Celotex, the Court stated that "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary

judgment is not appropriate until after the non-moving party has had sufficient opportunity for discovery. See Oksanen v. Page

Mem'l Hosp., 912 F.2d 73, 78 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992). In reviewing the supported underlying facts, all inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

4

B.

Review of Arbitration Awards Judicial review of arbitration awards is "among the narrowest

known to the law."

PPG Indus. v. Int'l Chem. Workers, 587 F.3d Federal

648, 652 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).

courts presumptively favor the validity of arbitration awards. Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 76 F.3d 606, 608 (4th Cir. 1996). The parties to a collective

bargaining agreement "bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation and resolution of their dispute." Id. A reviewing court generally defers to the arbitrator's reasoning in a labor arbitration case and should never overturn an arbitrator's findings absent fraud by the parties or dishonesty by the arbitrator. Id. This court

determines whether the arbitrator did her job, "not whether [she] did it well, correctly, or reasonably, but simply whether [she] did it." Id. To determine whether the arbitrator did her job, this

Court examines: "(1) the arbitrator's role as defined by the CBA; (2) whether the award ignored the plain language of the CBA; and (3) whether the arbitrator's discretion in formulating the award comported with the essence of the CBA's proscribed limits." Despite this narrow review, arbitration awards Id. be

may

overturned where the "award violates well-settled and prevailing public policy, fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement or reflects the arbitrator's own notions of right and wrong." Id. Therefore, an "arbitrator cannot `ignore 5

the plain language of the contract' to impose his `own notions of industrial justice.'" PPG Indus., 587 F.3d at 652 (quoting United

Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)). However, arbitrators need not provide any rationale for an award. Id. This Court will not refuse to enforce an award for "mere

ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority." Id. (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)). Accordingly, "as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." Misco, 484 U.S. at 38. This Court must also decide "whether a contractual

reinstatement requirement would fall within the legal exception that makes unenforceable `a collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy.'" E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United

Mine Workers of Am, Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000) (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)). Such a Id.

public policy "must be explicit, well defined, and dominant."

(internal citations omitted). In a case such as this, the question before this Court is not whether Anthony's drug use itself violates public policy, but whether Id. 6 the CBA provision relating to

reinstatement does so.

IV. A.

Discussion

Cross Motions for Summary Judgment As discussed above, this Court first looks to whether the

arbitrator did her job.

To do this, this Court looks to: (1) the

arbitrator's role in the CBA; (2) whether the arbitrator ignored the plain language of the CBA; and (3) whether the arbitrator comported with the essence of the limits of the CBA. Mountaineer

Gas, 76 F.3d at 608. Article XXIV, Section (a) provides that "[n]o employee covered by this Agreement may be disciplined or discharged except for just cause. The burden shall be on the Employer to

establish grounds for discharge in all proceedings under this Agreement." Article XXIV, Section (d)(3) states that "[i]f the

arbitrator determines that the Employer has failed to establish just cause for the Employee's discharge, the Employee shall be immediately reinstated to his job. If the arbitrator determines

that there was just cause for the discharge, the discharge shall become effective upon the date of the arbitrator's decision." Article XXIII, Section (c)(4) of the CBA provides that "[t]he arbitrator's decision shall be final and shall govern only the dispute before [her]." burden to show just Therefore, under the CBA, Consol has the cause for termination. The arbitrator

determines whether there was just cause for the discharge and her determination is final.

7

This Court next turns to whether the arbitrator ignored the plain language of the CBA. The Rules state in Section I that "[a]n

employee is prohibited from reporting for work, working, or coming onto Company work locations at any time after having used drugs or while impaired by drugs." (emphasis in original). Section IV of

the Rules provide that "[a]n employee who engages in any of the prohibited conduct set forth in Section I of these Rules will be subject to disciplinary action up to and including discharge." Further, as discussed above, the CBA provides that an employee will only be discharged upon a finding of just cause by the arbitrator. Consol contends that the arbitrator strayed from the plain language of the CBA. Consol believes that the language of the CBA

is clear and unambiguous and that the arbitrator should not have consulted an outside source for the meaning of just cause. Consol

further argues that the parties negotiated the issue and have already agreed that any violation of the Rules or any positive test result for drugs or alcohol is just cause for disciplinary action, including discharge. Finally, Consol believes that there is no

language in the CBA limiting its authority to determine just cause for termination in this case. This Court cannot conclude that the arbitrator ignored the plain language of the CBA. The CBA does not define "just cause."

Where the CBA does not address certain issues, the arbitrator has to address them through interpretation. 8 PPG Indus., 587 F.3d at

653. No where does the CBA impose mandatory discharge for employee drug use. The Rules do state that drug use will result in Unlike the collective

discipline, up to and including discharge.

bargaining agreement in Mountaineer Gas, the agreement in this case does not mandate discharge as a result of drug use. Rather, the

CBA states that drug use results in a penalty up to and including discharge. just cause. The CBA states that discharge will not occur without The CBA does not define that term. Instead, the CBA

leaves that decision to the arbitrator.

The arbitrator's decision

was consistent with the parties' general intent as manifested in the agreement itself and does not contradict "any clearly expressed limitation." Id.

As in PPG Industries, Consol's arguments about the plain language and whether the arbitrator comported with the essence of the CBA "constitute an attack Id. on This the correctness of the that

arbitrator's

decision."

Court

acknowledges

marijuana use is a dangerous activity and that reasonable minds could certainly differ as to the correctness of the arbitrator's decision in this case, but if an arbitrator "`even arguably' construes a CBA, a court must uphold the resulting award." (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 38). Id.

This Court has no warrant to

overturn the arbitrator because she consulted an outside source to define a term without a specific definition in the CBA. As

discussed above, an arbitrator does not need to give any reason for 9

her decision.

Id. at 652.

The plain language of the Rules and CBA

provide that an employee may be disciplined, up to and including discharged for drug use; that a discharge requires a finding of just cause by the arbitrator; and that if just cause is not found, the employee must be reinstated. The arbitrator here acted within

the scope of her authority by consulting an outside definition of "just cause."1 Accordingly, this Court finds that the arbitrator

did not ignore the plain language of the CBA and comported with the essence of the CBA. Arbitration awards may be overturned where the "award violates well-settled and prevailing public policy, fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement or reflects the arbitrator's own notions of right and wrong." Mountaineer Gas, 76

F.3d at 608. A public policy that contravenes an arbitration award must be explicit, well defined, and dominant. 531 U.S. at 62. contractual E. Associated Coal,

The question this Court must answer is "does a to reinstate [Anthony] with specific

agreement

conditions . . . run contrary to an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy, as ascertained by reference to positive law and not from general considerations of supposed public interests?" Id. at 63.

This Court notes that the arbitrator in Misco used the same seven factors that the arbitrator used in this case. Misco, 484 U.S. at 368 n.5. 10

1

West

Virginia

law

states

that

no

person

shall

bring

intoxicants into a mine nor shall a person enter a mine under the influence of intoxicants. W. Va. Code § 22A-2-57(c). While Consol admits that no public policy requires the termination of any employee who tests positive for marijuana usage, Consol argues that termination for marijuana usage is certainly consistent with the public policy favoring mine safety. Importantly, Anthony did not He used the

go into the mine intoxicated or with intoxicants.

marijuana six days before returning to work while on vacation. Again, while this Court recognizes that reasonable minds can differ as to whether termination or reinstatement was the more appropriate remedy, the arbitrator's award does not condone Anthony's conduct or ignore the risk to public safety that drug use by miners may pose. E. Associated Coal, 531 U.S. at 65. The award punishes The award does not Id. at 66;

Anthony by suspending him without back pay.

violate a specific provision of any law or regulation. W. Va. Code § 22A-2-57(c).

Accordingly, this Court cannot find in

any law or legal precedent an explicit, well defined, dominant public policy to which the arbitrator's decision runs contrary. E. Associated Coal, 531 U.S. at 66; Misco, 484 U.S. at 43; W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766. This Court further finds that the award does not fail to draw its essence from the CBA. The CBA provides that an employee may The CBA delegates to the

only be discharged for "just cause." 11

arbitrator the responsibility for finding just cause. As discussed earlier, at no point does the CBA define "just cause." The

arbitrator consulted an outside source to determine the meaning of "just cause." Accordingly, this Court finds that the award does

draw its essence from the CBA. Finally, this Court looks to whether the arbitrator imposed her own notions of right and wrong. Consol contends that the

arbitrator informed her decision by personal beliefs outside the four corners of the CBA because: (1) the arbitrator characterized her modified discipline, a three-week suspension, as a stiff penalty; (2) the arbitrator partially based her decision on her perception of the probability that Anthony would not violate the drug policy again; and (3) the arbitrator stated that the decision to discharge Anthony was too harsh. This Court does not believe that these statements by the arbitrator show an imposition of her own notions of right and wrong. This situation is inapposite to the situation in

Mountaineer Gas.

As discussed above, the collective bargaining

agreement in Mountaineer Gas required that an employee be promptly discharged for a positive drug test. In that case, the arbitrator

did not agree with the policy and found that just cause did not exist, thereby "blatantly" ignoring the "unambiguous language" of the company's drug policy. Mountaineer Gas, 76 F.3d at 610. The

court found that the words "proper cause" in the CBA could not be 12

a loophole for the arbitrator to bypass the company's drug policy's mandatory language and "to implement his own brand of industrial justice." Id. That did not happen in this case. Consol and the

defendants did not bargain for Consol to have the immediate right of discharge for an employee's drug use. They bargained so that

Consol could discipline up to discharge if Consol had just cause to terminate. Accordingly, this Court finds that the arbitrator did

not impose her own notions of right and wrong in the award. Because this Court finds that the arbitrator did her job by abiding by her proper role, following the plain language of the CBA, and comporting with the essence of the limits of the CBA and that the award does not violate well-settled and prevailing public policy, does not fail to draw its essence from the CBA, and does not reflect the arbitrator's own notions of right or wrong, the defendants' motion for summary judgment must be granted, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment must be denied, and the arbitration award must be enforced. B. Attorneys' Fees In their counter-claim, the defendants request that this Court award them attorneys' fees. The defendants argue that the

plaintiff failed to abide by the terms of the CBA by bringing this civil action. In reviewing the defendants' claim, the measure for

a case such as this, where the challenge relates to "whether an arbitration award `draws its essence' from the contract," is "the 13

relatively lenient one of whether [the challenge] has any arguable basis in law." Capitol Cement Corp., v. Cement, Lime, Gypsum, &

Allied Workers' Div. Of Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 17 F. Supp. 2d 564, 567 (N.D. W. Va. 1998) (quoting United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 400 v. Marval Poultry Co., Inc., 876 F.2d 346, 351 (4th Cir. 1989)). This Court finds that the defendants' challenge

to whether the arbitration award draws its essence from the contract, while not prevailing, has an arguable basis in law. Therefore, the defendants' request for attorneys' fees is denied. V. Conclusion

Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED. ENFORCED. It is ORDERED that the arbitration award be

The defendants' request for attorneys' fees is DENIED.

It is further ORDERED that this civil action be DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the active docket of this Court. IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum opinion and order to counsel of record herein. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment on this matter.

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DATED:

June 3, 2010

/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr. FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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