Anderson v. Consolidation Coal Company et al
Filing
37
Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Denying Plaintiff's Motion For Leave to File Surreply. The plaintiff's motion for leave to file an a mended complaint 34 is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to file the plaintiff's amended complaint. Further, the defendants' motion to dismiss 19 and the plaintiff's motion for leave to file a surreply 33 are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE subject to refiling based upon the allegations and contents of the amended complaint. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr. on 10/25/12.(mh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
JOYCE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 1:11CV138
(STAMP)
CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY
and CONSOL ENERGY, INC.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT,
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SURREPLY
I.
Background
In August 2011, the plaintiff, Joyce Anderson, commenced this
civil action by filing a complaint in the Circuit Court of Marion
County, West Virginia. The plaintiff alleges that after recovering
from a work-related injury, she sought to return to work but the
defendants,
CONSOL
Energy
Incorporated
(“CONSOL”)
and
the
Consolidation Coal Company (“CCC”), prohibited her from returning
and thus terminated the plaintiff.
claims arising from that termination.
The plaintiff asserts three
First, the plaintiff claims
that the defendants terminated her and therefore retaliated against
her as a result of their animus arising out of the plaintiff’s
filing of a workers’ compensation claim or her future eligibility
to file such a claim.
Second, the plaintiff argues that her
termination was also motivated by her gender, the perception that
she had a disability, or her actual disability in violation of the
West Virginia Human Rights Act (“WVHRA”).
Lastly, the plaintiff
argues that the defendants violated the WVHRA by relying on
osteoporosis
as
a
reason
for
terminating
the
plaintiff
from
employment because such a practice has a disparate impact on women.
On September 1, 2011, the defendants removed the case to this
Court based on diversity jurisdiction.
The defendants thereafter,
filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint.
Within this
motion, the defendants argue: (1) the federal Labor Management
Relations
Act
preempts
state
law
claims
that
require
the
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”); (2)
the plaintiff is collaterally estopped from re-litigating any
factual issues decided by the arbitrator; and (3) the plaintiff
failed to name an indispensable party, in this situation the Union
that prosecuted her grievance in arbitration.
The plaintiff filed
a response arguing: (1) the plaintiff’s claim are not preempted by
federal law because they do not require the interpretation of a
CBA; (2) the decision of the arbitrator does not collaterally estop
the plaintiff from pursuing the claims in her complaint in a
judicial forum; and (3) the Union is not an indispensable party.
Defendants thereafter filed a reply contesting the plaintiff’s
arguments and reasserting their arguments from the initial motion.
Within this motion, the defendants insert an argument regarding the
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint under Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
2
662 (2009) standards.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to file a
surreply, which this Court neither granted nor denied.
Following the motion to file a surreply, the plaintiff filed
a motion for leave to amend complaint.
The plaintiff argues that
this Court should not consider the defendants’ Federal Rule of
Civil
Procedure
12(b)(6)
Iqbal
and
Twombly
argument.
The
defendants asserted this argument in their reply to the motion to
dismiss by questioning the adequacy of the plaintiff’s claim for
reasonable accommodation.
The plaintiff explains that because her
complaint was originally filed in state court, she was not required
to
comply
with
the
heightened
federal
pleading
requirements.
Furthermore, the plaintiff claims that the proposed amendments do
not alter the cause of action as it appeared in the original
complaint.
Instead, the amended complaint only adds additional
facts.
The defendants filed a response arguing that the plaintiff’s
proposed amendments would be futile as the amended complaint could
not survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically,
the defendants claim that the plaintiff’s arguments regarding
disability discrimination fail to state a claim upon which relief
can
be
granted
because
the
plaintiff
is
not
accommodation based on the plaintiff’s amendments.
entitled
to
an
The defendants
further argue that the plaintiff’s references to the CBA and
arbitration in the amendments underscore the fact that a resolution
3
of her claims necessarily requires interpretation of the CBA and
therefore the matter is preempted by federal law.
Finally, the
defendants argue that the plaintiff cannot establish a prima face
case of either gender discrimination or disability discrimination.
The
plaintiff
then
replied
by
arguing
first
that
the
amendments are not aimed at the preemption argument, the preclusion
argument, or the indispensable party argument.
Instead, the
plaintiff asserts that the only argument affected by the amended
complaint is the Iqbal and Twombly argument. The plaintiff further
asserts that the defendants misconstrue her first amended complaint
as
she
has
complaint.
not
abandoned
any
of
the
claims
in
her
initial
Thus, she may have been entitled to an accommodation.
Next, the plaintiff claims that her complaint’s reference to the
CBA does not require interpretation of the CBA.
Lastly, the
plaintiff argues that the defendants’ contention that the plaintiff
cannot establish a prima facie case should be rejected as such a
contention requires this Court to address disputed facts.
For the reasons stated below, this Court finds that the
plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint is granted.
Therefore, the defendants’ motion to dismiss and the plaintiff’s
motion for leave to file a surreply and exhibit to the motion to
dismiss are denied without prejudice.
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II.
Federal
Rule
of
Applicable Law
Civil
Procedure
15(a)(1)(A)
states,
in
pertinent part, that “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a
matter of course . . . before being served with a responsive
pleading.”
If a party seeks to amend its pleadings in all other
cases, it may only do so “with the opposing party’s written consent
or the court’s leave.
justice so requires.”
Rule
15(a)
The court should freely give leave when
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
grants
the
district
court
broad
discretion
concerning motions to amend pleadings, and leave should be granted
absent some reason “such as undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory
motive
on
the
part
of
the
movant,
repeated
failure
to
cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to
the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment or
futility of the amendment.”
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962); see also Ward Elec. Serv. v. First Commercial Bank, 819
F.2d 496, 497 (4th Cir. 1987); Gladhill v. Gen. Motors Corp., 743
F.2d 1049, 1052 (4th Cir. 1984).
III.
Discussion
The defendants’ central argument in their response to the
plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint is that such amendments
would be futile and therefore this Court should not grant the
motion to amend.
The defendants claim that the plaintiff’s
amendments are futile because the amended complaint could not
5
survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).
Ordinarily, barring a showing that the plaintiff’s proposed
amendment is obviously frivolous or legally insufficient on its
face, consideration of the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s
claim is not appropriate when considering a motion for leave.
Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 510-511 (4th Cir.
1983); Kerns v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 1:10CV23, 2011 U.S.
Dis. LEXIS 93920 *8 (N.D. W. Va, Aug. 23, 2011); see also Madison
Fund, Inc. v. Denison Mines Ltd., 90 F.R.D. 89 (S.D. N.Y. 1981)
(Defendant’s argument regarding the sufficiency of amendment sought
does not support denial of motion for leave to amend.
Unless
defendant can show that added claims are frivolous, motion for
leave
to
amend
amendment.).
resolved
judgment.
is
not
appropriate
time
to
argue
merits
of
Instead, the merits of a complaint are usually best
through
a
motion
to
dismiss
or
motion
for
summary
Six, et al. v. Beegle, et al., No. 2:11cv698, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 115553 *8-9 (Aug. 16, 2012) (citations omitted).
“However, if there is no set of facts that could be proven under
the amendment [that] would constitute a valid and sufficient claim,
leave
should
be
denied.”
Id.
at
*9
(citations
omitted).
Therefore, various courts note that if an amended complaint cannot
withstand a motion to dismiss, a court should deny the motion to
amend as futile.
Perkins v. United States, 55 F.3d 910, 917 (4th
6
Cir. 1995) (citing Glick v. Koenig, 766 F.2d 265, 268-69 (7th Cir.
1985)); Frank M. McDermott, Ltd. v. Moretz, 898 F.2d 418, 420-21
(4th Cir. 1990) (“There is no error in disallowing an amendment
when the claim sought to be pleaded by amendment plainly would be
subject to a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”);
see also Kerns, No. 1:10CV23, 2011 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 93920 at *8
(finding that the plaintiffs’ proposed amendments are insufficient
on their face and would not survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).
This Court finds that the plaintiff’s amendments are not
subject
to
a
motion
to
dismiss
under
Rule
12(b)(6).
The
plaintiff’s amendments concern her disability discrimination claim.
These
amendments
provide
additional
facts
and
information
concerning her disability claim and are thus not frivolous, nor do
they make any claim of the plaintiff’s insufficient on its face.
The plaintiff has plead her disability claim in the alternative.
The plaintiff contends in her amended complaint that while she does
not believe she is disabled, if she is determined to be disabled,
she was denied a reasonable accommodation.
ECF No. 34 Ex. 1 *6.
While the defendants’ contention that the plaintiff is not entitled
to an accommodation if the plaintiff is not disabled may or may not
be
correct,
the
plaintiff
may
certainly
be
entitled
accommodation if she is determined to be disabled.
to
an
Therefore, the
defendants’ claim that the motion to amend should be denied because
7
the plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
because she is not entitled to an accommodation fails.
The defendants’ further arguments concerning preemption and
the
plaintiff’s
ability
to
establish
a
prima
facie
case
of
disability or gender discrimination, concern the substantive merits
of this case and involve factual disputes. As this Court explained
above, the plaintiff’s amendments are not frivolous, nor do they
make any of her claims legally insufficient on their face.
Thus,
the defendants’ arguments are more appropriately brought in a
motion to dismiss or summary judgment motion rather than in
opposition to a motion to amend.
Additionally, there is no evidence that any of the other
grounds for denying a motion to amend apply to bar amendment in
this case.
Undue delay is not at issue in this case, as the
plaintiff filed the motion to amend in accordance with this Court’s
scheduling order (ECF No. 10 *3-4) and upon notification of the
defendants’
Twombly
and
Iqbal
argument.
Nor
is
there
any
indication of bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
plaintiff, and as this is the plaintiff’s first request to amend
her
complaint,
there
has
not
been
repeated
failure
to
cure
deficiencies. Finally, and most importantly, this Court finds that
there is no evidence to support a finding that amendment would
unduly prejudice the defendants.
granted leave to amend.
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Therefore, the plaintiff is
Also pending before this Court is the defendants’ motion to
dismiss and the plaintiff’s motion to file a surreply to the
defendants’ motion to dismiss. Because these motions rely upon the
plaintiff’s original complaint, which is now superseded by the
amended complaint, this Court finds that the motions are moot.
Accordingly, this Court must deny these motions without prejudice
subject to refiling based upon the allegations of the amended
complaint.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff’s motion for
leave to file an amended complaint (ECF No. 34) is GRANTED.
The
Clerk is DIRECTED to file the plaintiff’s amended complaint, which
is attached as an exhibit to the plaintiff’s motion for leave to
file an amended complaint (ECF No. 34).
Further, the defendants’
motion to dismiss (ECF No. 19) and the plaintiff’s motion for leave
to file a surreply (ECF No. 33) are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
subject to refiling based upon the allegations and contents of the
amended complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.
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DATED:
October 25, 2012
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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