Transamerica Life Insurance Company v. Curkendall et al
Filing
48
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING NINA B. CURKENDALL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. The Court GRANTS 42 Motion for Summary Judgment. FINDS that the defendant is entitled to the full amount of the insurance proceeds under the Policy, and DIRECTS TransAmerica to pay her the full proceeds of Certificate No. G015341. The Court DISMISSES the defendant Michael H. Simmons's counterclaims against TransAmerica WITH PREJUDICE. ORDERS the parties to file motions for attorney's fees and costs, if any, within ten (10) days of the entry of this Order. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 1/17/2013. (kd)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
//
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12CV87
(Judge Keeley)
NINA B. CURKENDALL, SAMUEL E.
WRIGHT and MICHAEL H. SIMMONS,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING NINA B. CURKENDALL’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 42]
Pending before the Court is Nina B. Curkendall’s motion for
summary judgment, (dkt. no. 42), which is fully briefed and ripe
for review. For the reasons stated at the December 21, 2012 hearing
and discussed below, the Court GRANTS her motion and FINDS that she
is entitled to the insurance proceeds at issue in this case.
I.
TransAmerica Life Insurance Co. (“TransAmerica”) initiated
this
interpleader
action
against
Nina
B.
Curkendall
(“Mrs.
Curkendall”), Samuel E. Wright (“Wright”), and Michael H. Simmons
(“Simmons”) to determine the proper beneficiary of a life insurance
policy (“the Policy”) it had issued to Charles R. Curkendall (“Mr.
Curkendall”)
prior
to
his
death.
Both
Mrs.
Curkendall,
the
decedent’s wife, and Simmons, his former business partner, allege
TRANSAMERICA LIFE INS. CO. v. CURKENDALL, ET AL.
1:12CV87
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING NINA B. CURKENDALL’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 42]
that they are the sole beneficiary of the policy proceeds.1 The
relevant facts, as detailed below, are undisputed.
Mr.
Curkendall
originally
purchased
the
Policy
from
TransAmerica’s predecessor on June 7, 1990, naming his wife as the
sole beneficiary. Approximately one year later, on July 2, 1991, he
changed the beneficiaries of the Policy to Wright (50%) and Simmons
(50%),
who
were
then
his
partners
in
a
general
business
partnership. Thereafter, on July 12, 1997, Mr. Curkendall, Wright,
and Simmons entered into a “buy-sell” agreement that was funded by
the proceeds of their individual life insurance policies. The
partnership disassociated a few years later, when Simmons, in a
series of agreements executed between 2000 and 2001, purchased all
of Mr. Curkendall and Wright’s partnership interests. As a part of
this buyout, the partners’ life insurance policies were released
from the “buy-sell” agreement, and the ownership of each policy was
transferred back to the individual insureds.
As the buyout came to a close, the three former partners
contacted William Pell (“Pell”), an authorized insurance agent for
1
Wright, the third defendant, has not appeared in this case
or otherwise made a claim under the Policy. On October 1, 2012, the
Clerk entered default against him pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(a).
2
TRANSAMERICA LIFE INS. CO. v. CURKENDALL, ET AL.
1:12CV87
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING NINA B. CURKENDALL’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 42]
the company now known as TransAmerica, for assistance in changing
the ownership of their individual life insurance policies and in
designating their new beneficiaries. Pell, in turn, provided each
partner
with
the
standard
“Change
of
Beneficiary”
form.
Mr.
Curkendall executed that form before three witnesses on January 5,
2001, naming his wife, Mrs. Curkendall, as the primary beneficiary
under the Policy, and naming their three children, Terri, Charles,
and Rachel, as contingent beneficiaries. Pell then collected the
executed form from Mr. Curkendall and, in accordance with his
customary practice, mailed it to the attention of a TransAmerica
employee. The buyout thus finalized, Mr. Curkendall had no further
involvement, business or personal, with Simmons.
On May 11, 2001, approximately four months after he executed
the
Change
of
Beneficiary
Form,
Mr.
Curkendall
executed
and
delivered a form to TransAmerica’s predecessor that terminated his
premium payments and reduced the face value of his life insurance
to
$395,000.
In
a
responsive
letter
dated
May
23,
2001,
a
TransAmerica employee wrote Mr. Curkendall to confirm this change.
The letter also stated that:
You may recall you had entered into a buy-sell
agreement with your partners in 1998 and at
that time the beneficiary for your contract
was changed to Mr. Simmons and Mr. Wright. I
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TRANSAMERICA LIFE INS. CO. v. CURKENDALL, ET AL.
1:12CV87
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING NINA B. CURKENDALL’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 42]
have enclosed a change of beneficiary form
should you need to make a change at this time.
(Dkt. No. 43 at 12). Neither the Curkendalls nor TransAmerica took
any further action.
More than ten years later, on January 23, 2012, Mr. Curkendall
passed away. That same month, Mrs. Curkendall, his widow and
executrix, notified TransAmerica of her claim to the benefits due
under the Policy. When several weeks went by without any response,
she grew concerned and contacted Pell. He quickly discovered the
problem: TransAmerica did not have the January 5, 2001, change of
beneficiary form in its files, and as such, Wright and Simmons were
still listed in its records as the co-beneficiaries of the Policy.
Pell immediately advised TransAmerica of its mistake, and on
February 24, 2012, he delivered the January 5, 2001, change of
beneficiary form to TransAmerica via facsimile.
In early March of 2012, a TransAmerica employee contacted
Simmons and Wright and informed them that they were still listed as
the beneficiaries of record. Noting that a Change of Beneficiary
Form may have been sent, but not received, on January 5, 2001, the
employee asked Simmons and Wright if they would be willing to
disclaim the proceeds of the Policy so that TransAmerica could
disburse the benefits to Mrs. Curkendall. Wright agreed, and he
4
TRANSAMERICA LIFE INS. CO. v. CURKENDALL, ET AL.
1:12CV87
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING NINA B. CURKENDALL’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 42]
executed a written disclaimer of benefits on March 19, 2012.
Simmons, however, filed a claim with TransAmerica on April 22,
2012, alleging that he is the sole beneficiary under the Policy and
is thus entitled to the full amount of the insurance proceeds.
II.
A.
Summary
documents,
judgment
is
appropriate
electronically
declarations,
stored
stipulations
.
.
where
the
information,
.,
admissions,
“depositions,
affidavits
or
interrogatory
answers, or other materials” establish that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (a). When
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews all the
evidence “in the light most favorable” to the nonmoving party.
Providence Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc., 211 F.3d 846,
850 (4th Cir. 2000). The Court must avoid weighing the evidence or
determining
the
truth
and
limit
its
inquiry
solely
to
a
determination of whether genuine issues of triable fact exist.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the
Court
of
the
basis
for
the
motion
5
and
of
establishing
the
TRANSAMERICA LIFE INS. CO. v. CURKENDALL, ET AL.
1:12CV87
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING NINA B. CURKENDALL’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 42]
nonexistence of genuine issues of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has made the
necessary showing, the nonmoving party “must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 256 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” favoring the
nonmoving party will not prevent the entry of summary judgment; the
evidence
must
be
such
that
a
rational
trier
of
fact
could
reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248–52.
B.
The right to change the beneficiary of an insurance policy,
like all other contractual rights, “depends upon the terms of the
contract between the insured and the insurer.” Gill v. Provident
Life
&
Acc.
Ins.
Co.,
48
S.E.2d
165,
167
(W.
Va.
1948).
Consequently, as a general rule, “the mode prescribed in a life
insurance policy for changing the beneficiary must be at least
substantially followed.” Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lindamood, 152
S.E. 321, 322-23 (W. Va. 1930). This question turns primarily on
the activities of the insured, as his “substantial compliance with
the conditions relating to a change of beneficiary is sufficient”
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TRANSAMERICA LIFE INS. CO. v. CURKENDALL, ET AL.
1:12CV87
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING NINA B. CURKENDALL’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 42]
to effect his desired change. Id. at 323; see also Gill, 48 S.E.2d
at 169. In other words,
when the insured in a life insurance policy has done
substantially all that is required of him to accomplish a
change of beneficiary and the ministerial acts of the
officers of the insurer are all that remain to be done, the
change will be effective even though the formal details
were not completed before the death of the insured.
Gill, 48 S.E.2d at 169. In short, then, “[w]hen it appears that the
insured actually attempted to make a valid change of beneficiary[,]
the courts will give effect to his intention.” Provident Life &
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Dotson, 93 F.Supp. 538, 541 (S.D. W. Va. 1950).
III.
Mrs. Curkendall contends that she is entitled to the insurance
proceeds
because
her
husband
complied
with
the
change
of
beneficiary provision in the Policy when he executed the “Change of
Beneficiary
Form”
on
January
5,
2001,
and
provided
it
to
TransAmerica’s authorized agent, William Pell. Simmons argues that
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to Mr. Curkendall’s
intent to effect that change because he “took no steps” after he
received the May 23, 2001 letter from TransAmerica’s employee
indicating that it had not yet processed his form. (Dkt. No. 43 at
5).
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TRANSAMERICA LIFE INS. CO. v. CURKENDALL, ET AL.
1:12CV87
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING NINA B. CURKENDALL’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 42]
The Policy itself provides that the owner of the benefits,
i.e.,
Mr. Curkendall, can change his designated beneficiary “at
any time.” (Dkt. No. 3-1 at 34). The Policy’s only requirement for
such a change is that the owner “write to [TransAmerica] and notify
[TransAmerica]
of
the
change.”
Id.
Notably,
the
Policy
also
provides that “[a]fter [TransAmerica] receives the change, it will
be effective as of the date that the Owner signed the request, even
if the insured Participant died in the meantime.” Id.
Here, there is no question that Mr. Curkendall executed a
Change
of
Beneficiary
form
on
January
5,
2001,
naming
Mrs.
Curkendall as the primary beneficiary under the Policy. It is
further undisputed that he placed that form directly in the hands
of TransAmerica’s agent, and thus TransAmerica, on that same day.
It is consequently clear beyond peradventure that, as a matter of
law, he “at least substantially followed” the conditions of the
Policy relating to a change of beneficiary. Lindamood, 152 S.E. at
322-23. Indeed, his role in the process concluded once he gave the
form to Mr. Pell, and “all that remain[ed] to be done” were “the
ministerial acts of the officers of the insurer.” Gill, 48 S.E.2d
at
169.
His
designation
of
Mrs.
Curkendall
as
beneficiary was thus effective as of January 5, 2001.
8
his
primary
TRANSAMERICA LIFE INS. CO. v. CURKENDALL, ET AL.
1:12CV87
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING NINA B. CURKENDALL’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 42]
The letter penned by a TransAmerica employee on May 23, 2001,
upon
which
Simmons
places
so
much
emphasis,
is
entirely
inconsequential. There is no question that Mr. Curkendall did not
change the beneficiary of the Policy after January 5, 2001, and as
such, any wildly speculative “intent” that Simmons attempts to claw
from the May 23, 2001 letter is legally irrelevant. Furthermore,
there is not one iota of evidence in the record that Mr. Curkendall
ever “intended” to gift the benefits of his life insurance policy
to Simmons, an estranged former business relation, instead of his
wife and children.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, the Court:
1.
GRANTS the defendant Nina B. Curkendall’s motion for
summary
judgment
(dkt.
no.
42),
FINDS
that
she
is
entitled to the full amount of the insurance proceeds
under the Policy, and DIRECTS TransAmerica to pay her the
full proceeds of Certificate No. G015341;
2.
DISMISSES
the
defendant
Michael
H.
Simmons’s
counterclaims against TransAmerica WITH PREJUDICE; and
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TRANSAMERICA LIFE INS. CO. v. CURKENDALL, ET AL.
1:12CV87
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING NINA B. CURKENDALL’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 42]
3.
ORDERS the parties to file motions for attorney’s fees
and costs, if any, within ten (10) days of the entry of
this Order.
It is so ORDERED.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to transmit copies of
this Order to counsel of record.
DATED: January 17, 2013.
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10
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