Security Alarm Financing Enterprises, Inc. v. Parmer et al

Filing 127

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND DENYING DEFENDANT MITCH BROZIK'S MOTION TO DISMISS. Security Alarm Financing Enterprises, Inc.'s Motion to Strike Secure US, Inc.'s counterclaim 96 is GRAN TED, and Security Alarm Financing Enterprises, Inc.'s Motion in the Alternative to Dismiss the Counterclaim 96 is DENIED AS MOOT. Further, defendant Mitch Brozik's Motion to Dismiss 88 is DENIED. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr. on 2/21/2014. (copy to counsel of record via CM/ECF) (nmm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
SECURITY ALARM FINANCING
ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 1:12CV88
(STAMP)

BETTY PARMER, SECURE US, INC.
and MITCH BROZIK,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND
DENYING DEFENDANT MITCH BROZIK’S MOTION TO DISMISS
I.
Originally,

Procedural History

Security

Alarm

Financing

Enterprises,

Inc.

(“SAFE”) filed the above-styled civil action in this Court only
against the defendants, Secure US, Inc. (“Secure US”) and Betty
Parmer (“Parmer”).

In its complaint, SAFE asserted a claim of

successor liability as a result of the sale of defendant Secure US,
in addition to seeking a declaration that SAFE’s judgment lien
continues to attach to defendant Secure US’s assets, as the sale of
defendant Secure US was not commercially reasonable.

Defendant

Secure US then filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, which SAFE
opposed.

Thereafter, SAFE filed a request for entry of default as

to defendant Parmer, as defendant Parmer failed to file a timely
responsive pleading to SAFE’s complaint.

This Court then ordered

that default be entered against defendant Parmer.

After default

was entered, SAFE requested that this Court enter a default
judgment against defendant Parmer.

At that time, defendant Parmer

filed a motion to set aside default.1

SAFE then filed a motion to

amend its complaint wherein it sought to add two additional claims
and one additional party.
In its memorandum opinion and order, this Court first denied
defendant Secure US’s motion to dismiss, as this Court found that
SAFE had stated sufficient factual allegations to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.

This Court then determined that

good cause existed to set aside default as to defendant Parmer, and
denied SAFE’s motion for default judgment.

As to the plaintiff’s

amended complaint, this Court found that granting SAFE leave to
amend would not prejudice the defendants, nor were the amendments
sought futile or brought in bad faith.
Thereafter, SAFE filed its amended complaint, wherein it
added claims for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud. Included in
these two additional claims is an additional party, defendant Mitch
Brozik (“Brozik”).

In response to the claims, defendant Brozik

filed a motion to dismiss seeking to dismiss both Counts III and
IV, which are SAFE’s claims for fraud and conspiracy to commit
fraud respectively. In support of his motion to dismiss, defendant

1

Defendant Parmer entitled this motion and referred to her
request as a motion to set aside default judgment. However, as
this Court had not entered default judgment against defendant
Parmer at the time of this filing, this Court construed defendant
Parmer’s motion as a motion to set aside default.
2

Brozik argued that SAFE’s claim for fraud was not plead with the
requisite specificity, SAFE’s allegations against defendant Brozik
are subject to waiver for failure to act and SAFE has failed to
join an indispensable party.

This Court denied defendant Brozik’s

motion to dismiss, but ordered SAFE to file a more definite
statement

as

to

the

time,

place,

and

contents

of

the

false

representations made by defendant Brozik. As to defendant Brozik’s
waiver argument and indispensable party argument, this Court found
that SAFE did not waive its right to assert the claims in its
amended complaint nor did SAFE fail to join an indispensable party.
SAFE thereafter filed a more definite statement in compliance with
this Court’s order.
In response to SAFE’s more definite statement, defendant
Brozik has now filed a second motion to dismiss SAFE’s amended
complaint and defendant Secure US filed an answer and counterclaim.
In support of defendant Brozik’s motion to dismiss, he argues that:
(1) SAFE failed to allege damages, which are a required element of
fraud; and (2) SAFE waived any right to make claims based on the
secured party sale because SAFE admits to having notice of the
claimed defects in the sale and it failed to exercise appropriate
judicial

remedies

to

protect

its

purported

interests.

SAFE

responded in opposition arguing that it has alleged cognizable
damages as to its claims for fraud and SAFE has not waived its
right to seek monetary damages by not seeking to enjoin the secured

3

party sale. Further, SAFE indicates that this Court has previously
addressed

and

rejected

both

of

defendant

Brozik’s

arguments.

Defendant Brozik did not file a reply.
After defendant Secure US filed its answer and counterclaim
against SAFE, SAFE filed a motion to strike the counterclaim or, in
the alternative, a motion to dismiss the counterclaim.

In support

of its motion, SAFE argues that: (1) the counterclaim should be
stricken because Secure US failed to seek and obtain leave of Court
to file the counterclaim; (2) even if Secure US had sought leave of
Court,

it

could

not

establish

good

cause

for

permitting

a

counterclaim so late in the case; and (3) in the alternative, the
counterclaim should be dismissed based on the doctrine of judicial
estoppel.

Defendant Secure US responded in opposition, arguing

that SAFE asserted additional causes of action in regards to fraud
for the first time, prompting a proper counterclaim by defendant
Secure US and SAFE’s motion to dismiss based on judicial estoppel
fails because the doctrine of judicial estoppel is not applicable
in this matter.

SAFE filed a reply reiterating its initial

arguments and further asserting that Secure US’s response to SAFE’s
motion to strike or, in the alternative, to dismiss should be
stricken as untimely.
Both defendant Brozik’s motion to dismiss and SAFE’s motion to
strike or, in the alternative, to dismiss are fully briefed and
ripe for disposition.

For the reasons stated below, this Court

4

denies defendant Brozik’s motion to dismiss and grants SAFE’s
motion to strike.
II.

Facts

This action arises out of the sale of defendant Secure US to
defendant Parmer. In 2010, a judgment was entered in favor of SAFE
against defendant Secure US in the amount of $1,132,028.42.

This

judgment was the result of counterclaims filed by SAFE in a
separate proceeding for defamation, tortious interference, and
common law unfair competition.

Thereafter, SAFE registered a

certified copy of the judgment with this Court. At that time, SAFE
obtained a lien upon defendant Secure US’s assets after this Court
issued a writ of fieri facias.

SAFE then filed a motion for the

sale of defendant Secure US’s customer accounts, which defendant
Secure US opposed. The Milan Puskar Amended and Restated Revocable
Trust (“the Trust”), an entity that alleged it had a superior lien
on defendant Secure US’s property in the amount of $4.4 million,
then intervened to oppose the sale as well.

Both the Trust and

defendant Secure US opposed the sale by stating that the sale
amount

would

not

satisfy

the

Trust’s

lien.

United

States

Magistrate Judge James E. Seibert then found that SAFE’s motion for
sale should be granted and this Court agreed, overruling objections
from the Trust and defendant Secure US.
Defendant Secure US then requested that SAFE agree to postpone
the sale to pursue additional settlement negotiations.

5

SAFE and

defendant Secure US filed a proposed agreed order continuing the
sale for the purpose of engaging in settlement discussions.

This

Court then issued an order continuing such sale until May 16, 2012,
for the purpose of working towards a settlement. SAFE alleges that
after this Court issued the order, defendant Secure US refused to
continue settlement negotiations.

SAFE contends that on April 20,

2012, it received a notice in the mail regarding a secured party
sale of defendant Secure US’s assets. This notice stated that such
sale would take place on May 5, 2012.

SAFE alleges that defendant

Brozik, as President of Secure US at the time, was responsible for
providing the instructions regarding the settlement negotiations,
including the instruction to obtain a continuance.

SAFE asserts

that defendant Brozik’s representation that Secure US intended to
continue to pursue good faith negotiations was false and that
defendant Brozik had already contacted defendant Parmer to advise
her of the allegedly bogus secured party sale.
SAFE asserts that defendant Parmer bought the Trust’s notes
for $2.5 million prior to the scheduled sale. SAFE further asserts
that defendant Parmer is defendant Brozik’s aunt, and has no
history in the security alarm business, which defendant Secure US
conducts.

Defendant Brozik was the owner of defendant Secure US

until defendant Parmer eventually purchased defendant Secure US.
SAFE contends that it sent a letter objecting to the sale based on
irregularities and unusual terms that would discourage buyers,

6

which reached the attorney who would be conducting the sale.

SAFE

further contends that the attorney conducting the sale did not
adequately respond to potential buyers, specifically a Mr. Patrick
Egan.
Regarding the sale itself, SAFE asserts that numerous issues
existed.

Specifically, SAFE alleges that potential buyers were

only allowed to walk through the office and look around, and no
inspection of what was contained in the file cabinets was allowed.
Further, SAFE alleges that the potential buyers were denied access
to Secure US’s warehouse, which contained contents that were part
of the auction. SAFE also alleges that instead of defendant Parmer
accepting a $3.6 million cash bid for the assets, defendant Parmer
purchased the assets of the company for $4 million by issuing a
credit bid.
SAFE asserts that after purchasing these asserts, defendant
Parmer retained defendant Brozik’s new company, MB Security, to
manage, control, and operate the assets as a security alarm
monitoring business.

SAFE further asserts that defendant Brozik

uses MB Security to manage and control the assets that defendant
Parmer purchased from defendant Secure US, in the exact same manner
he used them to run defendant Secure US prior to its sale.
III.

Applicable Law

In assessing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a

7

court must accept all well-pled facts contained in the complaint as
true.

Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc, 591 F.3d

250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). However, “legal conclusions, elements of
a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement fail to constitute well-pled facts for Rule 12(b)(6)
purposes.”
(2009)).

Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
This

Court

also

declines

to

consider

“unwarranted

inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.”

Wahi v.

Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n.26 (4th Cir.
2009).
It has often been said that the purpose of a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) is to test the formal sufficiency of the statement of the
claim for relief; it is not a procedure for resolving a contest
about the facts or the merits of the case.

5B Charles Alan Wright

& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (3d ed.
1998).

The Rule 12(b)(6) motion also must be distinguished from a

motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56, which goes to the merits of the claim and is designed to test
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact.

Id.

For

purposes of the motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in
the

light

essentially

most
the

favorable
court’s

to

the

inquiry

party
is

making

directed

the
to

claim

and

whether

the

allegations constitute a statement of a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a).

Id. § 1357.

8

A complaint should be dismissed “if it does not allege ‘enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on is face.’”
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“Facial

plausibility is established once the factual content of a complaint
‘allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Nemet Chevrolet,
591 F.3d at 256 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).

Detailed

factual allegations are not required, but the facts alleged must be
sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
IV.

A.

Discussion

SAFE’s Motion to Strike Defendant Secure US’s Counterclaim
Defendant Secure US’s counterclaim asserted in response to

SAFE’s more definite statement contains two separate counts. Count
I of the counterclaim is a claim for breach of contract. Defendant
Secure US asserts that SAFE breached an alleged settlement contract
between the parties when SAFE demanded an additional $500,000.00 to
settle the claims after there had been a meeting of the minds as to
the original settlement agreement.

Count II is defendant Secure

US’s claim for fraud against SAFE.

Defendant Secure US alleges

that SAFE fraudulently entered into negotiations with the intention
of causing irreparable damage to defendant Secure US.

9

SAFE contends that defendant Secure US’s counterclaim should
be stricken because it failed to seek leave of court and, even if
it had sought leave of Court, defendant Secure US could not
establish good cause for permitting a counterclaim so late in the
litigation.

Initially, this Court notes that in accordance with

Rule 15(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[u]nless
the court orders otherwise, any required response to an amended
pleading must be made within the time remaining to respond to the
original pleading or within 14 days after service of the amended
pleading, whichever is later.” Rule 15, however, does not speak to
whether new claims may be asserted in such response.

While the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not
spoken as to the issue of whether a party may assert a new
counterclaim in response to an amended complaint without leave of
court, other district courts have, including district courts within
the Fourth Circuit.

Most courts have found that

‘when a plaintiff files an amended complaint which
changes the theory or scope of the case, the defendant is
allowed to plead anew as though it were the original
complaint filed by the Plaintiff . . . . The obvious
corollary is that if an amended complaint does not change
the theory or scope of the case, a [defendant] must seek
leave of court pursuant to Rule 15(a) before it can amend
its answer to assert a counterclaim.’
Tralon Corp. v. Cedarpids, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 812, 832 (N.D. Iowa
1997) (quoting Brown v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 610 F.Supp. 76, 78 (S.D.
Fla. 1985)); E.E.O.C. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 211 F.R.D.
225, 226-27 (S.D. N.Y. 2002); see Elite Entertainment, Inc. v.
10

Khela Brothers Entertainment, 227 F.R.D. 444, 447 (E.D. Va. 2005)
(citing

3

James

W.

Moore,

§ 15.17[6] (3d ed. 1997)).

et

al.,

Moore’s

Federal

Practice

In support of such rule, the court in

Morgan Stanley stated that “[i]f every amendment, no matter how
minor or substantive, allowed defendants to assert counterclaims or
defenses as of right, claims that would otherwise be barred or
precluded could be revived without cause.

This would deprive the

Court of its ability to effectively manage the litigation.”
F.R.D. at 227.

211

This Court finds such reasoning persuasive.

Defendant Secure US argues that SAFE has asserted additional
causes of action is regards to fraud for the first time, which
prompted defendant Secure US’s counterclaim for breach of contract
and fraud.

This Court finds, however, that SAFE has not asserted

additional

causes

of

action

that

counterclaims asserted by Secure US.
statement,

SAFE

only

included

the

would

prompt

the

type

In making its more definite
following

additional

paragraphs:
93. As the President of Secure US, Brozik was the sole
Secure US representative responsible for negotiating the
potential settlement with SAFE.
Brozik provided
instructions to Mr. Kupec regarding the settlement
negotiations, including (but not limited to) the
instruction to obtain a continuance of SAFE’s courtordered sale so that Parmer could conduct a bogus secured
party sale.
94. Brozik knew that the representation that Secure US
intended to pursue good faith negotiations was false when
he instructed Mr. Kupec to convey that representation to
SAFE (and this Court) on April 13, 2012. At that time,
Brozik had already (1) determined that Secure US would
11

of

two

not pursue any further settlement negotiations with SAFE
and (2) contacted Parmer to advise her about the
recently-concocted scheme to conduct a bogus secured
party sale.
ECF No. 86 *16.

Defendant Secure US failed to explain in its

response to the motion to strike how such paragraphs modified the
claims against Secure US specifically and this Court is unable to
discern any such modification.

These above-cited paragraphs only

modified SAFE’s claims as they pertained to defendant Brozik and
his involvement in the alleged fraud.

Accordingly, because SAFE’s

theory and scope of the case has not changed in regards to
defendant Secure US and defendant Secure US failed to seek leave of
court to add its counterclaim, this Court grants SAFE’s motion to
strike. Due to this Court granting SAFE’s motion to strike, SAFE’s
motion in the alternative to dismiss the counterclaim is rendered
moot.
B.

Defendant Brozik’s Motion to Dismiss
1.

Damages Arguments

Defendant Brozik makes two main arguments in his motion to
dismiss Counts III and IV of SAFE’s more definite statements.
Defendant Brozik first argues that SAFE’s claim for fraud, and thus
SAFE’s conspiracy to commit fraud claim is legally insufficient
because it fails to allege any cognizable damages.
Court

must

begin

by

noting

that

both

of

First, this

defendant

Brozik’s

arguments have been addressed in this Court’s order on defendant
Brozik’s first motion to dismiss SAFE’s second amended complaint.
12

See ECF No. 84 *10-12.

Nonetheless, this Court will take up such

arguments again.
Under West Virginia law, the essential elements of fraud are
as follows:
(1) that the act claimed to be fraudulent was the act of
the defendant or induced by him; (2) that it was material
and false; that plaintiff relied upon it and was
justified under the circumstances in relying upon it; and
(3) that he was damaged because he relied upon it.
Poling v. Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc., 575 S.E.2d 199, 202 (W. Va.
2002) (quoting Horton v. Tyree, 139 S.E. 737, 738 (W. Va. 1927)).
In this matter, defendant Brozik claims that SAFE failed to plead
the damages element.

In support of this assertion, defendant

Brozik argues that testimony has been offered that Secure US was
not worth more than $2.59 million in a distressed situation and no
more

than

$3.71

million

in

a

non-distressed

situation.

Accordingly, defendant Brozik states that because SAFE was a junior
lienholder to defendant Parmer’s $4.4 million lien, no excess funds
would have been available for SAFE’s recovery even if the sale was
reasonable and SAFE’s junior lien would have been extinguished.
This Court finds that such an argument requires much speculation
into what SAFE can and cannot prove and the worth of the assets at
issue.

Accordingly, this Court cannot grant defendant Brozik’s

motion to dismiss based on such argument.
Defendant Brozik also argues that SAFE cannot prove damages
because such damages would be precluded by SAFE’s failure to

13

mitigate.

Defendant Brozik asserts that SAFE had the opportunity

to prevent the sale from occurring but instead, allowed the sale to
continue hoping it would later find a way to satisfy its lien.
This Court finds that such argument is not a proper argument at
this stage of the litigation.

In determining whether to grant or

deny a motion to dismiss for the failure to state a claim upon
which

relief

may

be

granted,

this

Court

is

tasked

with

the

responsibility to determine whether the allegations constitute a
statement of a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).
Whether SAFE should have sought to enjoin the sale involves
questions

of

fact

for

the

fact-finder

to

determine

at

the

appropriate time. This Court cannot at this time say, based on the
facts presented to it, that SAFE did in fact fail to mitigate its
alleged damages.
Defendant

Brozik

next

argues

that

SAFE’s

request

attorneys’ fees also does not satisfy the damages requirement.

for
In

its order previously denying defendant Brozik’s first motion to
dismiss, this Court specifically stated the following:
As the plaintiff notes, however, it is well established
that under West Virginia law, a plaintiff who has been
injured by the fraudulent conduct of a defendant is
entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees.
Bowling v.
Ansted Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge Inc., 425 S.E.2d 144 (W.
Va. 1992). In his reply, defendant Brozik seems to argue
that it is impossible for SAFE to have been injured by
any
of
Brozik’s
alleged
misrepresentations,
and
therefore, impossible for it to have incurred any damages
as a result of such misrepresentations.
This Court
disagrees.
SAFE is at least alleging that based on
misrepresentations made that resulted in the postponement
14

of SAFE’s court-ordered sale of defendant Secure US, it
was injured, as it incurred attorneys’ fees seeking a
declaration that the secured party sale was a sham that
did not extinguish SAFE’s judgment lien on defendant
Secure US’s assets. This Court finds such a claim is
sufficient to satisfy the damages element of the fraud
claim.
ECF No. 84 *11. Defendant Brozik asserts in this motion to dismiss
that the majority of courts have held that attorneys’ fees alone
cannot satisfy the damage or injury element of a claim for fraud.
Even if this Court were to now accept defendant Brozik’s argument
that attorneys’ fees are not sufficient to establish damages in an
action for fraud, West Virginia has held that a plaintiff’s measure
of damages in an action for fraud “would be any injury incurred as
a result of the defendant’s fraudulent conduct.”

Persinger v.

Peabody Coal Co., 474 S.E.2d 887, 899 (W. Va. 1996).

Such damages

include those for “full compensation for all injuries directly or
indirectly resulting from the wrong” and punitive or exemplary
damages.

Id.

“Damages for annoyance and inconvenience are

properly included in compensatory damages.”

Id. at 899 n.18.

In paragraph 96 of SAFE’s second amended complaint, SAFE
asserts that it
has suffered significant damages, including (but not
limited to) the fact that SAFE: (a) lost its rights to
conduct its Court ordered judgment lien sale, (b) has
been forced to file this lawsuit and incur attorney’s
fees . . . and (c) had its prior lawsuit was [sic]
dismissed due to Secure US’ [sic] claim that SAFE’s
judgment lien was extinguished.

15

ECF No. 86 *17.

Thus, SAFE is seeking compensatory damages in

addition to attorneys’ fees for the loss of its right to conduct
the sale, which was an injury directly or indirectly resulting from
the alleged fraud, and for the dismissal of its prior lawsuit,
which again is either a direct or indirect injury resulting from
the alleged fraud.

This Court need not at this time venture into

the worth of such claims, as that is a fact specific determination,
which is not appropriately decided on a motion to dismiss.
2.

Waiver Argument

Defendant Brozik next makes the argument that SAFE has waived
its right to assert any claims relating to the sale of assets,
because SAFE chose not to take any action to prevent such sale.
This Court previously rejected this same argument in defendant
Brozik’s first motion to dismiss.

Defendant Brozik, however, has

added additional case law to support his argument, and thus, this
Court will address such argument again.
In West Virginia, to establish waiver, “there must be evidence
demonstrating that a party has intentionally relinquished a known
right.”

Potesta v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 504 S.E.2d 135, 142

(W. Va. 1998) (citations omitted).

The waiver may be expressed or

implied but if the waiver is implied, “there must be clear and
convincing evidence of the party’s intent to relinquish the known
right.”

Id.

The party asserting waiver has the burden of

16

establishing the defense.

Id.

Accordingly, in this instance, the

burden is upon the defendant to prove such waiver.
Defendant Brozik now argues that courts have interpreted the
Uniform Commercial Code § 9-315, codified at West Virginia Code
§ 46-9-315, to state that a creditor who knew of but did not
prevent

the

interest.

sale

of

its

collateral

had

waived

its

security

This Court finds such argument inapplicable to SAFE’s

fraud claim.

Both cases cited by defendant Brozik deal with the

waiver of a party’s lien on the collateral.

The cases do not

discuss nor apply to the waiver of a party’s tort claims.

See

Lifewise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 923-24 (10th
Cir. 2004); Neu Cheese, Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 825 F.2d
1270, 1272 (8th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the addition of such case
law does not change this Court’s previous finding that defendant
Brozik has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
SAFE waived its right to assert its fraud claim against the
defendants.
V.
For

the

reasons

Conclusion

stated

above,

Security

Alarm

Financing

Enterprises, Inc.’s motion to strike Secure US, Inc.’s counterclaim
(ECF No. 96) is GRANTED, and Security Alarm Financing Enterprises,
Inc.’s motion in the alternative to dismiss the counterclaim (ECF
No. 96) is DENIED AS MOOT.

Further, defendant Mitch Brozik’s

motion to dismiss (ECF No. 88) is DENIED.

17

IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.
DATED:

February 21, 2014

/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18