Security Alarm Financing Enterprises, Inc. v. Parmer et al
Filing
66
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT SECURE US, INC.S 11 MOTION TO DISMISS, GRANTING DEFENDANT BETTY PARMERS 21 MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT,DENYING PLAINTIFFS 20 MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS MOOT AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS 32 MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT. Clerk directed to file amended complaint. Plaintiff directed to serve the amended complaint. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 2/15/13. (cc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
SECURITY ALARM FINANCING
ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 1:12CV88
(STAMP)
BETTY PARMER and
SECURE US, INC.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANT SECURE US, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS,
GRANTING DEFENDANT BETTY PARMER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT,
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS MOOT
AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
I.
Procedural History
Security Alarm Financing Enterprises, Inc. (“SAFE”) filed the
above-styled civil action in this Court against the defendants,
Secure US, Inc. (“Secure US”) and Betty Parmer (“Parmer”).
In its
complaint, SAFE asserts a claim of successor liability as a result
of the sale of Secure US, in addition to seeking a declaration that
SAFE’s judgment lien continues to attach to Secure US’s assets, as
the sale of Secure US was not commercially reasonable.
Defendant
Secure US then filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
The
plaintiff filed a response to defendant Secure US’s motion to
dismiss.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a request for entry of
default as to defendant Parmer, because defendant Parmer failed to
file a responsive pleading to the plaintiff’s complaint.
This
Court then ordered that default be entered against defendant
Parmer.
The plaintiff then requested that this Court enter a
default judgment against defendant Parmer.
Thereafter, defendant
Parmer filed a motion to set aside default.1
The plaintiff then
filed a motion to amend its complaint on wherein it seeks to add
two additional claims and one additional party.
For the following reasons, this Court denies defendant Secure
US’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, grants defendant
Parmer’s motion to set aside default, denies as moot plaintiff’s
motion for default judgment, and grants plaintiff’s motion to
amend.
II.
Facts
This action arises out of the sale of Secure US to defendant
Parmer.
In 2010, a judgment was entered in favor of SAFE against
Secure US in the amount of $1,132,028.42.
This judgment was the
result of counterclaims filed by SAFE in a separate proceeding for
defamation,
tortious
interference,
competition.
Thereafter, SAFE registered a certified copy of the
judgment with this Court.
and
common
law
unfair
At that time, SAFE obtained a lien upon
Secure US’s assets after a writ of fieri facias was issued by this
1
Defendant Parmer entitled this motion and referred to her
request as a motion to set aside default judgment. However, as
this Court had not entered default judgment against defendant
Parmer at the time of this filing, this Court construes defendant
Parmer’s motion as a motion to set aside default.
2
Court.
SAFE then filed a motion for the sale of Secure US’s
customer accounts, which Secure US opposed.
The Milan Puskar
Amended and Restated Revocable Trust (“the Trust”), an entity that
alleged it had superior lien of Secure US’s property in the amount
of $4.4 million, then intervened to oppose the sale as well.
Both
the Trust and Secure US opposed the sale by stating that the sale
amount
would
not
satisfy
the
Trust’s
lien.
United
States
Magistrate Judge James E. Seibert then found that SAFE’s motion for
sale should be granted and this Court agreed, overruling objections
from the Trust and Secure US.
Secure US then requested that SAFE agree to postpone the sale
to pursue additional settlement negotiations.
SAFE and Secure US
filed a proposed agreed order continuing the sale for the purpose
of engaging in settlement discussions.
This Court then issued an
order continuing such sale until May 16, 2012, for the purpose of
working towards a settlement.
SAFE then alleges that Secure US
thereafter refused to continue settlement negotiations.
SAFE
contends that on April 20, 2012, it received a notice in the mail
regarding a secured party sale of Secure US’s assets.
This notice
stated that such sale would take place on May 5, 2012.
SAFE asserts that defendant Parmer bought the Trust’s notes
for $2.5 million.
SAFE further asserts that defendant Parmer is
Mr. Mitch Brozik’s aunt, and has no history in the security alarm
business, which Secure US conducts.
3
Mr. Brozik was the owner of
Secure US until defendant Parmer eventually purchased Secure US.
SAFE contends that it sent a letter objecting to the sale based on
irregularities and unusual terms that would discourage buyers,
which reached the attorney who would be conducting the sale.
SAFE
further contends that the attorney conducting the sale did not
adequately respond to potential buyers, specifically a Mr. Patrick
Egan.
Regarding the sale itself, SAFE asserts that numerous issues
existed.
Specifically, SAFE alleges that potential buyers were
only allowed to walk through the office and look around, and no
inspection of what was contained in the file cabinets was allowed.
Further, SAFE alleges that the potential buyers were denied access
to Secure US’s warehouse, which contained contents that were part
of the auction. SAFE also alleges that instead of defendant Parmer
accepting a $3.6 million cash bid for the assets, defendant Parmer
purchased the assets of the company for $4 million by issuing a
credit bid.
III.
A.
Applicable Law
Motion to Dismiss
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
a defendant to raise the defense of “failure to state a claim upon
4
which
relief
can
be
granted”
as
a
motion
in
response
to
a
plaintiff’s complaint before filing a responsive pleading.2
In assessing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept the factual allegations
contained in the complaint as true.
Advanced Health-Care Servs.,
Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 143 (4th Cir. 1990).
Dismissal is appropriate only if “‘it appears to be a certainty
that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state
of facts which could be proven in support of its claim.’”
Id. at
143-44 (quoting Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir.
1969)); see also Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d
324, 325 (4th Cir. 1989).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) should be granted only in very limited circumstances, as
the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) only mandate “a short and plain statement of a claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
Still, to survive a motion to dismiss, the
complaint must demonstrate the grounds to entitlement to relief
2
Although defendant Secure US states that it is filing a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
it cites West Virginia case law and the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure when stating the law of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Such cases and rules are not applicable to
defendant Secure US’s motion, and as such this Court will not apply
defendant Secure US’s cited case law and rules concerning Rule
12(b)(6) when making its findings.
5
with “more than labels and conclusions . . . factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”
B.
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Motion to Set Aside Default
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) provides:
“The court
may set aside an entry of default for good cause, and it may set
aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
In the present case, a default judgment has not yet been entered,
although the plaintiff did file a motion for default judgment.
Because this Court has not granted the plaintiff’s motion for
default judgment, this Court must evaluate defendant Parmer’s
motion to set aside default under the “good cause” standard of Rule
55(c) rather than the more rigorous standard of Rule 60(b).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
held that “relief from a judgment of default should be granted
where the defaulting party acts with reasonable diligence in
seeking
to
defense.”
set
aside
the
default
and
tenders
a
meritorious
United States v. Morandi, 673 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir.
1982); see also Payne ex rel. Estate of Calzada v. Brake, 439 F.3d
198, 204-05 (4th Cir. 2006) (“When deciding whether to set aside an
entry of default, a district court should consider whether the
moving party has a meritorious defense, whether it acts with
reasonable
promptness,
the
personal
responsibility
of
the
defaulting party, the prejudice to the party, whether there is a
6
history of dilatory action, and the availability of sanctions less
drastic.”).
“Whether a party has taken ‘reasonably prompt’ action
. . . must be gauged in light of the facts and circumstances of
each occasion and the exercise of discretion by the trial judge
will not be disturbed lightly.”
meritorious
defense,
the
Id.
defaulting
In order to establish a
party
need
only
present
evidence which, if believed, would permit either the court or the
jury to find for the defaulting party. Id. (citing Cent. Operating
Co. v. Util. Workers of Am., 491 F.2d 245, 252 n.8 (4th Cir.
1974)).
Justice “demands that a blameless party not be disadvantaged
by the errors or neglect of his attorney which cause a final,
involuntary termination of proceedings.”
Id. at 728.
Further,
Rule 55(c) motions must be “liberally construed in order to provide
relief from the onerous consequences of defaults and default
judgments.”
Lolatchy v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 816 F.2d 951, 954
(4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 130 (4th
Cir. 1969)).
C.
Motion to Amend Complaint
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
15(a)(1)(A)
states,
in
pertinent part, that “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a
matter of course . . . before being served with a responsive
pleading.”
If a party seeks to amend its pleadings in all other
cases, it may only do so “with the opposing party’s written consent
7
or the court’s leave.
justice so requires.”
Rule
15(a)
The court should freely give leave when
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
grants
the
district
court
broad
discretion
concerning motions to amend pleadings, and leave should be granted
absent some reason “such as undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory
motive
on
the
part
of
the
movant,
repeated
failure
to
cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to
the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment or
futility of the amendment.”
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962); see also Ward Elec. Serv. v. First Commercial Bank, 819
F.2d 496, 497 (4th Cir. 1987); Gladhill v. Gen. Motors Corp., 743
F.2d 1049, 1052 (4th Cir. 1984).
IV.
A.
Discussion
Motion to Dismiss
In its motion to dismiss, defendant Secure US argued that the
plaintiff’s complaint illustrated that the sale was commercially
reasonable, and as such the complaint is without merit. In arguing
this, defendant Secure US points to particular paragraphs, wherein
it believes the plaintiff has failed to state a claim concerning
whether the sale of Secure US was commercially unreasonable. It is
unclear whether the defendant addresses Count II of the plaintiff’s
complaint dealing with successor liability.
However, defendant
Secure US does state that “[t]he fact that the secured party is the
Aunt of the principal of [defendant Secure US’s] company and is now
8
conducting a business with theses assets under a new company is of
no legal significance.”
ECF No. 11.
The plaintiff responds by arguing: (1) the motion must be
denied because it failed to file a supporting memorandum of law;
(2) the detailed factual allegations in the complaint support a
finding that the secured party sale was commercially unreasonable;
and (3) the motion to dismiss fails to address the majority of the
factual allegations in the complaint.
plaintiff
in
so
much
as
it
finds
This Court agrees with the
that
the
plaintiff
stated
sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.”
1.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Count I: Declaratory Judgment
In Count I, the plaintiff requests that this Court find that
the sale of Secure US was not conducted in good faith or in a
commercially reasonable manner and therefore defendant Parmer took
Secure US subject to the plaintiff’s lien.
As stated above,
defendant Secure US states that the allegations alleged in the
plaintiff’s complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
Under West Virginia law, “[e]very aspect of a disposition of
collateral, including the method, manner, time, place and other
terms,
must
§ 46-9-610(b).
be
commercially
reasonable.”
W.
Va.
Code
If the disposition is “commercially reasonable, a
secured party may dispose of collateral by public or private
9
proceedings . . . and at any time and place and on any terms.”
Id.
In addition, regardless of the secured party’s actions, if the
transferee at the secured party’s disposition does not act in good
faith, it “takes the collateral subject to . . . any other security
interest or other lien.”
W. Va. Code § 46-9-617.
Because
defendant Parmer is both the secured party who conducted the sale
and the eventual transferee of the collateral of Secure US, she
must have conducted the sale in a commercially reasonable way as
the secured party and acted in good faith as the transferee.
Defendant Secure US takes issue specifically with paragraph 37
and 63 of plaintiff’s complaint.
First, paragraph 37 of the
plaintiff’s complaint states in pertinent part, “Mr. Morgan did not
disclose it was Brozik’s aunt who had purchased the notes from the
Trust and was the new secured creditor.” The plaintiff argues that
because the plaintiff earlier states in paragraph 33 of the
plaintiff’s complaint that it knew defendant Parmer purchased the
notes from the Trust, “the fact that the secured party was not
identified in the initial notice is of no relevance whatsoever as
to whether or not the sale was commercially reasonable or not.”
ECF No. 11.
At paragraph 63 of the plaintiff’s complaint, the
plaintiff states “Parmer and Secure US conducted the sale on a
Saturday
morning,
imposed
unusual
and
restrictive
financial
conditions upon a potential bidder, and refused to allow potential
bidders to inspect or otherwise access the assets being sold.”
10
Defendant Secure US argues that the sale being on a Saturday
actually enhanced the commercial reasonableness of the sale, as it
allowed time for travel and the bidders did not have to take time
off work to attend the sale.
Further, defendant Secure US argued
that the requirement that the buyer pay the sale price in a full
cash payment was not unreasonable, as it was intended to protect
the assets from being purchased by bidders that were unable to pay
the
purchase
price.
Finally,
it
argues
that
the
fact
that
potential bidders were not allowed to inspect or access the goods
being sold at the auction did not deter bidding and was not
commercially unreasonable.
The plaintiff responds by stating that the allegations in the
complaint do support a finding that the secured party sale was
commercially unreasonable.
The plaintiff states that the self-
dealing it alleges between the secured party, defendant Parmer, and
Secure US makes the sale unreasonable.
For this proposition, the
plaintiff cites, Fiber-Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Products of
Easton, Inc., 186 B.R. 603 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
In Fiber-Lite, the
court found that when a sale was orchestrated by the predecessor
corporation’s secured creditor to allow the predecessor corporation
to escape liability for its unsecured debt, the sale was not
commercially reasonable.
In this situation, the plaintiff has
alleged facts that could allow a finder of fact to determine that
defendant Parmer did orchestrate a sale to allow her nephew’s
11
company to escape liability for its unsecured debt.
the
plaintiff’s
allegations
in
its
complaint
Specifically,
concerning
the
relationship between the parties and the terms of the sale may
allow for such a presumption.
The plaintiff further states that secured creditor’s failure
to implement procedures designed to maximize sale proceeds renders
the sale commercially unreasonable, which procedures include the
notice and the pre-sale and sale procedures.
“It has been held
that reasonableness calls for utilization of recognized methods as
they are practiced in the particular trade.”
Am. Jur. Proof of
Facts 2d 1 (originally published in 1975) (citing Liberty Nat’l
Bank & Trust Co. of Okla. City v. Acme Tool Div. of Rucker Co., 540
F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1976)).
As it is unclear at this time what
the recognized practices are, this Court denies defendant Secure
US’s motion to dismiss on this matter to allow for more discovery
because plaintiff’s factual allegations may in fact provide a basis
for relief. Based on the above findings, this Court finds that the
plaintiff has stated sufficient factual allegation to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
Therefore, this Court denies
defendant Secure US’s motion to dismiss Count I.
2.
Count II: Successor Liability
Under West Virginia law, “[a] successor corporation can be
liable for the debts and obligations of a predecessor corporation
if there was an express or implied assumption of liability, if the
12
transaction was fraudulent, or if some element of the transaction
was not made in good faith.”
Syl. pt. 3, Davis v. Celotex Corp.,
420 S.E.2d 557 (W. Va. 1992). Further, a successor corporation may
be liable also if “the successor corporation is a mere continuation
or reincarnation of its predecessor.”
Defendant
Secure
US’s
claim
Id.
that
it
is
of
no
legal
significance that the secured party, defendant Parmer, is the aunt
of the principal of Secure US, Mr. Brozik, and is now conducting a
business with these assets under a new company does not negate a
claim of successor liability. While the fact that defendant Parmer
may be the aunt of Mr. Brozik may or may not be of any legal
significance, this does not mean that the successor corporation,
now
owned
by
defendant
Parmer,
is
reincarnation of its predecessor.
not
a
continuation
or
The plaintiff specifically
states in its complaint that “Brozik is the organizer, manager, and
sole officer of [the new company].
As such, he effectively
controls all of the very same assets that he formerly controlled as
the President of Secure US.”
Further, the plaintiff states that
the new company “is managing and operating the very same security
alarm business that Secure US formerly operated.”
The plaintiff,
therefore,
company
seems
to
be
claiming
that
the
reincarnation or continuation of Secure US.
new
is
a
Taking these alleged
facts as true, this Court finds that the plaintiff has alleged
“enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”
13
under Count II.
Further, this Court notes that it need not decide
whether plaintiff’s motion to dismiss was deficient based on the
Local Rules of the Northern District of West Virginia as, even if
it was not, this Court still finds that the motion fails on the
merits.
B.
Motion to Set Aside Default
In defendant Parmer’s motion to set aside default, she argues
that she had difficulty obtaining an attorney due to various
jurisdictional and conflict of interest problems.
Further, she
argues that she received the summons after business hours on
Friday, May 25, 2012, and was therefore unable to obtain an
attorney until Monday, May 28, 2012.
Further, she stated that she
thought she had 30 days to answer the plaintiff’s complaint.3
plaintiff
responds
by
stating
defendant
Parmer’s
The
responsive
pleading was due on June 22, 2013, as it effectuated personal
service on June 1, 2012.
Therefore, it states that regardless of
what date defendant Parmer received the summons, her responsive
pleading was at least due by June 22, 2012, five days before this
Court entered an entry of default.
Further, the plaintiff states
that defendant Parmer failed to allege good cause for setting aside
the default. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the defendant
3
Defendant Parmer’s answer was filed June 27, 2012.
17.
14
ECF No.
did not take reasonably prompt action to set aside default or
establish a meritorious defense to the plaintiff’s complaint.
In deciding whether good cause exists to set aside the entry
of default against defendant Parmer, this Court considers the
factors set forth above in Morandi and Payne.
First, this Court
finds that the defendant Parmer has taken “reasonably prompt
action” in seeking to set aside the entry of default.
This Court
entered the order directing the clerk to enter default against
defendant Parmer on June 27, 2012.
ECF No. 14.
Defendant Parmer
then filed an answer to the plaintiff’s complaint on that same day.
ECF No. 15. Thereafter, on July, 5, 2012, defendant filed a motion
to set aside default.
ECF No. 21.
This Court finds that such a
length of delay of only eight days between this Court entering the
order concerning default and defendant Parmer then requesting that
such default be set aside is reasonable.
While it is better
practice to enter both a responsive pleading and a motion to set
aside default as soon as possible after the entry of default,4 this
Court does not find that such immediate action is necessary.
Further, this Court finds that while no particular defense is
provided by defendant Parmer in her motion to set aside default,
the record in this case does establish such a possible defense.
4
Panhandle Cleaning & Restoration, Inc. v. Vannest, No.
5:11CV178, 2012 WL 1354572 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 18, 2012) (finding
that the defendant acted promptly by filing both the answer and
motion to set aside default on the same day plaintiff requested
entry of default).
15
See Burton v. TJX Companies, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-760, 2008 WL 1944033
at *3 (E.D. Va. May 1, 2008) (taking into account the record of the
case when defendant failed to address all of the factors involved
in
determining
whether
to
set
aside
an
entry
of
default).
Specifically, defendant Parmer’s answer provides such claimed
defenses.
See Kristensen ex rel. Kristensen v. Spotnitz, No.
3:09cv00084, 2010 WL 8753554 at *2 (W.D. Va. July 30, 2010)
(finding that allegations in a defendant’s answer asserting various
defenses
was
sufficient
to
establish
a
meritorious
defense).
Defendant Parmer asserts, among other defenses, the statute of
limitations, waiver, estoppel, and unclean hands.
Finally,
as
to
whether
or
not
the
plaintiff
would
be
prejudiced by this Court setting aside the entry of default, this
Court finds that such prejudice would be slight. Because defendant
Parmer filed the motion to vacate the entry of default eight days
after default was entered, it is unlikely that the plaintiff could
have taken any action during that time that would result in
prejudice should this Court vacate the entry of default.
refusing
to
set
aside
the
entry
of
default
would
However,
prejudice
defendant Parmer by preventing her from presenting her defenses to
the plaintiff’s claims.
Therefore, this Court finds that good
cause exists to set aside the entry of default against defendant
Parmer.
16
C.
Motion to Amend Complaint
The plaintiff seeks to amend its complaint by adding an
additional party, Mr. Mitch Brozik, and two additional counts.
As
explained above, Mitch Brozik was allegedly the owner of defendant
Secure US prior to defendant Parmer purchasing the company and the
plaintiff contends that defendant Parmer is Mr. Brozik’s aunt. The
first count alleges that Mr. Brozik and defendant Secure US
participated in a fraud against the plaintiff by fraudulently
conveying the misrepresentation that Secure US wanted to engage in
settlement
negotiations
after
a
judgment
was
entered
in
the
plaintiff’s favor in a different proceeding and a sale of Secure
US’s customer accounts was ordered. The plaintiff alleges it would
not have agreed to a continuation of the sale had it not been for
defendant Secure US’s promise to engage in negotiations.
The
second count that the plaintiff wishes to include is a count for
conspiracy to commit fraud.
In this count, the plaintiff alleges
that defendant Parmer and defendant Secure US conspired with Mr.
Brozik to help commit a fraud by having defendant Parmer act as a
straw buyer by purchasing the Trust’s notes and conducting a
secured party sale thereafter; thus, conspiring to deprive the
plaintiff of its judgment lienholder rights.
The defendants did not respond to the plaintiff’s motion.
This is plaintiff’s first request to amend.
It does not appear to
this Court that granting the plaintiff leave to amend would
17
prejudice the defendants, nor that the amendments sought are futile
or brought in bad faith.
Further, as the motion was filed on
October 18, 2012, it was timely, as the scheduling order in this
case allows for amended pleadings to filed until October 19, 2012.
Thus, the plaintiff’s motion to amend is granted as unopposed.
V.
Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, defendant Secure US, Inc.’s
motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11) is DENIED, defendant Betty Parmer’s
motion to set aside default (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED, plaintiff’s
motion for default judgment as moot (ECF No. 20) is DENIED,
plaintiff’s motion to amend its complaint (ECF No. 32) is GRANTED,
and the clerk is DIRECTED to file the amended complaint, which is
attached as Exhibit A to plaintiff’s memorandum in support of its
motion for leave to file its first amended complaint, ECF No. 33.
Further, the plaintiff is DIRECTED to serve the amended complaint
on the defendants.
The parties served with the amended complaint
shall make any defenses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12 and any counterclaims or crossclaims pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 13.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.
18
DATED:
February 15, 2013
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
19
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