Old Republic National Title Insurance Company v. Warner et al
Filing
28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 24 Motion for Recusal. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 5/31/13. (jss)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
OLD REPUBLIC NATIONAL TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
//
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12CV91
(Judge Keeley)
KRISTIAN E. WARNER, ANDREW M.
WARNER, and MONROE P. WARNER,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR RECUSAL [DKT. NO. 24]
Pending before the Court is the defendants’ “Motion to [sic]
Recusal of Judge” (dkt. no. 24). For the reasons that follow, the
Court DENIES the motion.
I.
The instant case has a long and storied history before the
Court. For the purposes of the instant motion, however, only a
broad summary of the relevant background is necessary.
On December 13, 2006, the plaintiff, Old Republic National
Title Insurance Company (“Old Republic”), and the defendants,
Kristian
E.
Warner,
Andrew
M.
Warner,
and
Monroe
P.
Warner
(collectively “the defendants”), entered into a written contract
by which Old Republic agreed to issue a title insurance policy in
exchange for the defendants’ promise to indemnify it for any loss
or damage - including attorneys’ fees and expenses - resulting from
OLD REPUBLIC NATIONAL TITLE INS, CO. v. WARNER, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR RECUSAL [DKT. NO. 24]
its
issuance
of
that
policy.
Subsequently,
Old
Republic
was
embroiled in several lawsuits related to the title insurance.
On April 29, 2010, Old Republic filed its first civil action
against the defendants in this Court, Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins.
Co. v. Warner et al, Civil Action No. 1:10-CV-00071 (N.D. W. Va.
April 29, 2010), asserting claims for declaratory judgment, breach
of contract, and unjust enrichment. The parties consented to the
jurisdiction of the magistrate judge, and on July 11, 2011, United
State Magistrate Judge John S. Kaull granted summary judgment to
Old Republic on the liability issues raised in its complaint,
leaving for a jury determination only the issue of the reasonable
amount of attorneys’ fees to be paid. Id. at (Dkt. No. 51). On
September 22, 2011, in light of the fact that the underlying suits
concerning the title insurance were still pending, the parties
stipulated to a dismissal of Civil Action No. 1:10-CV-00071 under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), and agreed that “[t]he damages
issue, . . . the sole issue remaining in this case, will be
dismissed without prejudice.” Id. at (Dkt. No. 99). The defendants
timely appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed Magistrate Judge Kaull’s summary judgment
order. Id. at (Dkt. Nos. 101, 102, 103).
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Old Republic filed the instant action on May 29, 2012, seeking
a judgment against the defendants for the cost of settling the
underlying lawsuits, as well as its attorneys’ fees and expenses.
(Dkt. No. 3). The Court conducted a scheduling conference on August
9, 2012, at which time it granted Old Republic’s motion to dismiss
the defendants’ counterclaims (dkt. no. 9)1 and confirmed that the
sole issue in this case is the appropriate amount of Old Republic’s
damages.
Old Republic filed a motion for summary judgment on February
8, 2013, arguing that the amount of attorneys’ fees and expenses it
incurred in the underlying lawsuits is reasonable. (Dkt. No. 23).
In support of its motion, Old Republic attached the report of its
expert, Robert M. Steptoe, Jr. (“Mr. Steptoe”), who was disclosed
to the defendants on October 5, 2012. (Dkt. No. 18). Mr. Steptoe
opines that the plaintiff’s requested fees “fall within the range
of reasonableness for the type and location of the litigation
involved.” (Dkt. No. 23-2).
Three days after Old Republic filed its motion for summary
judgment, on February 11, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to
recuse the undersigned from this case. (Dkt. No. 24). Although the
1
The Court notes that its oral order was recorded on the docket on
March 27, 2013. (Dkt. No. 27).
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parties completed their summary judgment briefing subsequent the
recusal motion, Old Republic filed no response to the defendants’
arguments for the undersigned’s disqualification. The matter is,
accordingly, ripe for the Court’s review.
II.
The defendants have moved for the undersigned’s recusal under
28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The Court considers
each in turn.
A.
The defendants argue that the undersigned must recuse herself
under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) because “Old Republic is offering the
testimony of [her] former law partner Robert M. Steptoe, Jr. as a
material witness . . . on the issue of the reasonableness of
attorney
[sic]
defendants,
fees.”
“recusal
(Dkt.
is
No.
24
mandated”
at
by
1).
the
According
statute
in
to
the
these
circumstances. Id. The Court disagrees.
1.
As a threshold matter, the Court finds that the defendants’
motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2), premised as it is
upon Mr. Steptoe’s role as a witnesses in this case, is untimely.
“[T]imeliness
is
a
requirement
4
when
recusal
is
sought
under
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DENYING MOTION FOR RECUSAL [DKT. NO. 24]
§ 455(b) in the Fourth Circuit.” E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v.
Kolon Indus., Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d 843, 857 (E.D. Va. 2012)
(citing United States v. Owens, 902 F.2d 1154, 1155 (4th Cir.
1990)); see also Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City
Vision, 650 F.3d 423, 432 (4th Cir. 2011) (timeliness is “an
essential
element
of
a
recusal
motion”
(citation
omitted)).
Allowing tardily filed recusal motions would permit a party “to
gather evidence of a judge’s possible bias and then wait and see if
the proceedings went his way before using the information to seek
recusal.” Sine v. Local No. 992 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 882 F.2d
913,
916
(4th
Cir.
1989).
As
such,
in
order
to
“prevent
inefficiency and delay, motions to recuse must be filed at the
first opportunity after discovery of the facts tending to prove
disqualification.” United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 339 (4th
Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
Here, Old Republic disclosed to the defendants that Mr.
Steptoe would be serving as an expert witness on October 5, 2012.
(Dkt. No. 18). Nevertheless, the defendants waited for over four
months, until after the Court denied their motion for an extension
of time to locate their own expert (dkt. no. 22),
and after Old
Republic had filed its summary judgment motion (dkt. no. 23), to
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file the pending motion to recuse. (Dkt. No. 24). This is “both too
little and too late.” Kolon Industries, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d at
856. The defendants’ motion thus fails on this ground alone.
Newport News, 650 F.3d at 432-33 (lack of timeliness alone ground
to deny motion to recuse); see, e.g., id. at 432–33 (three months
after knowledge too long); United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331,
1339 (7th Cir. 1993) (two months after knowledge too long); United
States v. Durrani, 835 F.2d 410, 427 (2d Cir. 1987) (four months
after knowledge too long);
at 851
Kolon Industries, Inc., 847 F.Supp.2d
(sixteen months after knowledge too long).
2.
Although
the
Court
need
not
address
the
merits
of
the
defendants’ argument in light of the motion’s untimeliness, it will
do so in the interest of finality.
28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) provides that a judge must recuse
herself from presiding over a case
[w]here in private practice [s]he served as a lawyer in
the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom [s]he
previously practiced law served during such association
as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such
lawyer has been a material witness concerning it [the
matter in controversy].
28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (emphasis added). Section 455(b)(2), in other
words, mandates recusal in three situations: (1) where the judge
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has previously served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy;
(2) where the judge’s former law partner, during the judge’s tenure
with
the
firm,
served
as
a
lawyer
concerning
the
matter
in
controversy; or (3) where either the judge or “such lawyer” has
been a material witnesses concerning the matter in controversy. Id.
The defendants’ argument for recusal under § 455(b)(2), which
consists of exactly two sentences, makes no mention of either the
undersigned or Mr. Steptoe’s prior involvement with the “matter in
controversy.” Rather, the defendants appear to assume that recusal
is necessary solely because (1) the undersigned worked with Mr.
Steptoe at Steptoe & Johnson PLLC between 1980 and 1992; and (2)
Old Republic has retained Mr. Steptoe to serve as an expert witness
in this case. Although the defendants have not elaborated on their
reasoning, the Court assumes by virtue of their conclusion that
they advocate for a broad interpretation of “such attorney [who]
has been a material witness” in the third clause of § 455(b)(2) –
i.e., that this phrase refers to any attorney, without restriction,
with whom the judge formerly practiced, and triggers recusal
whenever a judge’s former associate is a material witness in a
pending case. Such an interpretation, however, is untenable.
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There is a dearth of authority specifically interpreting the
final clause of § 455(b)(2). See, e.g., Blue Cross, Blue Shield
R.I. v. Delta Dental, 248 F. Supp. 2d 39, 43 (D.R.I. 2003) (noting
the “scant case law interpreting § 455(b)(2)”). Most courts - and
most litigants, for that matter – appear to simply assume that some
degree of temporal overlap between the judge’s association with the
attorney in question and that attorney’s involvement with the
matter in controversy, as either witness or counsel, is a necessary
element under all three prongs of § 455(b)(2). Cf. Rahman v.
Johanns, 501 F. Supp. 2d 8, 14 n.4 (D.D.C. 2007) (“Even under th[e]
associational standard [of § 455(b)(2)], the matter must have been
under
consideration
by
the
firm
while
the
judge
was
still
associated with the firm.”). Indeed, the Court was able to locate
only one case that directly addressed the meaning of the final
clause of § 455(b)(2), and that judge specifically held that some
sort of “transactional connection” between his former associate’s
proffered testimony and the “work [the former associate] performed
before [the judge’s] departure” from the firm was required to
mandate recusal under this subsection. United States ex rel.
Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc., No. 06–1381–PHX–NVW,
2008 WL 169636, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 16, 2008).
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The defendants, for their part, have provided no authority in
support of their expansive view of the statute - that a judge is
required to automatically disqualify herself every time a former
colleague, no matter how attenuated the relationship, is tapped to
serve as a witness in a pending case. The three case citations the
defendants did provide - without explanation or analysis - fail to
examine
the
final
clause
of
§
455(b)(2)
and
are
factually
distinguishable from the matter before the Court.2 In the absence
of binding interpretive authority, then, the Court turns to the
language of the statute itself.
2
See United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 285 (4th Cir. 1998)
(analyzing the scope of the “matter in controversy” where party
seeking recusal argued, inter alia, that “two lawyers at [the
judge’s] former firm provided representation concerning the ‘matter
in controversy’ . . . during the time [the judge] worked at the
firm.”); Kolon Industries, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (recusal
sought on the grounds that “two of the presiding judge’s former law
partners represented [the plaintiff] in [a related case] and
because the presiding judge was a partner at [the firm] when those
partners represented [the plaintiff] in that case”); Blue Cross,
Blue Shield R.I., 248 F. Supp. 2d at 46 (analyzing the scope of the
“matter in controversy” and ultimately reaching a conclusion that
contradicts Fourth Circuit precedent). The Court further notes that
it has also carefully considered In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196 (4th
Cir. 1976), which did examine the scope of § 455(b)(2). That
decision, too, did not directly address the final clause of the
statute, and involved allegations - which almost invariably appear
motions made pursuant to § 455(b)(2) - that a judge’s former
associate was engaged in certain conduct “before the judge withdrew
from the firm.” Id. at 1198 (emphasis added).
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DENYING MOTION FOR RECUSAL [DKT. NO. 24]
When interpreting a statute, it is well-established that any
analysis must begin with the plain meaning of the statute itself.
Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 651–52 (4th Cir. 2000). In the third
subsection
of
adjective
that
§
455(b)(2),
modifies
the
the
word
word
“such”
“lawyer.”
is
a
qualifying
The
dictionary
definition of “such” is, essentially, “aforementioned.” See, e.g.,
Black’s Law Dictionary 1473 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “such” as
“[t]hat or those; having just been mentioned”); see also BP America
Production Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006) (“Unless otherwise
defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance
with their ordinary meaning.”). The phrase “such lawyer,” then, “is
clearly intended to apply to a class of attorneys referred to in
the previous clause.” United States ex rel. Cafasso, 2008 WL
169636, at *2. The scope of the preceding clause limits “lawyer” to
those attorneys “with whom [the judge] previously practiced law”
and those who, “during such association,” served “as a lawyer
concerning the matter [in controversy].” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2).
Congress’ use of the present perfect verb tense - “has been a
material witness” - is also significant. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2)
(emphasis added); Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 130 S. Ct.
2229, 2236 (2010) (“[W]e have frequently looked to Congress’ choice
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of verb tense to ascertain a statute’s temporal reach.”). “The
present perfect tense ‘refers to (1) a time in the indefinite past
. . ., or (2) a past action that comes up to and touches the
present.’” Dobrova v. Holder, 607 F.3d 297, 301 (2d Cir. 2010)
(citing Chicago Manual of Style ¶ 5.119 (15th ed. 2003)); see also
Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 216 (1976) (finding that
the use of the present perfect tense in 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) - “has
been shipped in interstate commence” - denotes “an act that has
been completed” (emphasis added)). That past, in the context of
this statute, can only mean the time period when the judge was
associated with her former colleague.
The Court does recognize that 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) is not a
model of linguistic clarity. See Faulkner v. Nat. Geographic Soc’y,
296 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding it “not entirely
clear”
when
recusal
is
triggered
under
the
final
clause
of
§ 455(b)(2)). Nevertheless, even assuming that the operative scope
of § 455(b)(2) is ambiguous and in need of further construction,
the legislative history of the statute contradicts the defendants’
position. See generally Yi v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d
526,
533
(4th
Cir.
2005)
(resort
to
legislative
history
appropriate when “the language of the statute is unclear”).
11
is
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DENYING MOTION FOR RECUSAL [DKT. NO. 24]
The House Judiciary Committee Report states that the purpose
of the relevant amendment to § 455 was to make “the statutory
grounds for disqualification of a judge in a particular case
conform generally with the recently adopted canon of the Code of
Judicial Conduct[,]” a reference to Canon 3C of the 1972 version of
the
Code
of
Judicial
Conduct
adopted
by
the
American
Bar
Association. H.R. Rep. No. 93–1453, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6351. To this end, Congress copied the language of former Canon
3C(1)(b) - verbatim - when it created 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2). Id. at
6353. With respect to Canon 3C, the American Bar Association
Reporter’s Notes to the Code of Judicial Conduct state:
The Committee was of the opinion that [a judge] should also
disqualify himself in a proceeding if a lawyer with whom he
previously practiced law [1] was a witness or served as a
lawyer [2] concerning the same matter [3] during such
association.
E. Wayne Thode, Reporter’s Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct 63
(1973) (emphasis added).
This interpretation, particularly when viewed in the context
of the statute as a whole, makes sense. As one court has observed,
“every other ground for disqualification under § 455(b)(2) is
dependant on a transactional connection to services performed while
a judge practiced law. Nothing in the statute suggests that the
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DENYING MOTION FOR RECUSAL [DKT. NO. 24]
last clause should be interpreted differently.” United States ex
rel. Cafasso, 2008 WL 169636, at *3. Indeed, the appropriate scope
of § 455(b)(2) is brought into sharp relief when one compares the
subsection of the statute requiring automatic disqualification when
a judge “[i]s . . . likely to be a material witness,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(5)(iv) (emphasis added), framed in the present tense, with
the pertinent language requiring disqualification when “the judge
or such attorney has been a material witness,” framed in the
present perfect tense. Id. § 455(b)(2) (emphasis added). The
defendants’
proposed
construction
would
wipe
this
temporal
distinction from the statute and render the quoted portion of
§ 455(b)(5)(iv) superfluous.
For all these reasons, the Court concludes that 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(2) does not mandate recusal unless the judge’s former
colleague served as a witness in the matter in controversy during
the judge’s tenure with the firm, or the judge’s former colleague
plans to testify in a current case concerning information he
learned during the judge’s tenure with the firm. As neither of
these circumstances is present in the instant case, § 455(b)(2)
does not require the undersigned’s recusal.
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B.
Having found no basis for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2),
the Court turns to the defendants’ argument that the undersigned is
disqualified under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
1.
Recusal is necessary under § 455(a) if a person with knowledge
of
the
relevant
facts
might
reasonably
question
a
judge’s
impartiality. United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 530 (4th Cir.
2008).
In
reasonable
other
words,
factual
“[d]isqualification
basis
exists
for
is
doubting
required
the
if
a
judge’s
impartiality. The inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have
a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality, not
whether the judge is in fact impartial.” In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818,
827 (4th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Allegations of bias or
prejudice must, as a general rule, stem from “‘a source outside the
judicial proceeding at hand’ in order to disqualify a judge.” Belue
v. Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 545 (1994)).
The Fourth Circuit has recognized that overly cautious recusal
would improperly allow litigants to exercise a “negative veto” over
the assignment of judges simply by hinting at impropriety. United
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States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir. 1998). Recusal
decisions
thus
“reflect
not
only
the
need
to
secure
public
confidence through proceedings that appear impartial, but also the
need
to
prevent
parties
from
too
easily
obtaining
the
disqualification of a judge, thereby potentially manipulating the
system for strategic reasons, perhaps to obtain a judge more to
their liking.” Belue, 640 F.3d at 574 (quoting In re United States,
441 F.3d 44, 67 (1st Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, “[a] judge has as
strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse
as he does to recuse when the law and facts require.” Nichols v.
Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
2.
The defendants’ arguments under this subsection can be roughly
organized into three categories: (1) the undersigned’s former
association with the defendants’ attorney; (2) the undersigned’s
rulings in this and other cases in which the defendants’ attorney
is or was involved; and (3) the undersigned’s interactions with the
defendants’ attorney. Inasmuch as the defendants’ arguments cover
a broad swath of events that are months - and sometimes years - in
the past, the Court will simply note that these arguments, too, are
untimely raised and fail on that ground alone. Newport News, 650
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F.3d at 432-33. Nevertheless, in the interest of finality, the
Court will address the defendants’ motion on its merits.
i.
Former Association with Counsel for Defendants
The defendants’ attorney claims, without evidentiary support,
that “it is no secret” that the undersigned, while serving as a
partner at Steptoe & Johnson PLLC in the late 1980s, “actively
participated in the termination of [his] employment” from that
firm. (Dkt. No. 24 at 2). This allegation has no basis in fact. A
judge need not recuse herself because of “unsupported, irrational,
or highly tenuous speculation,” DeTemple, 162 F.3d at 287 (quoting
In re United States, 666 F.2d at 694), and the undersigned will not
do so here. This argument does not support disqualification.
ii.
Prior Rulings
The defendants’ attorney also contends that the undersigned
“has shown its bias” against him by, in his words, “consistently
ruling against him and dismissing all of his civil cases.” (Dkt.
No.
24
at
memorandum
2).
In
support,
to
challenging
counsel
the
devotes
merits
of
the
bulk
several
of
of
his
the
undersigned’s prior decisions in this and other cases. “[J]udicial
rulings alone,” however, “almost never constitute a valid basis for
a
bias
or
partiality
motion.”
16
Liteky,
510
U.S.
at
555.
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Consequently, although counsel may believe he has “ample grounds
for appeal” of the undersigned’s rulings, his “[d]issatisfaction
with [the Court’s] views on the merits of a case” does not further
his argument for recusal. Belue, 640 F.3d at 575 (citing Liteky,
510
U.S.
at
555).
Having
carefully
reviewed
the
allegations
contained in the defendants’ memorandum, the Court is satisfied
that a reasonable, well-informed observer, looking at all the facts
and circumstances involved in this and prior proceedings, including
the rulings made by the Court, would not question the undersigned’s
impartiality.
As
such,
this
argument
provides
no
basis
for
that
the
disqualification.
iii. Interactions with Counsel
The
defendants’
attorney
further
complains
undersigned has (1) chastised him for “violating the rules”; (2)
“humiliated” him by ordering him to cite authority “in open court”;
and (3) remarked that a case in which he served as plaintiffs’
counsel was “frivolous.” (Dkt. No. 24 at 3). While the Court
certainly understands why such interactions may cause counsel some
angst, these incidents do not rise to a level that would require
recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
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A
judge’s
“expressions
of
impatience,
dissatisfaction,
annoyance, and even anger” are generally insufficient to support a
recusal motion. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555–56. In other words, “[a]
judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — even a stern
and
short-tempered
judge’s
ordinary
efforts
at
courtroom
administration — remain immune.” Belue, 640 F.3d at 574 (quoting
Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555–56); see also LoCascio v. United States,
473 F.3d 493, 495–96 (2d Cir. 2007).
As eloquently stated by the
Fourth Circuit:
This is not to say judicial distemper is somehow
admirable. It is not. But the alternative of purging
through recusal motions all those with strong or strongly
stated beliefs not only threatens limitless gamesmanship
but the fearless administration of justice itself.
Belue, 640 F.3d at 574.
Here,
the
incidents
of
which
the
defendants’
attorney
complains are simply insufficient to provide a reasonable basis for
believing
that
the
Court’s
“impartiality
might
reasonably
be
questioned,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), or that the Court “has a personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of
disputed
evidentiary
facts
concerning
the
proceeding.”
Id.
§ 455(b)(1). It is well-established that “judicial remarks during
the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even
18
OLD REPUBLIC NATIONAL TITLE INS, CO. v. WARNER, ET AL.
1:12CV91
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR RECUSAL [DKT. NO. 24]
hostile
to,
counsel,
the
parties,
or
their
cases”
will
not
ordinarily support a bias or partiality challenge, Liteky, 510 U.S.
at 555, and appellate courts have regularly found disqualification
unwarranted in cases involving judicial remarks that are far more
onerous than those identified here. See, e.g., In re Cooper, 821
F.2d 833, 843–44 (1st Cir. 1987) (concluding that recusal was not
necessary where judge told one of the litigants that he “has no
credibility”
and
“may
be
a
fit
candidate
for
a
perjury
indictment”). This argument, too, provides no basis for recusal.
iv.
Relationship with Witness
Finally,
undersigned’s
although
the
relationship
defendants
with
the
did
not
address
the
plaintiff’s
witness,
Mr.
Steptoe, in the context of § 455(a), the Court notes that it is
satisfied
no
relationship
exists
that
would
require
disqualification. See United States v. Cole, 293 F.3d 153, 164 (4th
Cir. 2002) (recusal necessary only where a judge’s relationship
with a witness would cause a neutral third party to reasonably
question her impartiality). Over twenty years have passed since the
undersigned last worked with Mr. Steptoe, and although the two
remain acquainted and occasionally attend the same social events,
the relationship is sufficiently attenuated such that a third party
19
OLD REPUBLIC NATIONAL TITLE INS, CO. v. WARNER, ET AL.
1:12CV91
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR RECUSAL [DKT. NO. 24]
with knowledge of all the facts would not reasonably question the
undersigned’s
impartiality.
See
generally
Alberts
v.
Wheeling
Jesuit University, No. 5:09cv109, 2010 WL 1928255, at *3 (N.D. W.
Va. May 10, 2010) (“Friends, former associates, and even foes of
judges appear before them routinely. The circumstances surrounding
such appearances vary widely. But such associations certainly do
not automatically require a judge to disqualify himself.” (quoting
Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co., LLC, v. AT & T Corp., 353 F.Supp.2d
1160, 1181 (D. Utah 2005)).
III.
The defendants’ motion to recuse, at bottom, is premised
almost entirely upon disagreement with the rulings of this Court.
The undersigned will not, however, “encourage strategic moves by a
disgruntled party to remove a judge whose rulings [he] dislikes.”
Belue, 640 F.3d at 574 (quoting In re United States, 441 F.3d 44,
67 (1st Cir. 2006)). Having carefully considered the defendants’
arguments, the Court finds that there is no basis for recusal in
this case and therefore DENIES the defendants’ motion. (Dkt. No.
24).
It is so ORDERED.
20
OLD REPUBLIC NATIONAL TITLE INS, CO. v. WARNER, ET AL.
1:12CV91
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR RECUSAL [DKT. NO. 24]
The Court directs the Clerk to transmit copies of this Order
to counsel of record.
DATED: May 31, 2013.
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
21
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