Moore et al v. Equitrans, L.P.
Filing
103
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS 93 MOTION TO STAY,GRANTING AS FRAMED DEFENDANTS 95 MOTION TO SCHEDULE STATUS AND SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND SCHEDULING STATUS AND SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON BOND AMOUNT. The judgment of t his Court is therefore STAYED. Scheduling Conference, Status Conference and Bond hearing set for 5/18/2015 11:15 AM in Wheeling District Judge Courtroom, South before Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp Jr. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 5/6/2015. (Copy counsel of record)(jmm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
JEFFREY J. MOORE and
SANDRA J. MOORE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil Action No. 1:12CV123
(STAMP)
EQUITRANS, L.P.,
a Pennsylvania limited
partnership,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STAY,
GRANTING AS FRAMED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SCHEDULE
STATUS AND SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND
SCHEDULING STATUS AND SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
AND HEARING ON BOND AMOUNT
I.
Procedural History
The plaintiffs, Jeffrey J. Moore and Sandra J. Moore (“the
Moores”), initially brought this action in the Circuit Court of
Marion County, West Virginia, against the defendant, Equitrans,
L.P. (“Equitrans”). The defendant subsequently removed this action
to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. This case was tried
by jury and the jury, by its verdict, found in favor of the
plaintiffs, specifically that the defendant either committed a
trespass upon the plaintiffs’ property or breached its contract
with the plaintiffs.
This verdict led the defendant to file a motion to stay
execution and motion for status and scheduling conference.
motions
are
now
fully
briefed.
Further,
both
parties
Those
have
submitted their version of proposed judgments and the parties have
made objections thereto.
Prior to entering this order, this Court
has entered a separate judgment.
II.
Facts
At trial, the plaintiffs alleged that predecessors of the
defendant and the plaintiffs entered into a valid right-of-way
agreement to place a 16-inch pipeline (what the parties call the
“H-557 pipeline”) on the plaintiffs’ property.
However, the
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant breached that contract and
trespassed by constructing approximately 700 feet of pipeline off
of the designated route in the right-of-way agreement.
The jury
found that the defendant had either breached the right-of-way
agreement or trespassed. By way of relief, the plaintiffs now seek
an ejectment order for the removal of the pipeline from their
property.
The defendant is now seeking a stay so that it has the
opportunity to file a condemnation action relating to the subject
property pursuant to the Natural Gas Act.
seq.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 717 et seq.
Natural Gas Act, §§ 1 et
The defendant argues that all of
the elements required to condemn are met as (1) the defendant is a
holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity, (2)
the
defendant
now
needs
to
acquire
an
easement
right-of-way
agreement to maintain the pipeline (given the jury’s verdict), and
(3) the defendant has been unable to acquire the right-of-way
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agreement as the plaintiffs’ current monetary demand for the
property is unreasonable.
The defendant thus argues that the
plaintiffs’ claim for ejectment will be mooted by a finding in the
defendant’s condemnation action and a stay should be granted.
Further, the defendant argues that a stay will avoid irreparable
injury to the defendant and the public at large.
Finally, the
defendant indicates that it believes that ejectment is not an
appropriate
remedy
but
that
the
Court
need
not
make
such
a
determination at this time.
In its separate motion for a status and scheduling conference,
the defendant seeks a conference for the purpose of issuing an
order staying the execution of judgment and to address any other
issues regarding the stay.
In response, the plaintiffs argue that the defendant’s motion
to stay is premature because (1) a judgment requiring ejectment has
not been entered and (2) the defendant has not posted or proposed
security.
Further, the plaintiffs assert that the defendant has
failed to carry its burden of proving that a stay is required.
First, the plaintiffs contend that the defendant cannot show
it would be successful in a condemnation action because (1) the
defendant already has an express right-of-way agreement; (2) the
defendant’s wrongful conduct, failing to negotiate a right-of-way
agreement
with
the
plaintiffs
and/or
initiate
condemnation
proceedings before relocating the pipeline, defeats the defendant’s
3
current claim of condemnation; and (3) the condemnation would
violate the plaintiffs’ due process rights.
Next, the plaintiffs
assert that there is no evidence of irreparable harm to the
defendant
that
justifies
a
stay
which
is
evidenced
by
the
defendant’s previous repairs done in 1996 that did not lead to
significant service interruptions. Further, the plaintiffs contend
that public policy favors following the law rather than trespassing
and ejectment would not detrimentally affect service. Finally, the
plaintiffs argue that a stay would unfairly harm the plaintiffs
given
the
time
and
expense
that
has
already
been
expended
litigating this case.
As to the motion for a status and scheduling conference, the
plaintiffs argue that a conference is unnecessary as it presumes
that the Court will deny the motion to stay.
In its reply, the defendant asserts that the motion to stay is
not premature as the jury found a breach of contract or trespass.
Thus, the defendant argues that this Court may still consider the
fact that monetary damages would provide the plaintiffs with
complete relief and avoid the significant costs associated with
ejectment. Further, the defendant asserts that a stay at this time
is more efficient because a successful condemnation action would
require
the
plaintiffs
to
forego
any
ejectment
request.
Additionally, the defendant contends that ejectment at this point
would cause significant monetary losses and costs to the defendant
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whereas the plaintiffs cannot show any unfair prejudice if the stay
is granted. The defendant supports this contention by arguing that
the portions of the pipeline that the plaintiffs are seeking to
eject have been there since 1996, are buried underground, and do
not
obstruct
or
interfere
with
the
plaintiffs’
day-to-day
activities.
For the reasons that follow, this Court finds that a judgement
as framed should be entered, the defendant’s motion to stay should
be granted, and that the defendant’s motion for a status and
scheduling conference should be granted as framed.
III.
Applicable Law
It is well settled law that federal district courts possess
the ability to, under their discretion, stay proceedings before
them when the interests of equity so require.
Williford v.
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 715 F.2d 124, 125 (4th Cir. 1983).
While no such power has been expressly promulgated by statute or by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is inherent within the
courts’ “general equity powers and in the efficient management of
their dockets to grant relief.”
unfettered.
Id.
Still, this power is not
A party seeking a stay must sustain the heavy burden
of justifying it by showing that clear and convincing circumstances
support a stay. Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55
(1936).
Further, the Court must weigh the equities when deciding
whether to grant a stay, and must also consider the interests of
5
judicial economy and the desire for “the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases.”
See Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,
630 (1962).
IV.
A.
Discussion
Applicability of Rule 62(b)
The plaintiffs argue that the defendant’s motion is premature
as a judgment has not been entered.
This Court, prior to entering
this order, has entered a judgment.
As such, this argument is
without merit.
The plaintiffs also assert that because the defendant has not
posted or proposed security under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
62(b), that its motion to stay should be denied.
Rule 62(b)(2) states the following:
On appropriate terms for the opposing party’s security,
the court may stay the execution of a judgment--or any
proceedings to enforce it--pending disposition of [a
motion]. . . under Rule 52(b), to amend the findings or
for additional findings . . . .
Further, “Rule 62 taken in its entirety, indicates a policy against
any unsecured stay of execution after the expiration of the time
for filing a motion for a new trial.”
Int’l Wood Processors v.
Power Dry, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 212, 214 (D. S.C. 1984) (citing
Marcelletti & Sons Construction Co. v. Millcreek Township Sewer
Authority, 313 F. Supp. 920, 928 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Van Huss v.
Landsberg, 262 F. Supp. 867, 870 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
Otherwise, “the
burden is on [the] defendant[ ] to demonstrate affirmatively that
6
posting a bond or providing adequate security is impossible or
impractical.”
Id. (citations omitted).
This Court finds that a bond must be posted if a stay is
granted and before any stay can take effect. This Court also finds
that the defendant’s motion may still be granted despite the fact
that the defendant has not posted a bond or provided adequate
security.
To the contrary, this Court finds that because the
defendant has not demonstrated that posting a bond or providing
security would be impossible or impractical, the defendant has
conceded that a bond must be posted.
Moreover,
this
Court
finds
that
it
must
construe
the
defendant’s motion to stay as a dual motion for a stay and a motion
pursuant to Rule 52(b), to amend findings or for additional
findings.
The defendant requests in its motion that additional
findings be made regarding condemnation.
Absent the plaintiff’s
arguments above as to prematurity, both parties agree that Rule
62(b) should apply and, accordingly, this Court finds that it does
apply.
This Court must therefore determine what an appropriate
bond amount would be in this case if it determines that a stay
should be granted within this Court’s discretion.
B.
Interests of the Parties
The plaintiffs assert that the four-part test from Long v.
Robinson, 432 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1970), is applicable in this case.
However, that test is applicable when a party is seeking a stay of
7
the execution of a judgment while the case is being appealed.
at 979.
Id.
The defendant is not seeking such a stay and is not, at
this time, appealing the judgment.
Rather, the defendant is
seeking a stay of the execution of a judgment while further
proceedings and findings are made regarding the outcome of the jury
trial, namely to allow the defendant to initiate an appropriate
condemnation action regarding the subject property.
Thus, the
four-part test set out in Robinson is not applicable to this case.
Rather, this Court must consider and weigh the interests of the
parties and the interest of judicial economy. Williford, 715 F.2d
at 125.
The defendant argues that it now meets the three requirements
for condemnation under the Natural Gas Act: (1) it is a holder of
a certificate of public convenience and necessity (the defendant
provided proof through its exhibits); (2) it needs to acquire an
easement, right-of-way, land, or other property necessary to the
operation of its pipeline system; and (3) it has been unable to
acquire those interest from the owner.1
This Court previously held
1
Title 15, United States Code, Section 717f(h), “Right of
eminent domain for construction of pipelines, etc.” states as
follows:
When any holder of a certificate of public convenience
and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to
agree with the owner of property to the compensation to
be paid for, the necessary right-of-way to construct,
operate, and maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for the
transportation of natural gas, and the necessary land or
other property, in addition to right-of-way, for the
8
that this issue would not arise until the defendant was found to
have trespassed and/or breached the right-of-way agreement, as only
then the defendant would no longer have an agreement with the
plaintiffs and thus would qualify for condemnation under the
Natural Gas Act.
ECF No. 55.
Given the judgment, this Court has
now entered, this Court finds that its previous finding in its
order denying the parties’ motions for summary judgments now
applies.
This Court further made such a finding in light of the
United States District Court for the District of Kansas’s findings
in Humphries v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1282
(D. Kan. 1999), which the plaintiffs raise in their attempt to
block the motion to stay.
In considering that case, this Court
still found that “the defendant would be unable to use § 717f(h) at
this time, but would rather only be able to raise condemnation if
this Court found that the defendant trespassed, and the only relief
location of compressor stations, pressure apparatus, or
other stations or equipment necessary to the proper
operation of such pipe line or pipe lines, it may acquire
the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain
in the district court of the United States for the
district in which such property may be located, or in the
State courts. The practice and procedure in any action
or proceeding for that purpose in the district court of
the United States shall conform as nearly as may be with
the practice and procedure in similar action or
proceeding in the courts of the State where the property
is situated: Provided, That the United States district
courts shall only have jurisdiction of cases when the
amount claimed by the owner of the property to be
condemned exceeds $3,000.
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).
9
available
property.”
was
to
eject
the
ECF No. 55 at 35.
defendant
from
the
plaintiffs’
Thus, the defendant has an interest
in pursuing condemnation proceedings given the judgment that has
been entered.
Moreover, this Court has an interest in staying the judgment
pending a finding regarding condemnation.
This Court would be
required to consider further questions regarding ejectment and
would have to determine whether ejectment was a proper remedy
versus monetary damages.
Ejectment has been held to be a proper
equitable remedy where it is possible that the plaintiff could
recover a money judgment, but that he would not be afforded
complete relief by such a recovery.
71 S.E.2d 65, 70 (W. Va. 1952).
Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co.,
This finding was not made by the
jury nor has such a finding been made by this Court.
Thus, this
Court would be required to consider such an issue whereas a
condemnation proceeding may dispose of such an issue.
Further, the plaintiffs have not provided any reason why
ejectment is the best remedy in this action.
The plaintiffs only
recently learned that the pipeline had been misplaced and had been
living with the pipeline in its current location since 1996. Thus,
this Court cannot find that the plaintiffs’ interest in the remedy
of
ejectment
outweighs
the
other
interests
cited
Accordingly, this Court finds that a stay must be granted.
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above.
C.
Motion for a Status and Scheduling Conference
The defendant has also requested a status and scheduling
conference regarding its motion to stay.
This Court finds that it
would be beneficial to hold a hearing regarding the bond amount and
the defendant’s plans regarding condemnation proceedings. As such,
the defendant’s motion for a status and scheduling conference will
be granted as framed.
V.
Conclusion
Based on the analysis above, the defendant’s motion to stay is
GRANTED. The judgment of this Court is therefore STAYED. Further,
the
defendant’s
motion
to
schedule
a
status
and
scheduling
conference is GRANTED AS FRAMED.
The parties are further DIRECTED to appear by counsel for a
status and scheduling conference and hearing on bond amount on May
18, 2015 at 11:15 a.m. in the chambers of Judge Frederick P. Stamp,
Jr.,
Federal
Building,
Virginia 26003.
1125
Chapline
Street,
Wheeling,
West
The parties are DIRECTED to meet and confer prior
to this hearing to discuss a proper bond amount and the defendant’s
plans regarding condemnation proceedings.
The stay will not take
effect until a suitable bond has been given by the defendant.
Further, the Court will permit those out-of-town attorneys
having their offices further than forty (40) miles from the
Wheeling point of holding court to participate in the conference by
telephone.
However, any such attorney shall advise the Court as
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soon as possible prior to the conference of his or her intention to
participate by telephone and shall (1) inform all counsel of his or
her appearance by telephone; (2) confer with other out-of-town
attorneys to determine if they wish to appear by telephone; (3)
advise the Court of the name of the attorney who will initiate the
conference call and all such attorneys appearing by telephone; and
(4) initiate a timely conference telephone call with such attorneys
to
the
Court
conference.
at
304/233-1120
at
the
time
of
the
scheduled
If the attorneys cannot reach agreement as to the
initiator of the call, the Court will make that determination.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.
DATED:
May 6, 2015
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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